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INTRODUCTION 
Modernisation has been a ge.al in China for more than a 
century. The late Qing Court, the Nationalist Government and the 
Communist leadership had all tried to launch China onto the road 
to modernisation. It has been a goal shared by all Chinese 
leaders but questic.ns cc.ncerning t~,e strategy, the s cope, the 
timetable and practical implementation caused mud, debafe, even 
till these days. 
The sweeping economic changes in China in the name of 
model'" ni sa t iCln since Mao's death had sparked off lots of 
controversies among China watchers as regards to China's future 
direction and its impact on the international scene. China's 
embark~ent upon a path of modernisation based on increasing 
dependence on foreign trade, fe;reign investments and financing 
was greeted initially with enthusiasm by many countries, 
particularly Japan and the advanced industrialised countries of 
the West, partly because c.f the potential that the China market 
presented. 
However, China's smaller ASEAN neighbours in South-east Asia 
le.oked at China's modernisation with some ambivalence. China, by 
virtue of its physical size, huge population, geQgraphical 
location, its cultural and historical influence and its communist 
ideology and rhetorics expounded since the formation Qf the 
Pee.ple's Republic of China in 1'349, has over the years resulted 
in some uneasiness and apprehension amongst her southe .... n 
neighbours. 
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It is in the light c.f these inteyesting devel':'pments in 
China foY the last ten yeays (1978-88) that this thesis is 
wyitten. The Thesis is essentially a discussion of China's 
modernisatic'n effoyts f.:.r the past decade and the impact these 
had on her ASEAN neighbours. 
Based primarily on library research and secondary sources, a 
histoYical backgy.::>und of China's long expeyience with 
modernisation is given in the first chapter. The immediate 
reasons behind the change to the present model c.f development 
adopted not 10ngafteY Mao's death aye also e xployed. Chapter Two 
then goes on to describe the various new policies adopted by the 
Chinese leadership in order to achieve the goals of modeynisation 
that they have set. 
The impact of China's modernising efforts on ASEAN's 
security is discussed in Chapter Three. Chinese influence .:.n 
ASEAN's security is examined with regayds to four main ayeas: 
China's relations with ethel' superpololers in the Southeast Asia 
region, its policies towaYds the ASEAN communist parties and the 
oveyseas Chinese and China's claims ovey the Spratly Islands in 
the South China Sea. 
The economic impact of China's modernisation on the ASEAN 
countries is dealt with in Chapter Four. As the costs and 
benefits of China'S modernisation is unevenly spread amongst the 
ASEAN cQuntYies, the e .valtlation is done in the perspective c.f 
individual ASEAN countries. 
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Chapter Five summarises the impact of China's modernisation 
in the last decade, 1978 to 1988, on the ASEAN countries. It 
attempts to determine if indeed a modernising China had .been a 
stabilising influence in the Southeast Asian region, contributing 
to the ,:,verall secl.lrity of ASEAN. It also answers the questions 
if efforts at economic modernisation in China has helped to 
e xplain any changes in China's policies towards the ASEAN 
cc.mmunist parties and the overseas Chinese communities in t~,e 
ASEAN countries. 
iii 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE MODERNISATION OF CHINA : A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
During the mid-nineteenth century, China under the Ding 
Dynasty .... as at the start of its dynastic decline. The Manchu 
Imperial Government had to reckon .... ith gro .... ing economic pr o blems 
such as the scarcity of arable land due to rapid population 
gro .... th. With ;,0 development of large-scale trade and industries, 
the surplus labour could not be absorbed. The number of landless 
peasants s .... elled, leading to .... idespread hardship and poverty and 
thus increasing discontent. Other problems such as the .... eakening 
of ,the Manchu 
CC'I"'Y"t.tptic,n and 
dissension. 
bureaucratic and 
natural disasters all 
military systems, 
added to produce 
rampant 
internal 
Externally, the Ding Gc.vernment had to contend .... ith the 
challenges th~t arOse from its increasing contacts .... ith the 
foreign po .... ers. The changes in the international environment, the 
rise of imperialism and the impact of c'apitalism had a 
significant impact e.n China's image of itself as the Middle 
Kingdom of the .... orld. These factors also laid the foundations for 
change and the future development of China. 
Large-scale internal unrest, ,such as the Taiping rebellion 
and the challenges posed by the Western po .... ers, especially after 
the military defeats in the hands of the British during the Opium 
War (1939-42) and the Arro .... War (1845-60), stirred the Ding Court 
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to an effort at averting further humiliations and reversing the 
dynastic decline (Rinn-Sup Shinn, 1'381: 16-20). T ..... c. majc.r efforts 
undertaken by some scholar-officials of the Qing Court to 
strengthen the Dynasty and achieve seome form of meodernisation 
..... ere the Self-strengthening Movement (1861-18'35) and the 18'38 
Reform Movement. 
Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895) 
After the signing of the peace settlement ..... ith Britain and 
France in 1860 foll.: ...... ing the Arrc ...... War, the Qing Court ..... as able 
to concentrate its effort (and even mustered the help ,:01 the 
British) in suppressing the Taiping rebellion. Relative peace and 
corder ..... as achieved after the successful crushing of the Taiping 
rebellion in 1864, and t~,e Qing CO'-Irt ..... as able to fo ..... ge a 
momentary reprieve. This ..... as coupled by reform efforts in the 
military and diplomatic arenas and also some form of early 
industrialisation. The main thinking behind the Sel f-
Strengthening Movement ..... as to use foreign technology to control 
lithe barbarians " . 
The bulk of the Self-Strengthening projects ..... ere promoted by 
provincial authorities such as Zeng Kuofan (Tseng Kuo-fan), Zuo 
Zc.ngtang (Tso Tsung-tang) and Li He.ngzhang (Li Hung-chang). The 
main sponseor of such modernisation efforts in the Central 
Government ..... as Prince Gong (Kung). 
The Self-Strengthening Movement eon the ..... hole comprised only 
superficial attempts at modernisation. The scope of activity ..... as 
.y" 
~. 
limited to firearms, ships, machines, mining and light 
industries. Western arms, arsenals and steamships were built; 
modern communicatic,ns began with the introduction of telegraph 
a nd railroad lines and the building of new harbours. L~estern 
technical works were translated but no attempts were really made 
at achieving better understanding .:)f the Western political and 
sociCleconomic institutions, aY"ts and culture. The belief in the 
superiority of the Chinese political system and Chinese culture 
was never questioned. The advocates of the Self-strengthening 
Movement only promoted those projects (especially in the military 
and defence-industri complex) aimed at increasing military power 
to resist foreign aggression and to suppress domestic unrest, and 
more importantly, to fortify their own positions of power (Rinn-
Sup Shinn, 1981:20-21l. 
The limited natclre of the modernisation programme, co::.upled 
with various o::.tr,er problems contributed to the futility .:.f tr,e 
Movement. Examples include the lack of coordination amongst those 
who, support the modernisation and reform, shortage of cap'ital and 
the social and psychological inertia within the society in 
general and the gentr,y (the ruling class) in particular 
FuY"thel"ffloY"e, conservative opposition to model'"nisation abounded. 
This was the main obstacle to the reform efforts. Chinese defeats 
in the French War in 1885, followed by another defeat at the 
hands of the Japanese in 18'35, pointed to the inadequacy of the 
limited modernisation that was pursued during this peri.:.d ( Hsu, 
1975:356). 
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The Hundred Day Reforms (1898) 
The defeat by Hie Japanese in 1895 (which r-esulted in the 
annexation of Kor-ea by Japan) signalled the impending demise of 
the Qing Dynasty and ushered in a per-iod of aceeler-ated for-eign 
imperialism and the scr-amble for concessions, for instance, the 
German's lease of ~~iaochow, the Russian's appropriation of 
Liaotung peninsula, the French lease of Kwangchow, the British's 
hold on HongKong, and so forth. 
The cl .• tting of China into yarious foreign enclaves 
threatened the partition of the Qing empire. The frightful 
pr-ospect of such dismemberment precipitated a reform movement in 
C~,ina in 18'38. The need for a more extensive reform than those 
taken during the Self-strengthening Movement was recognized by 
scholars, officials and even the Emperor and the Empress Dowager-, 
although they differed on the question of the nature and scope of 
During this period policy differences intertwined with power 
struggle between the Emperor and the Empress Dowager, adding an 
important dimension to the conflict between the conservative 
reformers and the more progressive reformers. 
The important advocates of conservative ref':'rms were Weng 
Tongho (Weng Tung-ho), 
(Chang Chih-tung). These conservative reformers advocated saving 
China by reviving Confucianism as the moral basis of state and 
adopting Western devices for practical use. The thinking behind 
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'was reflected in Zhang's "ti-yong" thee,ry (Chinese learning for 
the foundation (ti) and Western learning for application (yong). 
However, the radical reformers led by Kang Youwei (Kang Yu-
wei) and his student Liang Qichao (Liang Chi-chao), wanted a 
more fundamental change in the political institutions and 
administrative strictness and procedures by adopting Western 
methods and principles. 
The Emperor supported the more radical reforms suggested by 
Kang and Liang. On the other hand, the Empress Dowager was 
initially not opposed to efforts at modernisation so long as the 
basic Chinese traditions and institutions were preserved. But 
when the reform programmes suggested by Kang (such as the 
propc,sal to replace the eight-legged essay in the Civil Service 
Examinations by essays on cuyyent affairs; abolition of some 
c,ffices deemed as unnecessary by the reformers, for e,,:ample, the 
Office of Transmission, the Banqueting Court, the Court of State 
Ceremonial, the Imperial Stud, the Court of Sacrificial Worship; 
appointment clf ' more pYogY"essi Yes in gover-nment and so fo'( t h) 
began to threaten some of the bases of Chinese institutions and 
traditions, and mc,re importantly her power base, she began to 
withdraw her support for the whole modernisation movement. 
Suspecting the Emperor of trying to use the reforms to wrest her 
authority and oust her out of power, she intervened by staging a 
.. 
palace coup and put the Emperor under house arrest. 
As the reform movement began to take the form of a ' powel' 
strtJggle between the Emperor and the Dc,wager, it was doomed to 
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failure, as power had always been vested in the hands of the 
Empress Dowager. There was also considerable OPposition from high 
.o;:,fficials, both in the Central ;'1nd Provincial administrations. 
The Hundred Day Reform advocated by Kang thus ended with the 
e:t.ecution of si,,; of its pl"incipal advc'cates and the flight of 
Kang and Liang (Hsu, 1'375:433-467). 
The 1911 Revolution 
With the deepening crisis and the failures of both reform 
efforts initiated by some Qing e,fficials, many Chinese began to 
see outr-ight revolution as the only solution tel end internal 
~iscord and foreign influence. The Republican Revolution was 
another attempt to bring China into the modern age to meet the 
challenges posed by the internal disintegration of the old order 
and the external imperialist West. 
The establishment of a Republic in China after the 
successful Wuchang Revolution on 10 October 1911 was an epochal 
event in Chinese history. It bOI.'ght an end to more than 2,000 
years of imperial dynasties. However, the Revolution was an 
incomplete one. It did not result in a unified China. Neither did 
it succeed in stopping further foreign encroachment into China's 
territorial integrity (Wang, 1977:1). 
The subsequent Nationalist GovEirnment (1927-45) ~tnder Jiang 
Jieshi (C~liang Kai -shek) struggled to carry Sun 
Zhongshan's (Sun Vat -sen) legacy of natie.nal l"ec,;)nstruction to 
bUild a modern China. Although some progress in the fields ,:,f 
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finance, communications, ~ndustrial developments and educati.~n 
was aci'".ieved, the much-needed basic sc,cioeconomic r-efonns we,e 
neglected. Thus, on balance, the Nationalist G.:,v ernment was not 
entirely successful in propelling China the route 
advancement. 
The Rise of Communist China 
The Nationalist Goveynment's ineffective attempt at 
moder-nisation was the major reason for its downfall. The crisis 
in China at the macro socio.political level deepened, especially 
during the period of the Sino-Japanese war from 1937-45. However, 
it was also during this period that the influence of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) began to grow rapidly. 
The success of the CCP in bringing the whole of China under 
its control by 1949 was indeed a remarkable achievement. With the 
formal establishment of the People's Republic (,f China (PRC) on 
1st October 1949, a sense c,f euphoria swept across the whole 
country, as it marked the end of more than a century of 
humilia.tion. 
After the e,-,p~le'ria, like previous governments, the Chinese 
Ce,mmllnist leadership had to face the realities of tackling the 
vast problems that existed in ·the .society. Attentic)f1 was turned 
towards reconstruction and the attainment of modernisation in all 
fields, an overridl"ing concern of Chinese leadership for a whole 
centltry. 
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From 1949-57 China pursued the goal of modernisation based 
,:,n the Soviet model, that is, basically an industrialisation 
programme with great emphasis in the heavy industries. Ths 
regime's primary goals in the initial reconstruction period 
(1'349-52) were l-elatively modest, namely, to restore pre-l'349 
peak levels of production in both agriculture and industry, 
establishing state control over the economy and carrying out land 
I"'efoym in the countryside in preparatic,n for later 
collectivisation. 
Having achieved its initial gc'als, the Chinese government 
then embarked upon its First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), a more 
ambitious programme of rapid development. Following the Soviet's 
model, priority was given to industry over agriculture and to 
heavy industries over light industries. Beijing looked to Moscow 
for both advice and aid. 
The basic objective during the First Five-Vear Plan <TVP) 
was to maximise the rate of growth through high investments and 
low consumption. Though egalitarian social values were not 
ignored, the requirements e,f econe,mic growth were given higher 
priority; The regime attempted to institute a highly centralised 
system of economic planning. It focused on the bureaucratic 
management the eccJ.nomy by experts and pY'ofessic,na 1 s. 
Industrial management policies were modelled on Soviet practices 
which stressed the key role of highly qualified enterprise 
management (Barnett, 1974: 121-123). 
Though an overall impressive growth rate of an average of 71 
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a year was achieved during the First Five-Year Plan (estimate by 
Joint Economic Ce'mmittee, US Congress, 1'368) several problems 
remained unresolved. F,:,r instance, because of the emphasis on 
capital-intensive heavy industries, there was of 
absor-bing the 5u'fplu5 1 aboul'". Excessive investment, gene'fal 
economic overexpansion, over-emphasis on production and quantity, 
all created bottlenecks and caused financial difficulties. 
Agricultural output lagged seriously behind the people's growing 
needs. New problems due to increased urbanisation also emerged. 
Besides the practical econe,mic problems, Mao also began to 
worry about many of the socio-political conseqlJences that arose 
from this development strategy. For example, he was disturb.d by 
the increasing influence and power of China's huge economic 
bureaucracy. With increased bureaucratisation, specialisation and 
prcofessional ism, regime's commitment to egalitarian 
revolutic'nary goals (in Mae,'s eyes) weakened. The masses were 
also slowly._ being alienated, as the gap between the rulers and 
the ruled widened (Barnett, 1974:123). 
Partly because of the strength of China's own heritage, 
particularly the tradition of authoritarianism and the special 
status of the intellectuals in the society, and partly because of 
the policies adopted dtlring the First Five-Year Plan, Mao felt 
strongly that China was still far from the ideals of a Communist 
SOCiety as defined by him. These were manifested in many aspects 
of the society. Fe'r instance, in industry, the structure was 
still characteristic capitalist with each 
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enter-pr-ise containing its own manager-iaI, technic4,1 ~:\nd tr- a de 
union hierarchy. Based on managerial authority and a high degree 
of specialisation, heavy emphasis was p~t on individual material 
incentives and codified regulations and procedures. To handle the 
tasks of econc,mic constr-uction, the bur-ealICl'"4'CY was incl"easing, 
helping to perpetuate the traditional class of pattern of worker, 
professional (specialist) and manager. Many institutions in China 
were still organised in such a manner as to isolate the 
intellectuals from the '",orkers and peasants (Collier, 1973:22-
36) • 
In the villages, the process of collectivisation was carried 
out rather slowly. There were state farms where the employees 
received wages, as in industry, but these accollnted for only a 
small par-t of the agricultural population. The land reform had 
created a class of well-to-do peasants, and some enriched 
the~selves further by money-lending activities. On the other 
hand, the majc,rity of peasants, lacking technical know-ho'", and 
s~fficient means of production, were still subjected to poverty. 
Mao was thus also worr-ied that the tendencies towards 
polarisation, if not checked, would create further problems 
(Chang, 1975:11-12). 
Mao became increasingly concerned with the reduced emphasis 
on r-ev..:-lutionaYy values and he w':-Yy-ied about, the erosion of his 
power. Thus he began to impose his vision as the effective means 
fe,r achieving modernisation. The Maoist vision of the spiritual 
transformation of the people and the society - the subjugation of 
personal needs for the collective good and the participation of 
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everyone in this transformation, was not only applied to achieve 
mc,del"'nisati()n, but was became an end in itself (Schwar-tz, 
1965:175-179). The Great Leap Forward and the Commune movement of 
1'357-59 marked the high tide of the application of the Maoist 
visictn tel the tasks of model""nisation. This new developmental 
strategy was designed bc,th te, accelerate growth and to promote 
Mao's l""evolutional""Y political and social values. 
The Great Leap appl""oach centred on a newly created 
socioeconomic and political system in the countryside: the 
. formation of communes. They were designed to maximise the 
mobilisation of local labour and either resotjrces to encourage 
local self-reliance and self-sufficiency. Planning and economic 
management were decentralised from the top down· to the local 
authorities. The importance of technical experts, specialists and 
professionals was de-emphasized. Instead, the power of party's 
generalists at the provincial levels increased substantially. 
Ideological and pc,litical incentives emphasized over 
material incentives. Consumption was also reduced in order te' 
increase savings and investments. 
Though innovative, the idealistic goals of the Great Leap 
Movement coupled with the natural disasters during the 1959-61 
period interacted to produce massive economic problems. There 
were breakdowns of central planning, shortages of raw material 
because of wastage, overproduction of poor-quality goods and 
serious food s~lortages due tc' pc,c,r harvests (Barnett, 1974: 124-· 
126). 
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Agricultural production \<las adversely affected by deficient 
\<later conservation pr':'jects and faulty de-alkalinisation of the 
so! 1.. I ntensi ve use of rna chineyy .wi th,:,ut prQper mal ntenance in 
order to keep up \<lith the high production quotas resulted in the 
rapid deterioration and damage to the tools (Chou, 1964:851-858). 
Grain output declined from 200 million metric tons in 1958 to 165 
million tons in 1959 and to 160 million tons in 1960. The general 
agricultul"'al prcrduction indeY;, taking 1957 as 100, dY"I:'pped from 
108 in 1958 to 86 in 1959 and 83 in 1960. The industrial 
. production inde,/", hO\<lever, fared slightly bett.er: it r,:;,se tc' 131 
in 1958 and 166 in 1959, but then fell to 161-3 in 1960 and 107-
110 in 1961 (Joint Economic Cc'mmittee, US Congress., 1'372:5). The 
industrial indices, however, \<Iere misleading. Though production 
went lip as a whole, the indigenQus production methods and ~mall-
scale industries en,:,rmc"Jsly \<lasted ra\<l materials and operating 
costs \<Iere high \<Ihile they yielded l'~\<1 quality prodtlcts. For 
instance, the steel turned out by the backyard blast furnace 
could not meet indllstrial requirements, and more disheartening 
was that many . of these makeshift furnaces dissolved in 
rainstorms. 
On the \<Ihole, the resul ts of the Great Leap and the Commune 
Movement were discouraging and there \<las gr~at discontent among, 
the people (Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, 1975:5). The 
Gross National Pre,duct (GNP) dropped from US$95 billie,n in 1958 
to US$92 billie,n in 1'359, te, US$89 billion in 1960 and US$72 
. billion in 1961. 
'T'>: 
<~:'~; ," 
.. ~, 
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Faced with this situation, the Chinese leaders had no choice 
but to retract from the Great Leap pre'grammes. The retreat was 
carried out under the supervision of Liu Shaoqi and Deng 
Xiaoping. The retreat started from 1960 and mark~d a return to a 
more sober estimate of modernisation but no longer .:In an 
e>;clusively Soviet model as pursued during the First Five-Year 
Plan. The immediate strategy inv,,",lved cc'mpr':'mises between · the 
policies of the First Five-Year Plan and those of the Great Leap. 
The approach was essentially pragmatic and focused mc.re on the 
basic problem of survival . 
. Early in the process of retreat from the Leap, the regime 
t ·ook major steps to restore incentives in both agriculture and 
industyy. The Commune idea was temporarily set aside, and local 
responsibility for both production and distribution were 
decentyalised to the pyoduction teams. Functional specialists and 
e>;perts came te. the foyefyont once again, and renewed attention 
was given to efficiency and technical impyovements. Pyofitability 
was used to measuye an enterprise's performance and market foyces 
weye allowed to play a gyeatey part than befoye. Egalitarian 
consideyations weye given less importance, as emphasis was place~ 
on material incentives to SPUy production efforts. 
The highest prioYity was given to agriculture to sol ve the 
grain shortage. To encourage higher agYicultural growth, not only 
were private plots re-established and free markets re-opened, but 
modern industrial inputs into agYicultuYe (such as chemical 
feytilisers) were steadily incyeased. The diyectives for 
agriculture again made the production team, iNstead of the 
'. --- . 13 
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production brigade, the basic lmit for agriculto.lral production. 
Individual incentives tied to workpoints were emphasized. During 
this period, a further set of four polici~s was applied 
throllghout the country. Known as the "Three Freedoms and One 
Responsibility" (San zi yi baa): they were the freedom to 
increase the size of private plots for individ'Jal families to 
cultivate; freedom to develop small enterprises with sole 
responsibility fc.r p..-ofit and 10::'55; and freedom to develop an 
open ma..-ket. The one ..-esponsibility was to fix output quotas 
based on the household (Howa..-d, 1977:288-9). 
Although sc.me fo..-m of collective wo..-k WilS maintained, such 
as the development of water control, increased mechanisation and 
supply of artificial fe..-tilise..-s, in general the san zi yi bao 
system stimulated the growth of p~ivate ente..-prises and weakened 
the collective spirit of the peasants. 
In the industrial sector, the Seventy Clauses of the 
Di..-ective for industries which emphasized the autho..-ity and 
responsibility of management and the technical authority of the 
professionals and experts. It severely tightened labour 
discipline, emphaSizing on rules, regUlations and material 
rewards. Piece rate systems and bonuses were used to inc..-ease 
p..-oductivity (Collier, 1973:51-2). 
The ..-eadjustment policies seemed to wo..-k, and by 1965 China 
had recovered from the post-Leap crisis. However, the emphasis on 
economics over politics was not universally accepted, fo..- it 
comp..-omised the kind of ..-evolutionary values (constant class 
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struggle, active participation by the masses, and so forth) t ha t 
Mao wanted to sustain and enhance. 
As the process of economic recovery too~~ place during 1962-
65, so did the polarisation within the leadership. The issue over 
the right path to modernisation and to what e xtent the Communist 
values should be comp .... omised surfaced a.gain and culminated .in a 
p,:,wer struggle between two factions in the top leadership : the 
Maoist faction which believed in the basic correctness of the 
Great Leap policies, and the Liu faction comprising Liu, Deng and 
.other party apparatchiks who wanted to save the economy following 
the failures of the Great Leap. 
As the conflict widened, a dichotomy between political and 
ece,nomic policies emerged. In the field of politics, Mao pushed 
steadily from 1962 on for radicalisatie,n. He,wever, in the field 
of economics the regime's bureauc .... atic leaders, planners and . 
administrators continued to support the rela~ively pragmatic non-
revolutionary approach. This dichotomy contributed greatly to the 
growing tensions that set the stage for the Cultural Revolution. 
<, 
A parallel could be · drawn here between the conflict within 
the Communist leadership and that of China's late nineteenth 
century Qing leaders. At both points of time, the leaders were 
committed to the goals of modernisation. The tervent wish to ma ke 
China stro:'ng again was widespread. However, the dilemma was over 
how much c,f the traditional Chinese values ( in the case of the 
CCP - Comml.tnist vallJes) sh'::.uld be compromised. 
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China's nineteenth century moderate (conservative) reformers 
led by Weng Tongho and Zhang Zhidong and tacitly supported ~y the 
Empress Dowager approached modernisation on the assumption that 
while it was necessary to borr.:.w utilitarian practical learning 
from the West, it wa. important to preserve the essential values 
embodied in C·:,nfucianism (the "ti-yo:,ng" theory e>'pounded by 
Zhang). Their goal was to obtain the results of the modern 
scientific and technical yevolution without accepting the 
intellectual, cultural and social underpinnings of modernisation. 
He,wever, the o:,ther group of ref.:.rmers led by Kang Youwei and 
Liang Qichao supported by the Emperor, proposed more far-reaching 
changes wi th .:)u t which they believed mc-dernisation cannot 
succeed. The conflict between these two groups of reformers was 
not only over the concrete policies but e~"tended to becc.me a 
pow.er struggle between the Emperor and the Empress D.:.wager. 
Similarly, not long after the establishment of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC), the Communist Party leaders differed on 
their views as to how to achieve modernisation. Mao wanted 
China's scientific and technical modernisation to proceed without 
compromising the essential ideological and social values which he 
deemed necessary to maintain the revolutionary fe .... vour in 
society. Mao s.::.ught to avoid many of the consequences of 
in other [ountl""ies, such as large-scale mc,der nisa t ion 
urbanisation, mushr':)oming bureaucracies and specialisation 
leading to elitism. He was even willing to:, slow the process of 
modernisation in order to avoid such undesirable consequences. Ori 
.the other hand, another group of leaders, led by Liu Sha.:.qi was 
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more inclined to accept such trends as inevitable in the process 
of modernisation. Basically the latter believed in first building 
up a strong ecc'nomic base before changing the consciousness of 
the people (Barnett, 1'374: 1'3-20). 
To this day, the controversy over the path to modernisation 
persists. Even with the Open-De'or Policy over the last decade, 
differences over the speed, scope and extent of this policy 
remained. One might therefore see the modernisation programme for 
the last decade from 1'378 to 1'388 as a temporary triumph of one 
group of leaders in pushing ahead with their strategy of 
achieving modernisation. He,wever, the immediate reasons leading 
to the victory of Deng Xiaoping and his supporters in . the power 
struggle and in pushing ahead with their reforms resulted from 
the particular legacy of the Cultural Revolution. 
1.2: THE IMPETUS FOR CHANGE 
Ideole'gy, personality and the instruments of governing set 
much of the tone of the .first years c,f the PRC. However, policy 
issues and the need to ma~e hard choites about how to modernise 
China intensified the divisions within the leadership. Throughout 
the long period of struggling for power in the 1'330s and 19405, 
it had been possible to submerge personal differences. 
Furthermc,re, a lot needed to be done in the initial years of 
reconstruction to keep everybody busy. However, in time to come, 
substantive policy problems became increaSingly troublesome 
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especially when they merged with power struggles within the top 
leadership. Ultimately, all these problems plunged t~re leaders 
into open cQnflict (Pye, 1'384:256). 
Differences Qver policies, the strategies and tactics 
develc.ped into conflicts; and the conflicts become identified 
with personalities and were overlaid with bids f.:.r pC.\.Ier (Dutt, 
19io:1-2). Mao's struggle beoth tQ re-establish his personal pO\.ler 
(demanding absQlute and unquestioned obedience fY'om his 
associates and fQllowers) and to shift the overall cc,urse China 
was 10110\.ling eventually led to the Cultural . Revolution. 
By launching the Cultural Revolution Mao sought to loosen 
the strengthened grip of the bureaucracy over society. Relying 
primarily on mass mobilisation and mass campaigns to keep society 
in constant turmQil (in Maoist terms - continuous class struggle) 
Mao deliberately sought mechanisms to prevent a bureaucratic 
domination in China. the revolutionary effort to 
transform Chinese · society lett behind. a troubled economy and a 
social crisis follo\.led by a loss ,:,t popular confidence in the 
ruling Communist Party and its ideology. The Cultural Revolution 
seriously undermined the legitimacy of the Communist leadership, 
and the ideological and pO\.ler struggles undermined the unity of 
the party. Communist ideology degenerated into slogans teo suppeort 
factions in the struggle and it ceased to legitimise the regime 
CStavis, 1988:18). 
The origins of the Cultural Revolution could be traced back 
t,::> the days c'.f the Great Leap For\.lard. The Great Leap. For\.lard 
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marked the great divide in the history of the Communist China. It 
raised disagreements within the top leadership to the point oJ 
bitter conflicts. It was also at this time that the Sine,-Soviet 
rift widened and the Soviets began to withdraw all their 
technicians and all forms e,f aid from China. The country ..... a s in 
serious economic dislocation. There was also a sense of weariness 
and bitterness on the part of the people, who Jelt that they had 
received too little for so much hard work during the Great Leap 
(Sch ..... artz, · 1969: 115). 
The failure of the Great Leap p r e'grammes gave the party 
apparatchiks led by Liu Shaoqi enough ammunition to question the 
precipitous course o;;,f development charted by Mao. Mao had no 
choice but to retreat into second line leadership, while Liu and 
Oeng advanced into the first line. Although retaining his 
pc,sition as the Chairman of the Party's Central Committee, Mac' 
was replaced by Liu as tt,e Chairman ,:,f the People's Republic. 
Oeng Xiaoping was appointed Secretary General of the Party in 
charge of the Secretariat. 
With their newly elevated pe,sitions, Liu and Deng began t ,:> 
push for a more institutional and economically rational approach 
tc' ..... ards development. Faced ..... ith massive econe,mic problems, they 
decided on a crash programme of aid to agriculture and a polic y 
of liberalisati,:,n, relying on material incentives to induce the 
people towards greater productivity. 
Unhappy over the strategy ade'pted by Liu, O·eng and their 
supporters and angry that he was being pushed inte' the second-
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line leadership, Mao attempted to recover control o ver the party 
and the country by launching the Cultlll'al Revoluti,:,n. He wanted 
teo establish the Sllpl'emacy e,f his authol'ity and his appl'oach 
towal'ds social pl'ogress by revitalising and politicising the 
masses. Thus the majol' issues ,::)f the Clll tural Rev,=,lo.ltion wel'e the 
undel'lying conflicts between the two factions over the fOl'ms and 
speed of tl'ansfol'ming China. 
(1) Issue over Modernisation strategy 
Chinese leaders shal'ed a common faith on the bl'oad goals of 
mCldel'nisa t ion. Di ffel'ences concel'ned immediate and shol't -term 
pl'oblems: on what priol'ities to give to val'ious objectives, how 
fast the pace of change should be in a given area, what 
institutional changes wel'.e desirable and how e,(isting reSOUl'ces 
should be allocated (Bal'nett, 1974:5) . The dilemmas and policy 
choices facing Beijing's leadel's involved the following: 
(a) The role o~ "experts" in the developlaent of China 
To what e~;tent · a person should be "l'ed" and to what 
extent an I'expert'l has been a controversial issue for many 
years. Mao emphasized the importance of ideological 
dedication and plIl'ity above expel'tise 01' technical skills 
(Barnett, 1'374: 154-·). 
In the initial yeal's of the People's Republic of China, 
the Chinese leadership was willing to some 
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ideological inadequacy in order to tap the kno ..... ledge ,ond 
expertise of a vast ayray of pee.ple to contYibute to ..... ayds 
the yeconstyuctic.n c.f China. Mao also recognised the need 
fe.y technical experts in me.deYnising China and the crucial 
yole that intellectuals play in shaping a society's values. 
Ho ..... ever, he al so feared that gyo ..... ing professiona I ism and 
specialisation ..... ould endanger the egalitaYian values that he 
believed ..... ere essential for a genuinely revolutionary 
s':.ciety. 
It ..... as Mao's hope that the yegime ..... ould be able to 
create a ne ..... generati.:.n that ..... ould be both I'ed and expel't, 
that is, loyal, ideol':'9ically me.tivated, servants of the 
revolution and technically pyoficient specialists capable of 
perfoYming the complex tasks required in a modernising 
society (experts). Ho ..... ever, ..... hen faced ..... ith a choice, Mac. 
insisted on political coryectness above all. He ..... ould pre fey 
lI)""eds" who were not "expert" to lIexpeY'ts" who were not red. 
He feared that pYofessionals and technical experts ..... ho ..... ere 
not "red" might undeymine the kind of commitment to the 
ideological dogma that he s.:.ught to build 1.lp and ..... hich he 
saw as cyucial in maintaining the yevolutie.nary feyve·ur in 
China (BaYnett, 1967:25-27). 
The iyony of the situation, ho ..... evey, was that the 
process of modeynisation requiyed and helped to create 
special ists ..... ho tend t.:. val \-Ie pl'ofessional ce.mpetence ovel' 
ideole.gi cal commitment. Al though the experience during the 
Great Leap pointed to the fact that professiOnal competence 
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could be tc,tally substituted foY" by ideological 
militancy and that the role of professionals and specialists 
was crucial in contributing towards the development of 
China, Mao stuck to his view that politicisation must come 
first. He maintained that doctrinal purity must be the most 
important quality. To him, the professionals and specialists 
should not be allowed to escape thought reform in the name 
of professional competence. 
On the other hand, many party functionaries led by Liu 
were convinced that the country's progress depended on 
training large numbers of technically prc,ficient and 
professic'.nally cc'mpetent persons in various fields. AltholJgh 
they shared Mao's views that the maintenance of ideological 
orthodoxy was important, they were not convinced that 
reve,lutic,nising a values be rapidly 
accomplished in a country whose traditic'ns reached as far 
into the past as China's. They were therefore disposed to 
give a lesser pric'rity to idee,logy and a higher prie'rity to 
increasing the efficiency of China's institutions, 
mobilising the country's resources, increasing production 
and promoting growth. In sum, they tended te, stress the 
crucial importance of expertise even at the e xpense of 
redness or ideological purity. They favoured rather than 
opposed the values embodied in the professional ethic, 
accepting that the priCE for this might be a society t~,at 
would be less egalitarian and more elitist than the Maoist 
ideal (Barnett, 1974: 18). 
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Thus during the rehabilitation period immediately after 
the Great Leap, the role of professionals and other 
specialists was again emphasized. These peop 1 e were gi ven 
wider scope of authority, leading to what Mao saw as the 
growth and stratification of new technocratic elites and the 
decay of revolutionary spirit. He repeatedly insisted that 
the regime must take vigorous steps including intensive 
indoctrination of all elite and universal 
participation in manual labour, to prevent the rise of 
elitism and to narrow the gap between intellectual and 
manual workers. And as soon as condi tionlO permi tted, Mao 
insisted again on the enfor cement of this concept and the 
purging of all those who did not fall in line (Dutt, 
1970:87-8). 
(b) The issue on material incentives 
Basic to Maoist ideology is the value of equality in 
austerity. According to Maoism, a true Communist is willing 
to work hard for the glory of communism with no expectation 
of personal benefits. It emphasizes the individual's 
overriding commitment to a society and total immersion into 
the collectivity. And this state of total identification 
with social goals has t 'o be achieved through spiritual 
transformation and not the use of material incentives 
(Schwartz, 1965: 171-174), Mao had consistently been uneasy 
about economic incentives because of his belief that people 
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should be motivated by ideology and not material gain. The 
problem was how to inspire dedicated work primarily by the 
use of nonmaterial incentives (Barnett, 1974:15). 
Maoist ge,al had been to transform the incentive 
structure of the economy, to develop new ideological, 
political and moral incentives, and new kinds of social and 
psychological rewards that would substitute for material 
incentives (He,ffman, 1967:21 as cited in A Doak Barnett, 
1974:130). 
However, the truth is that Chinese workers were 
e~,; t reme I y the benefits they received. 
Consequently, Chinese planners had sUbstantial evidence that 
material incentives could be extremely useful to the 
government. Political loyalty and economic performance 
directly followed the receiving of material rewards. Yet the 
.country did not have enough resources to provide material 
rewards for all who worked hard. Thus people also had to be 
encotlraged to expect self-sacrifice and to seek me,ral and 
spiritual rewards (pye, 1984:270). The problem was striking 
a balance between the use of these two broad types of 
incentives. 
(c) Centralisation versus local initiatiye 
Another f'.lndamental issue for Chinese develc.pment has 
been the q'.lestion of how centralised China's economy and 
society could become without greatly reducing efficiency. 
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The heart of the issue of centralisation versus 
decentralisation was how, where and to whom economic powers, 
responsibilities and benefits should be allocated. A key 
question was whether to give extensive powers to people in 
the higher levels of administrative authority extensive 
power in facilitate control, planning and 
coordination or to increase the power of lower level 
a'-Ithorities in order to stimulate le'cal incentives and 
initiatives and to permit greater adaptation of policy to 
le,cal conditions. These decisions involved difficult 
questions regarding who should exercise the powers allocated 
to lower levels government economic bureaucrats and 
experts, pr.ofessional managers or party cadres who were 
political representatives of the masses (pye, 1984:136-7). 
During the first years e,f Communist government, the 
need for national unity and acceptance of the regime's 
legitimacy became confused with the belief that centralised 
direction would accelerate Chinese economic and political 
development. Towards the later years of the First Five-Year 
Plan, a centralised administrative system evolved. However, 
the excessive growth of central bureaucratic power generated 
some problems. For instance, the concentration of authority 
in the ministries in Beijing gave rise to delays in making 
decisions and settling day-to-day questions. The high degree 
of centralisation placed enormous power in the hands of the 
ministries in Beijing and resulted in a tendency towards 
ministerial autarky (Chang, 1'375: 52). 
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During the period of the Great Leap Forward, changes in 
the administrative system, involving an enlargement of the 
power of provincial authorities were proposed. There was to 
be increased pr,:,vincial control over industry, finances and 
economic planning. The infll\ence of party cadres at 
provincial and local level~ therefore increased greatly and 
the functions and power of the central ministries were cut 
back significantly. 
Howevei, it was extremely difficult to find a workable 
balance between centralised control and decentralised 
authority. The implementation of the Maoist strategy during 
the Great Leap period gave the provincial authorities 
greater control over the economy. Since ecc'nc,mic planning 
had been decentralised and no effective regional 
coe,rdinating bodies existed, ltndesirable tendencies 
displayed by the prOVincial authorities such as the 
construction of independent industrial complexes within the 
provinces and the ltnsupervised IJse of the extrabudgetary 
funds in capital cc:onstruction, were not checked for a long 
time. The cumulative effects of these development were an 
excessive economic over-expansion, over-investment and waste 
of resources. As a result, the development of China'S 
economy was retarded (Holliste~, 1964:18). 
Thus following the retrenchment from the Great Leap 
Forward, centralised econc,mic planning was again imposed, 
thc1ugh not to the same degree as during the First Five-Year 
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Plan. However, Mac. still maintained that strong 
centralisation created problems. Most serious were the 
difficulties of excessive bureaucratisation. Centralised 
control meant de.mination by o:.fficials in Beijing who were 
generally out of touch with local problems and the attitudes 
of workers. Mao's attack on the economic bureaucracy reached 
its shrillest note during the Cultural Revolution. 
(2) Issue over State Building 
Related to the issue of modernisation was the strategy over 
state-building, that is, the conflicts over the mass line 
<mobilisation) and the institutional, centralised approach. The 
moderates wanted to strengthen the political institutions, such 
as the Ministries and the State Bureaus, and preferred to have a 
systematic cc.de of laws to rule China. However, Mao wanted to 
Llphold the mass line strategy to pc.liticise the masses. He was 
always aware of the danger of bureaucratisation and the 
alienation of the masses. From the Great Leap Forward t.:> the 
Cultural Revolutio:.n, Mao resorted to mass politics, bypassing 
bureaucratic obstacles so that he could get the support of the 
people. Liu and Deng were purged by means of mass criticisms 
engineered by Mao. 
As a result of central economic planning, theve was a rapid 
grc.wth of government institutions, especially the economic 
bureaucracy. The party not only failed to curb bureaucratic 
excesses but itself became infected by them. The greatest danger 
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in this trend as perceived by Mao, was not so ml~ch the party 
losing its separate identity from the government but losing 
ce.ntact with the people (Schwartz, 1969: 109). 
The gre.wing trend towa'fds bureaucratisation and 
routinisation in China, in the party as well as in the 
gc.vernment, was seen by Mao as undermining the revolutic.nary 
character of the regime. Despite all the top leaders' efforts, 
old bureaucratic patterns of behaviour and pressures towards 
administrative regularisation reemerged. The party and government 
.cadres in China increasingly became an elite set apart from the 
population. This elite was highly stratified and rank-conscious 
<Barnett, 1'367:27). 
Moreover, within the party itself, there was a steady trend 
tc.wards the development of specialised interests and functional 
differentiation. Many officials and cadres were accused cf 
"departmentalisaticn", a catch-all phrase referring to such 
practices as the establishment of protective interpersonal 
relationships among mutually vulnerable officials and the 
promotion of private interest~ in disregard of the interests of 
the state and the masses (Baum, 1971:68). 
(3) The Power Struggle 
Along with policy differences, a gigantic power struggle 
between Ma.::. and Lit! te.ok place. The catastrophic failure of the 
Great Leap and the discouraging results of the Commune Movement 
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in 1958 SOlIN a l'"ed'Jction in Mao's pOlNey and pyestige lNithin the 
party. The ideas and ce,ncepts that fOl'"med the ne:HIS of Mao's 
philosophy of development came undel'" shal'"p criticisms lNithin the 
Communist ·Party, and MOl':' himsel f did not escape blame for the 
resulting mess. So Liu Shaoqi quickly occu~ied the central stage 
and entrenched himself in the payty and burea,.lcracy. Liu then 
further built up his olNn independent and rival power base (Dutt, 
1970: 85-7). 
To prevent once and foy all any threat that Mao might lapse 
back inte, any "radical policies", Liu had to consolidate his 
pOlNer after the dismantling of the INhole Great Leap movement. He 
stYengthened his OlNn team by putting Deng Xiaoping into the 
position of General Secyetary of the Pal'"ty Secretayiat and also 
his tyusted compatYiots, Lu Tingyi and Luo Ruiqing into the 
S~cyetal'"iat of the Central Committee. At the same time, to 
discyedit Mao, he eventually took over the cyiticisms INhich Peng 
Dehuai had made of the Gyeat Leap (Leys, 1981:36-7). 
Mao thus found himself gradually yestricted 
to the yole of some kind of ancient totem; eveyyone 
genuflected to him but he lNas completely pOlNerless. 
(Leys, 19B1: 32) 
Proof of the fact that he had been forced into the background was 
supplied during the CultUral Revoilition, ,when Deng Xiaopi"g 
confessed that over the whole period he had settled all the 
party's affairs without ever refeYYing them tc, Mao (Quoted in 
MingBao, 18/8/67, as cited in Simon Leys, 1981: 32). An,:,theY 
example was sholNn in the Red Guard wall posters put on display in 
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Beijing in early January 1967, which quoted Mao as saying that 
Liu and Deng "treat me like their dead parent at a funeral" (New 
York Times, 6/1/67). 
For a man who had ruled the country since 1945, Mao was not 
prepared to let pc·wer slip out of his hands without any fight. 
Even after the failures of the Great Leap and the Commune 
Movement, Mao yemained convinced of the effectiveness of 
ideological education and the correctness of his Great Leap 
policies. He had been forced to give concessions in order to tide 
over the crisis, but the passage of time did not sc.ften his' 
resolve to strike back at those who criticised the Great Leap 
pc.licies. The bitterness of the denunciation in the Cultural 
Revolution of those who raised doubts about his Great Leap 
policies and the emphatic reassert ion of the correctness of the 
Great Leap policies was an indication of Mao's moods and 
convictions (Dutt, 1'370:75-6). 
He was obsessed with his own ideological correctness and 
infallibility. To exert his ideological authority, it was not 
enough fe.r him to be only the people's nominal leader, teacher 
and philosopher. Power had to be monopolised. He wanted absolute 
and unquestioning obedience from his associates and followers. He 
hated to be questioned about the soundness of his decisions for 
he considered himsel f to be the ' man who had every ri ght to 
charter the course for the new China he had created (Chou, 
1982:201-3). Thus, at least since 1962, (after the economy showed 
signs of recovery), Mao engaged in a gradual but escalating 
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I ~ struggle to wrest back power and pull down Liu Shaoqi. 
1t,: 
The Cultyral Revolution 
The ongoing conflict between the top leaders over the 
Val""il:ll~(S issues I:.f mCldel"nisatic,n and the ensuing power conflict 
finally culminated in a mass movement - the Cultural Revolution -
to purge the Maoist opponents in the ' entire party and government 
apparatus. 
The most immediate event leading to the Cultural Revolution 
was the Socialist Education Movement in 1962. The major aim of 
this Movement was to cleanse all Chinese of any anti-Maoist 
tendencies. The Movement called upon the people to arm themselves 
with Mao's Thollght. It was designed te. I'"ectify the shol'"tcomings 
of the cadres at the grassroots level. Many cadres from the city 
wel'"e sent to the countl'"yside to live and wOl'"k with the peasants 
and to learn fl'"om them. MOl'"e specifically, the goals of this 
Movement were to educate and remould the peasoants with 
proletarian ideology; to raise the class awakening of the bre.ad 
masses; te. imprc.ve the ideOlogical work-style of the cadres; to 
promote closer relations · between the cadres and the masses; t e. 
overcome and prevent erosion by capitalist ideology; and to 
consolidate the collective economy. The Socialist Education 
Movement also came to be known as the Four clean-up campaigns -
to clean things up in the field of politics, ideology, 
organisation and economy (Tao Chu, "The People'·s Communes are 
Making Progress" Hong Qi, No. 4 26/2/64, as cited in Dutt, 
1970: 22). 
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Mao was determined to carry out his vision of the Socialist 
Education Movement, but he encountered resistance, and, the 
Socialist Education Campaign was not following the course that he 
intended. Though the payty leadenl at vayious levels did not 
oppose Mao directly or challenge his campaigns, they also did not 
carry out his Socialist Education movement adequately. Al the,ugh 
Mao could and did make the basic policy decisic'ns, his overall 
ability to control events was diluted because other party leaders 
who controlled the operati':on of the payty and supeyvised pC'lie y 
implementation were in a stYategic position to yevise and modify 
his gClidelines. (Chang, 1975: 153) 
Thcls by 1964, Mao discovered that the Socialist Education 
Movement and related campaigns w.re ineffective because they were 
not carried out faithfully by the party cadYes. Mao felt a deep 
sense of betrayal and unhappiness when he realised that the whole 
party machine had alyeady slipped out of his control and was in 
the hands c,f Lilt and Deng. To regain contyol of the Social ist 
Education Movement and to ensure that his ideas weye carried out, 
he needed a power base outside the party appayatus and for this, 
he relied on his demigod image among the Ch·inese masses and alsc, 
tuYned to the People's Libeyation Army (PLA) which under Lin Biao 
stood .alone in the early 1960s as the foremc'st Maoist 
revolutionayy organisation (Tal, 1972:12). 
By late 1965, Mao began to press his case. The fiYst stage 
of the Cultural Revolution was launched at a Working Conference 
of the Central Committee in September 1965. It was decided dUYing 
32 
., 
"~~ . . 
: ,~ 
7wi:~ I i 
~. , 
- -?,-, 
~~, 
this meeting to form a Cultural Revolution Group comprising five 
high party officials. The group was led by Peng Zhen, Politburo 
member and the Mayor cd Beijing. Mao then left Beijing in 
Ne,vember 1965 for the Vangtse Valley and South China, where he 
spent the ne:<t si~; months with some ,:;,f his closest followers 
observing developments in Beijing and planning his next move. 
Mao was by now fully convinced that the CCP was completely 
out of his control. It was at this point that he decided to begin 
his comprehensive purge of the entire party apparatus. The 
resistance of the party organisation made it necessary for him 
to escalate this conflict. Knowing that the central party 
apparatus and the Beijing Party machine were in the hands of his 
opponents, Mao was compelled to turn to the Shanghai Party 
Committee for a base to launch his attacks. 
The first salvo came in November 1965 with the publication 
of an article written by Mao's supporters, Vao Wenyuan, then the 
editor-in-chief of the Shanghai branch of the Liberation Army 
Daily. The article attacked Wu Han, the Deputy Mayor of Beijing 
for his Beijing Opera on "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office". Wu Han 
was one of the leading critics of Mao who had used the above 
opera to criticise Mao on what he seen as unjust sacking of 
Marshal Peng Dahua! in 1959. 
The attack on Wu Han led to a direct conflict between Mao 
and Peng Zhen, who as Head of the Cultural Revolution Group tried 
to restrict the purge to one of criticism and discussie,n c,nly. 
The episode concerning Wu Han once again demonstrated to Mao that 
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'~~. : ' despite his persistent effe.rts, he was .. mabIe te. enforce his will 
to have Wu Han purged when payty leadeys who disagyeed with him 
controlled the payty machine. Although Peng Zhen did not oppose 
Mao openly, the tactics he used were those of subterfuge, 
,:>bstnlction and passi ve yesistance. When yepeated I y pyessed by 
Mao to yepudiate Wu Han openly, Peng went along outwardly, but in 
fact he shifted the basic orientation c,f the attack and used 
diffeyent ploys to shield Wu Han from political cyiticism. Peng's 
efforts at diversion culminated in the "Outline Repe,yt on the 
CuYrent Academic Discussion" that attempted to diveyt the work of 
the CultuYal Revolution Grotip from the political direction 
intended by Mao into histoyical and asthetic channels. With the 
support ,:.f Liu and Deng, this ".Outline Report" was apprc,ved in a 
Politburo Standing Committee Session chaired by Liu on 5 February 
1966 and issued to the party organisation as the g .. lideline for 
the CultuYal Revolutie.n (Chang, 1'375: 164). 
With the issue of this "Outline Repoyt", the stage was set 
foy an open showde.wn. Mao himsel f convened a sessie,n of the 
Standing ' Committee of the Politbuyo in Hangzhou fyom 17 to 20 
March 1966, where he sharply criticised the "Outline Repoyt" and 
denounced Peng Zhen foy undermining the Cultural R~volution. This 
completed the split in the leadership gyoup. On the one hand, in 
Beijing, weye Liu and the majority of the party machine 
sl.lppe,yting Peng in pyeventing the p'Jrge of critical 
intellectuals. On the othey hand, in Shanghai and Hangzhc'u, Mao 
and Lin Biao supported by the People's Libeyation Aymy (PLA) and 
the Fedeyation of Trade Unions called on the masses to attack 
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those party cadres taking the revisionist line (Domes, 1973:156). 
After some intense struggles, Peng Zhen was f~nally purged 
during the absence of Liu. Peng Zhen was considered as tc,c, soft 
on the party intellectuals and bureaucrats. A new Central 
Committee Cultural Revolution Group was formed with Chen Boda as 
the Head. Tao Chu and Kang Sheng functioned as advisers and Mao's 
wife, Jiang Qing was first deputy head. 
With . the new Cultural Revolution Group under the control of 
the Maoists, the Cultural Revolution came into full play and was 
broadened t6 an open mass mobilisation campaign with more purges 
and attacks on intellect'-Ials, the party and government 
bureaucrats. Students and youths were organised into units known 
as the Red Guards. Under the guidance of the Cultural Revolution 
Group and the PLA many Red Guards were sent down to various areas 
to carry out the Revolution. 
With the help of the Red Guards, Mao began to attack party 
leadership at both the prOVincial and regic'nal levels. However, 
these people holding real power were able to put up highly 
effective resistances. They formed their own Working Teams te, 
ward off attempts by the revolutionaries to seize power. The 
resistance put up by the party organisation was e,ne of sel f-
protection and survival. But it was also true that these Working 
Teams enjoyed genuine authority because of long obedience to the 
orders of the party organisatic'n (Tang, 1971: 196-7). There wel'"e 
thus widespread clashes and chaos. Mao had no choice but to tUl'"n 
more and more to the PLA. By early 1967, it was cleal'" that 
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without the direct intervention of the PlA, the seizures of power 
by the revolutionary masses would not survive. 
Though the basis of Mao's power, the PlA was a conservative 
force · in the Maoist cc,alition, frequently resisting the more 
extreme measures undertaken by the Red Guards. Thus when the PlA 
began to move towards preserving law and order and limiting the 
extent of the political purge, clashes between the Red Guards and 
the PlA in the provinces began. Armed clashes across the country 
grew, with the Red Guards looting and destroying as they fought 
·among themselves, and against the Army for political leverage. 
With widespread chaos and violence growing, Mao had to call for a 
return to moderation and gave the Army a free hand in restraining 
by force, if necessary, the fanaticism of the Red Guards (Tang, 
1 '371: 1 '38) • 
.. ' 
By late 1968, there was a trend towards restoration of order 
~nd authority. This coincided with a period of growing tensions 
with the Sov.iet Unic,n, especially at the Sino-Sc.viet bc.rder. 
Worried that continued internal discord would invite Soviet' s 
invasion, Mao initiated a retllrn to law and order. Some party 
cadres were rehabilitated in order to use their administrative 
skills to overcome the anarchy that had been created. The Red 
Guards were disbanded and told to go back either to sch.=,c.ls 01' 
back to factories to reactivate the economy (Bridgham, 1971:124). 
However, by now, the damage to the polity, the economy and the 
social fabric was done. 
Cultural Reve·lution wrs 
The 
the 
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immediate consequences of the 
destruction of the party 
Oyganisation, disyuption of the functioning of the gc,veynment 
buyeaus and seyious damage to authoYity. Economic pyoduction was 
adyeysely affected duying the initial phase of the Cultural 
Reyc,lution, when the Red G~layds weye rampant but it resumed in 
. the later phases cot the CultuYal Revolution. Hc,wevey, nothing 
was more difficult than rebUilding a new set of stable political 
yelationships in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution (Tang, 
1971:202) • 
The silence of intellectual dissent affected the morale and 
efficiency of the Chinese scientific community and technical 
expeytS. The educational system in most payts of the countyy weYe 
chaotic. Many schools were closed for about two years during the 
active 'phase c.f the Cui tural Revol ution when Red Guayds were 
actively involved in the seizuYes of power. The change in the 
curriculum and the abolition of the examination system resulted 
in low academic quality which in tuYn impeded scientific and 
technological development. 
Public morale and confidence in the Cc.mmunist regime were 
impaired. The CultuYal Revolution left behind a legacy .:.f local 
animosities, feuds and vendettas. The entiye society '""as 
embittered, exhausted and alienated. The picture was so despayate ' 
th~t even the old guayd leadeys Yecognised that political 
survival yequiY"ed dY"astic action. Thus the post-Mao leadeys 
embayked on a seyies of yeforms designed to raise the abysmally 
low standayd of iiving, to open safety valves for mass 
dissatisfaction and gradually to restore popular confidence in 
the ruling Communist Party again. As aptly put by Zhao Ziyang in 
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his report to the Thirteenth National Party Congress, the present 
leadership believes that "reform is the only process through 
which China can be revitalised". The legitimacy of the post-Mao 
leadership thus depends on the success of the reform programmes 
that they have implemented since 1978, in raising the standard of 
living of the people. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MODERNISATION PRDBRAMMES OF CHINA (1978-1988) 
~.11 INTRODUCTION 
,.. Post-Mao economic programmes represented an &/volutie,nary 
process which began with their adVocates' full rejection of the 
Maoist model of development to which they had been objecting 
since the 1950s. Following from the line of argument in Chapter 
One, it is possible for us to see the modernisation pe,licies 
implemented duri~g the last ten years (1979-88) as a temporary 
triumph of the group of leaders advocating a particular model for 
the modernisation of China. That conflicts still exist over the 
exact timing, scope, speed and tactics of the development 
strategy and the power struggle that underlies these policy 
differences can be seen in the various retreats (such as the 
campaigns against bourgeois lib.nalism in 1980-81, against 
spiritual pollution in 1993 and against "unhealthy tendencies" in 
1986) and consolidation advocated in the process of the 
modernisation. 
However, thl! policies adopted in the past ten years also 
represent a far more radical departure than those implemented 
during Mao's era. The developmental strategy became far more 
flexible than anything that the Chinese Communists had ever 
attempted. The appraisal of the consequences of the Great Leap 
Forward and the legacy of the Cultural Revolution led present 
leader. to depart sharply from Mao's views on the way to achieve 
modernisation. The problems that the post -Mao leadership 
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! nherited from the Maoist era were as follows I 
1. A lag in the nation's agricultural output in relation to 
its growing needs. Basically an agricultural country, 
China's economic performance depends largely on how well the 
agricultural sector performs. 
2. Failure to achieye any significant increase in the 
productiyity of industrial labour. Although China achieyed 
an ayerage annual growth rate of 4.4X at 1980 constant price 
from the period from 1953-76, this was due to high domestic 
capi tal inyestment and growth of the 'I abour force, with 
productiyity increases accounting for a yery small share of 
the total growth. Giyen such high rates of domestic 
inyestment in both capital and l~bour, the Chinese economy 
should hays grown much faster. But it did not and was 
. ~ .... actually operating below its actual potential. Post-Mao 
leaders recognised that it would be difficult to continue to 
. ~: ... i . increase productiYity simply through adding labour and 
capi tal. 
3. Widespread unemployment and underemployment. 
4. Low ayerage standard of liYing. Although growth, 
especially in the industrial sector, was sustained eyen 
during the tumultous period of the Cultural Reyolution, real 
per capita income grew only from $102 Yuan in 1952 to $252 
Yuan in 1978. Many ordinary Chinese had become increasingly 
impatient with the lack of improyement in their liying 
standa r d . 
.. " 
42 
.. \ ' ., 
5. Inefficient use of capital due not only to political 
disruptions, but to inefficiencies in planning and 
management. The Chinese economy under the rigid central 
planning system was grossly inefficient. 
6. The radicals' policies on education, research and 
intellectual development between the mid-1960s to early 
1970s resulted in a loss of Ii whole generation of trained 
scientific and technological personnel. The research 
establishment was unable to keep up with the accelerating 
worldwide pace of technological change (Barnett, 1981127-
33) • 
Recognition of these problems convinced post-Mao leaders 
that to speed up economic growth and to raise the standard of 
living of its population, major changes in policy and in the 
structure of the country's economic system were essential. More 
importantly, the legitimacy of the CCP would increasingly depend 
on its ability to produce concrete results in improving the 
material standard of living of the people. 
I n general, all post -Mao leaders agreed that the Chinese 
economy had to be modernised. The major impetus for this 
modernisation had to come from the technological upgrading of 
existing enterprises. Improvement i'n . the quality 01 output was 
critical. The planning system had to move away from a system 
where the only criter~ then was the gross value of output. The 
market should supplement the state plan in the allocation c.f 
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All also agreed that productivity had to be 
increased, and that workers had to be rewarded according to their 
labour. Responsibility systems were needed both in the urban 
industries and in the countryside. Agriculture and light 
industrieS! should receive higher priority. Capital construction 
had to be controlled. China should open itself to the 
international economy, and Western science and technology should 
be imported to help speed up modernisation. Scientists, 
engineers, technical experts and other professionals should play 
a larger role (Bachman, 19861319). 
Ever since the fall of Hua Guofeng in mid-1981, cleavages 
within the reform coalition led by Deng Xiaoping widened. 
Differences between market advocates (represented by Zhao Ziyang 
and H~I Yaobang) and central planners (represented by Chen Yun) 
concerned the degree to which necessary changes should be 
implemented. Chen Yun, for instance appeared to be more cautious 
in opening China to the West because of the impending influences. 
He also placed more emph.sis on central planning than on the 
market, and he viewed the maintenance of a balanced state budget 
as of utmost importance. In fact, Chen would rely on the three 
bal.nces to guide the economYI a balanced budget; balance between 
supply and demand; and a corresponding balance between bank loans 
and their repayment. With regards to changes in the political 
arena, Chen's faction was less will~ng to experiment with wide-
scale political reforms to accompany the economic changes. 
On the other ~,and, Zhao Ziyang was less cautious abol.lt 
involving China in the international economy. He was also more 
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loIilling to let market forces playa greater role in yegulating 
the economy. He yelied on economic devices and wanted the self-
interests of the producers and consumeys to guide the economy. 
I;': Thuili he WilS more wi 11 ing to tolerate budget def i ci ts and some 
inflation in the pyocess of pushing the economy foywiilYd. The 
group led by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang was ~lso moye tolerant of 
political dissent, and they viewed political yeforms as necessary 
for the success of economic reforms (Bachman, 19861311-318). 
Undoubtedly, there were also zigs and zags in the course of 
modernisation in the decade under consideration, though they loIere 
on a much smaller scale ccompared to those dUYing Mao's era. In 
periods of economic expansion, the market advocates would 
prevail, while during periods of economic contraction or of 
serious economic problems, such as spiralling inflation, the 
views; cof the centr.;:.l planners would prevail. Thus the economic 
contractions of 1980-81, 1983 and 1985-86 were accompanied by 
ideological campaigns against "bourgeois liberalisation", 
"spir i tual pollution"- and "unheal thy tendencies" respectivel y 
(Dittmer, 1989: 12-3). 
Deng's policies in t~e last decade from 1978 to 1988 were a 
definite departure from Mao's era. The general strategy adopted 
was to restore order and discipline in the economy, the polity 
and the society. 
A mixed economy and consumerism were the pyedominant 
features of Deng's revolution. In gensral, several key themes yun 
through the changes in different areas of policy: the primacy of 
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goals, notably efficiency, productivity, growth and 
anced consumption; a concerted intentic,n to decrease state 
tontr61, to free the economy from the trammels of bureaucracy by 
the use of market economic levers, as opposed to 
administrative methods; an increase in econe,mic links with the 
west and Japan, bot~, in trade and capital flows, leading to the 
establishment of ~oint ventures and special export zones; a 
", relaxation of political and ideological controls and an allowance 
' of greater intellectual and cultural expression and more freedom 
:'L" 
" for individual political dissent; ' and lastly, an abandonment or 
(', downgrading of previous Maoist values, notably those of 
redistribution, mass mobilisation, emphasis on political 
"correctness" over technical expertise and professionalism, 
collective effort and local and national self-reliance (Gray ~ 
, , 
. Whi te, 198212). 
" 
2.2: CHANGES IN THE DOMESTIC ECONQMIC SPHERE 
-, ', 
The concept of Four Modernisatiory.' which ref'erred to the 
modernisation of Agriculture, Industry, Science & Technology and 
National Defence" was first suggested by Premier Zhou Enlai way 
back in 1964 during the Third National People's Congress in 
December 1964. But before he could implement his ideas, the whole 
of China was plunged into the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, 
followed by the lin Biao affair. It was; not until the FC".lrth 
"- National People's Congress in 1975 that Zhou again called for the 
- implementation of the Four Modernisation Programmes. He expressed 
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hope that overall modernisation in each of these sectc,rs 
be achieved by th& end of the century. However, at this 
, Zhou was too ill to put all his plilns into pr-actice. It 
Deng Xiaoping who helped him dr-aft thr-ee major- Documents 
later- became the bluepr-ints of the Four MOdernisation. 
thr-ea Documents were : 
1. A General Programme for- Work in the Party and the Nation; 
2. A Summar-y of Dir-ectives for- Wor-k in the Academy of 
Science; and 
3. Certain Problems in Improving Development of Industries 
Following the death of Zhou in Januar-y 1976, Deng was purged 
the plans were not car-r-ied out. For- the whole year- of 1976, 
plans did not make any headway because Beijing was embroiled 
in the political str-uggle for succession. Hua Guofeng was 
finally named as Mao Zedong's successor following the death of 
. thelatter in September 1976. 
Hua Guofeng was also inter-ested in lodging the Four 
Moder-nisation Pr-ogramme, but h~ wanted to pr-omote moder-nisation 
in the spirit of r-evolutionary vigour-, that is, he did not want 
to sacr-ifice Mao's ideas and pr-inciples when implementing the 
Four- Modernisiltion Pr-ogr-amme. Hua's legitimacy as the leader- was 
par-tly based on the fact that he was Mao's "chosen man". 
Ther-efor-e, it was imper-ative for Hua . to uphold Mao's ideas. The' 
goal of the Four Moder-nisatiory " was . formally wr-.itten into the 
Constitution of the Chinese Communist Par-ty (CCP) which was 
pas!iSed at the Eleventh National Par-ty's Congr-ess on 18 AllQlIst 
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1977, and ag~in incorporated into the new State Constitution of 
thl!! people's Republic of China (PRC) which was passed at the 
Nation.d People's Congress on 5 March 1'378. 
In 1977, Deng was rehabilitated and put in charge of the 
modernisation programme. Deng was willing to strive for the goals 
of the Four Modernisation at a far greater cost to the Chinese 
revolution. Although promulgating his adherence to the four 
fundamental principles of upholding socialism; the dictatorship 
of the proletariat; leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and 
upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thought, he was 
willing to sacrifice many of Mao's ideas for the sake of 
modernisation. As such, differences existed between Hua and Deng 
with regards to the specific approach toward modernisation. 
On 12 August 1977 in his "Political Report to the Eleventh 
Party Congress", Hua Guofeng announced that the mission for the 
last quarter of the twentieth century was "to bring into ful t 
play all positive factors inside and outside the Party, at home 
and abroad and make China a great, powerful and modern socialist 
country before the end of the century" (Beijing Review, Vol. 20, 
No. 35, 26/8/77). This st~tement officially launched the country 
on the Four Modernisation Programmes. A Ten-Year Modernisation 
Plan covering the years from 1976-1985 was revealed. By and 
large, this'ten-year plan was the first plan by post-Mao leaders 
to put the Four Modernisation into practice. The thrust of this 
plan was to save agriculture, reinforce basic industries, 
strengthen the communications network and increase foreign trade. 
On top of that, the plan was meant to~tructure the economy. 
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However, the target set by this ten-year plan was too high 
unrealistic. As a result, d~lring the Third Plenllm of the 
eventh Centl"al Committee in December 1'378, a progl"amme designed 
Deng and his supporters to readjust, restructllre, consolidate 
improve the national economy was announced. Seen as a victol"Y 
Deng's reform efforts, the general direction and nattlre of 
and policy changes being proposed and adopted 
clearer. The gist of the changes were as follows: 
.(1) Readjusting the Economy 
The readjustment c.f the economy. involved a conscientiolls 
move towards more detailed and balanced planning to bring about 
better coordination and the development of agr i cui tllre, light 
industry and heavy industry. It also included maintaining a 
pre.per ratio between accumulation and consumption, as well as 
rat~onalisation of investment projects on the basis of both 
direct and indirect economic costs and benefits. All these were 
aimed at bringing investment output and foreign trade targets 
more in line with a new set of growth priorities considered 
economically necessary. 
(2) Restructuring the Econo.y 
Economit restructuring involved primarily reforms towards a 
form of market socialism. Some of the changes recommended were 
eliminating absolute egalitarianism, eliminating overlapping and 
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inefficient administrative organs; and giving greater autonomy to 
local authorities with respect to planning, capital construction, 
finance, acquisition of raw material and the conduct of foreign 
trade. The need to allow the lowest economic unit greater freedom 
to react to the plans they were given was recognised. In 
agriculture, this meant the production team was to be given more 
freedom in making its own production and distribution decisions. 
Private plots were allowed. Household sideline activities were 
encouraged. 
In the industrial sector, piece rates and bonuses were used 
to stimulate production, and specialisation was encouraged. 
Groups of workers were encouraged to form their own cooperatives 
to produce and sell any commodities they like or to service the 
market when supplies were short. 
In sum, the restructuring of the economy entailed increasing 
the role of market forces, and emphasizing profits and material 
incentives and local initiative in reaction to these forces. 
(3) Consolidating the Econo.y 
Changes towards consolidating the economy included the 
establishment 01 a system of clearly defined responsibility for 
everyone in the enterprise, and a system 01 speCialisation e,1 
labour and coordination of economic activities across different 
enterprises to achieve greater economies of scale in production. 
Poorly managed enterprises were cc,nsol idated thre,ugh 
reorganisation and merger. 
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Improying the Economy 
Economic improvement was aimed at raising the productivity 
efficiency of the various sectors by promoting technological 
vat ions, and by reducing input-output ratios throughout the 
through upgrading the vocational skills of cadres and 
4;i,,,!,,o,rkers and through better management. Learning science and 
chnology and management technique from foreign count I' ies and 
development of foreign trade (in order to finance the import 
foreign technology and equipment) were encouraged (Tung, 
<A9921 27 -29) • 
The retreat from the ambitious ten-year plan represented a 
riumph 1'or Deng's faction in the power struggle. They began 
,Slowly to push through their development strategy. The above 
'Yeforms advocated by Deng were endorsed at the Third Plenum of 
·the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1979. To push forward 
_.'j' 
"his plan for economic modernisation and to consolidate his 
position in the party leadership Deng committed China to a number 
of plans and agreements 'with other countries; downgrade Mao's 
" thoughts and place hili own supporters in the key State, Party and 
the Military institutions. 
Since the endorsement of Deng's policies during the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Central Commi ttee in December 1978, Hua 
,,"as pushed more and more into the background of the political 
leadership. The term Four Modernisation was replaced by emphasis 
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economic reforms. It was envisaged that the emphasis of the 
ty's work would be on economic development. Modernisation of 
and Technology would be carried out to serve the goals of 
·· conomic modernisation, while military modernisation would only 
possible after the country has achieved steady economic 
Following the endorsement of the above outline for economic 
reforms by the party, there was a gradual but steady series of 
changes including the creation of the Spe~ial Economic Zones 
(SEZs); streamlining the top-heavy economic bureaucracy; 
decentralising decision-making to rely more on professional 
managers and replacing fixed wages based on work points wi th 
wages based on profits. The accumulative impact of the changes 
was enormous and resulted in improved economic results each year. 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below show the increases in agricultural and 
industrial output in both absolute and relative terms. Table 2.1 
ref lects the total output of agr i cuI ture and induf>try in Yuan 
(RMB) at current prices, and Table 2.2 points to the significant 
rise in the indices 01 t~tal output value of both agriculture and 
industry (at constant price) since 1980, taking 1952 as 100. 
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TABLE Z.l 
TOTAL OliT/'liT OF A(;IHCULTURE AN» IN))USTRY 
RlTlh 100 milliull at (IIrn'II' price.Ii 
'1'411:11 ulI(llut Tu(;,1 Tohll 
of HJ.:,ricullllre a~rkullurul induslriul Of which: 
al1<1 ltulus(ry output output ) ,jJ.,:hl lIoa\'y 
industry induslry 
I t)...Jf) 4(J6 12() 1411 111.1 ,\7 
19W 2,1l'!4 457 1,6.17 547 I .11<)(1 
19711 3,13N 1,1I5H 2.IIHII %11 I . 1211 
1975 4.467 I ,.14.1 3,124 1,.176 1.7 :.; 
IlJHII 7.1177 2.1 XII 4,X<J7 2..11~J 2.5:\M 
19KI 7..'XII 2,460 5.1211 2,( .. ,7 2.4,~.1 
IIJX2 ~,2f)1 2.7X5 550(, 2,7hh 2,7·111 
ICJXJ 9.211 
.1 . 12.1 (),IIKH 2,954 3.1:l4 
19H4 111.797 .1.75.5 7.1142 3.3.15 3.707 
TABLE 1l.2 
.. 
INDICES OF TOTAL OUTPUT VALUE OF A(;IUCliLTUIlE AN)) 
INDUSTItV {lit (.'onsl~lI1t Iwins) , 
1952= 100 
Tot"r output Tutal Total 
val tiC of :tl-!ri- aJ,!rtculllln,1I illdu.'ill-ial Of which: 
culture nlld output output Light Ilcavy 
industry \' ~lluc value Industry induslry 
. 
1949 56.:1 (,7.4 411.K 46.(, 311.3 
I t}52 IIKI.II 11111.11 IIHUI IIKI.O IIXU! 
1%11 279.3 96.4 535,7 269.7 1.1I35.H 
19711 4~4.3 1(,(1.3 7X1.1 515 .() 1.2<)(1.2 
197.1 61(;.2 2112.1 1.2IH.H 74X.4 2,1I9J.X . 
I'JXII 'JIIX.6 2S'!.1 I.KKX .9 1,259.5 3,036.4 
19KI 9511.4 276.2 1,%6 . .1 1.437.1 2.XY3.7 
It)X2 1,11).1.1 J1I6.7 2,117.7 UIY .II J.n7.J 
19K] I.UK.5 336. 1 2,J411.1 1,651 .2 3,5713 
19K4 1 .. 1(~U 3YJ.6 V)r, 7.7 I ,KKII.7 4,tl7H.4 
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The economic changes were substantial enough to deserve the 
"revolution". Robert Dernberger puts it succinctly: 
Taken as a whole the post-Mao's leadership's programme 
of economic policies and reforms has become an across-
the-board attempt to change the Chinese traditional 
development model. This involves a rejection of the 
Maoist radical economic principles in favour of those 
proposed by the right wing, the abandonment of Stalin's 
"big-plISh development strategy" in favour of balanced 
growth and consumerism and a modification of the 
Soviet-type economic system to incorporate significant 
elements of market socialism (Dernberger, 1984:138). 
By 1988, the Chinese economy had evolved into a mixed 
;' economy. Though there was still a large element of central 
.... '.-:' 
[ planning, there was also an expanding and increaSingly important 
, private sector. Managerial reforms were also introduced for 
·· gover nment enterprises to enable them to function more 
.ffectively in a market economy. 
A. RURAL REFORMS 
.. ,.". 
One of the most far-reaching economic changes in the rllral 
sector was the de-collectivisation of agricuiture. Starting from 
1978, the functions and ijportance of the Communes (especially as 
·self-suf·ficient economic llnits) were slowly eroded. The "demise" 
of the communes was largely due to the introduction of the 
"system of responsibility" in agriculture production and other 
rural activities. Under this system, basic means of production, 
such as land, reservoirs and large farming equipment, still 
' belong to the state or the collective. But the land is leased by 
contract to peasants cor small groups, and they are allowed 
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ivately to own farming tools and draft animals (Jan, 1986:397). 
importantly, the responsibility system links t~,e peasants' 
directly to the task that is performed. 
The responsibility system spread slowly and by 1982 the 
Government decided to abolish the People's Communes. 
cording to the 1982 State Constitution of the PRC, the People's 
formally ceased to e.ist as an integrated unit of self-
vernment. Its political and administrative functions were 
ansferred to the te.wnship and village bureauer.aeies, which in 
.'." .. ,., 
n had already been integrated into the broader administrative 
'erarchy of the provincial bureaucracy. The village committees 
~'> .. ':' /.were replaced by the production brigades, and dealt essentially 
" ~;with community affairs and social services (Chossudosvsky, 
, .. -
!':1986: 46) • 
Initially a few popular systems of responsibility were 
~~dopted. These included : 
(1) Contracting Output Quotas out to Work Sroups (or 
linking output to the Group - Baochan dao Zuoyezu). Under 
this system, the production team divides its fields into 
strips and its forces into several work groups. The team 
then contracts a certain amount of land to each group. The 
team's management and the group then agree on the targetted 
output. The work groups are paid in work points, with 
bonuse. and fines depending upon the output. The work points 
paid to the group are f~lrther divided among the members 
accc.rding to their personal labour contribution. The team 
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retains the authority for administering many aspects of farm 
production, including planning and the use of animals, 
machinery and fertiliser. 
(2) Contracting Specialised Fixed Tasks ilnd Production 
Quota to individuals or groups. In this system, the 
teams contract specialised fixed je,bs to 
individual9 or group·s and pay them in an agreed numbel' of 
wol'k points for an agreed amount of output. Used pl'imarily 
for sideline pre,dclction where special skills are reqclired, 
such as fishery, forestl'y and animal husbandry, this system 
involves the signing of with individuals, 
households or specialised work groups. Peasants receive a 
fixed number of work points for meeting the production quota 
and a bonus for surpassing it, compr ising more work points, 
some of the surplus or all of it. 
:~ 
(3) Household Contract System. There are two types of 
.J. 
Household Contract: the "Baochan daoha" and the "Baogan 
daoha". The forruer occurs under unified team management and 
involves fixed investment, work points, output levels and 
unified accounting, though all the farmland is contracted te, 
individual households for separate cultivation. The 
contracted part of the outpClt goes to the production team 
for unified distribution among the members and the relSt is 
ei thel" shared between the team and the "contractors" or 
granted to the lattel" as a bonus • 
......... 
The "Baogan daoha" refers to households with total 
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responsibility; in other word it is actually private 
farming. Under this system, while the production team 
maint.ins cc.llective ownership of the land, it divides the 
land and other means c.f production (such as farm tools) 
among individual households. By contract, the households pay 
the State Agricultural Tax and meet the minimal compulsory 
sales as well as the productic.n teams' public accumulation 
and welfare funds. Apart from this, they may grow anything 
and handle all the rest of the surplus output in any way 
they want to. The production teams thus no longer practise 
unified accounting and income distribution among their 
members (unlike the Baochan). The household becomes the 
primary unit of accounting and accumulatic.n (Zweig, 
1 '383 : 882 -884) • 
The Household Contract System in fact resembles tenant 
farming with the collective and the state as ··landlord". Because 
. the "rent·· (State Agriculture T.x plus contribution to the 
collective and the tax implicit in the low-priced quota sales) 
was fixed, and because access to the higher prices from above· 
quota and free market sales is achieved only with higher Olltput, 
increased · productivity brings the household a more than 
proportional increase in income. This system thus greatly 
motivates peasants to increase their productivity. This was 
6tspeciall y so under the "tc,tal household responsibi 1 i ty system" 
.(Baogan daalliJ.). 
Since the early 19805, most of the countryside has adopted 
the Household Contract system. Along with the household 
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r,e,s~,o"".Lbility system, private plots have been greatly expanded. 
rictions on peasants' sideline activities have also been 
'l~;, lOl~SI""tantially eased. This has given rise to the so-called 
" 'specialised households", families that engaged in specialised 
production or activities such .s fishery, forestry, 
:,;!", 
"',' animal husbandry and transportation. 
In early 1983, the Central Committee issued the first of two 
watershed directives labelled "Document No. One", which further 
rati f ied the development of the household responsibil i ty system 
as the dc.minant mode of rural organisation. Document No. One of 
1983 explicitly promoted the household responsibility system. It 
permitted individual farm households to hire labour, buy and own 
" 
, trucks and farm machinery, sell their surpluses of goods in free 
' markets and transport goods long distances and acyoss 
administrative boundaries to the market. 
Document No. One e.f 1984, added several impe,rtant 
provisions. It lengthened the contract to more than fifteen years 
' with the possibility of transferring the land to their heirs, 
encouraged the concentration of land in the hands of more 
efficient producers (the ~o-called key households) by permitting 
lease-like arrangements between ho'~seholds and it promoted the 
free flow of peasant investment into various kinds of private and 
cooperative enterprises (Kallgren, 1985:104-105). 
Both do~u~ents thus officially sanctioned the trend towards 
private plots and specialisation among peasant households. 
Another significant change came in 1985 when the system of 
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ndatory plan quotas for such agricultural commodities as grain 
cotton whereby the state was obliged to purchase all 
' ;.;~~~.almounts offered to it fc.r sale (including those above quc.ta) 
replaced by a system of contract procurement. 
With these new policies came an expansion of peasant 
··.·. marketing. Rural fairs were revived in 1979. Free markets have 
ince then been greatly expanded. Prices in these markets are 
, ,,~'. ; 
"'determined by supply and demand. More recently, new r'~ral banks 
... have also been created to generate rural credit, so that budding 
peasant entrepreneurs can invest in new seed, fertiliser and 
. machinery. In summary, within the 1irst ten years of rlile by 
.~ post-Mao le·aders, the collective system - a predominant feature 
.::·of the agricultural sector for over two decades - was largely 
replaced by the household responsibility system, which 
.. established closer link between effort and reward 
~individual farmers. Households were permitted to lease land on a 
long-term basis and to dispose freely of any production in excess 
.. of the state quota. These rural reforms which were accompanied by 
increases in procurement prices had a significant impact on 
_gricultural production. 
Al though the responsibi 1 i ty system did provide ecc.nomi c 
incentives for the peasants to work harder and has enabled China 
to increase agricultural production as well as improve the 
:standard of 1 iving of the peasants to some degree, it al so 
created many new problems. Some of these include : 
(1) Increasing gaps in income. The emergence of some 
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prosperol.ls peasants wi th income many times that of their 
fellow peasants caused jealousy and yesentment. Poor 
peasants resented this prosperity, and the cadyes often 
extracted money from the rich ones by a variety of illegal 
methods. This discollraged the more capable peasants from 
working hard. They also worried about the heavy taxes and 
the abuse of the cadres. 
(2) Small and fragmented farms. China's arable land per 
capi ta is now about one "mu" (one-sixth of an acre). A 
family of six would be assigned about one acre of farmland. 
Due to the different quality of the land in each team, the 
practice was to draw lots to divide up the land of the team. 
Because of di ffeyent ferti 1 i ty, I and was drawn into four 
different parcels by the team. Each household would get a 
portion of land in each of the four parcels. This resulted 
in the creation of small and fragmented farms (for example, 
a household of four may end up with a total of less than one 
acre of land in four di fferent locations). This si tuatic.n 
wasted the peasants' time and labour and caused disputes 
among peasants over farm boundaYies and other yelated 
matters. Under this condition, China also cannot 
realistically expect the peasants to modernise their 
farming. 
(3) Shrinkage of grain growing acreage. The grain 
cultivatic.n area has been reduced dlle to development of 
industry, transportation, housing, etc. But the peasants' 
preference for cash crops was one of the main reasons for 
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the reduction c,f grain cultivation area. The reduction of 
arable land due to non-agricultural development and the 
decrease of grain cultivation limit the increase of China's 
grain production unless China can modernise its farming 
methods on a nationwide basis. This plus the me,re than 17. 
annual poplilatie,n growth would mean that per capita grain 
allocation cannot improve appreciably in the near future. 
(4) lack of planning and coordination of economic 
development in rural areas. The peasants were motivated by 
profits in their production. However, they had no confidence 
in the longevity of the responsbility system. They feared 
the change of the system anytime. Therefore they had no 
interest in improving the quality of the land or long-term 
conservation work. They were primarily interested in short 
term profits. 
The industrial sector was also not geared to assist the 
changed needs of the agricultural sector. For instance, 
because the responsibility system was based on households 
wi th small farms, there was more need for small farming 
tools and less need " for the larger farming machines. But 
many industrial enterprises were " still manufacturing the 
traditional larger farming machines. The shortage of small 
and medium-sized farming tools became a serious problem in 
the villages. 
(5) BArriers to free flow of goods and servic".s. There were 
.... ~ . 
several outlets for peasants to sell their surplus products, 
.. J. 
61 
such as to the state purchasing programme, to the supply and 
marketing cooperative or 1n the free markets. However, there 
were .lso many barriers to the free-flow of ge.ods and 
services. In many areas, movement between counties and 
provinces was difficult because of restrictions imposed by 
the state, and also because of prc.blems of storage space, 
transportation, grain management, corruption and theft. 
(6) Inadequate government assistance to peasants concerning 
technical problems and market research, supply of materials 
such as pesticides and fertilisers. Because of shortages, 
many officials exploited the peasants by demanding br ibes. 
Also many peasants and collectives engaged in specialised 
enterprises without adequate market research. The result was 
that they could not sell their products even when they had 
successfully made them. 
(7) Insufficient investment in the agricultural sector by 
the government. Dlle to the need for modernisatic.n in non-
agricultural projects, government investment in agriculture 
not only failed to increase, but actually decreased in . some 
cases (Jan, 19B6:401~406). 
B. INDUSTRIAL REFORMS 
After 1976 industrial policy passed through several distinct 
phases each involving an intensification of the prace5s of 
Change. 
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r;;~!· The first phase lasted from Octc,ber 1976 until the Fifth 
. ~ .. ,,; . 
r:~'i 
,,:; National People's Cc,ngress in February 1978. During that time, 
", .. 
the framework for industrial policy wa.s provided by the Four 
Modernisation and by Mao's article liOn the Ten Major 
Relati,:,nships" , officially published for the first time in 
• December 1976. In practical terms, the industrial policies 
outlined by Deng in September 1'375 began to be introduced. These 
included strengthening management and managerial rules, restoring 
the status of technical experts, providing clear directives for 
realising the eight planning targets (output volume, product 
type, quality, consumption of materials and fuel, labour 
productivity, costs, profits and use of liquid capital), greater 
regional coordination leading to greater specialisation by 
production units, firmer central planning and tighter control of 
investment policy, and increased importation of foreign 
technology. The emphasis on impre,ving prodllctivity and quality 
was backed by a call for greater use of material inc'entives 
(Watson, 1982: 91). 
Although the industrial r 'eforms were not as sweeping as 
those in agriculture, as early as January 1979, the main features 
of the emerging pol i cies were very clear. Deng's famous saying 
th~t the colour of a cat did not matter so long as it could catch 
mice, (that is economic results are what matter) was revived. The 
growth of a mixed economy with complementarity between planning 
and marketcc,mpeti tion was prome,ted as a way of overcoming 
bureaucratic practices and coordinating the activities of China's 
industrial enterprises, and the numerous other economic units. 
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Urban reforms covered enterprises management, taxation, 
e, pricing, employment, wages and foreign and domestic 
More specifically, the following reforms have been 
,rIr'aclu, ... ll Y introduced since 1 '378 : 
(1) Expansion of Enterprises' Autonomy 
In the past, the state assigned production plans to 
enterprises in the form of a mandate. It also allocated raw 
material, eq'.lipment and personnel through the unified 
distribution system and it purchased and distribllted all 
manufactured products. In reb.lrn, all profits made by the 
enterprises were returned to the state. Conversely, all losses 
incurred were borne by the state. 
In line with the overall reform policies, enterprises were 
granted greater freedom from state administration hopefully in 
order to achieve higher productivity and efficiency. Enterprises 
were given more decision-making power with respect to production 
planning; sales and the handling of finance. Under the new 
system, enterprises must fulfil the production targets set forth 
in the state plan. After fulfilling state quotas, however, they 
were free to decide how to utilise their extra capacity. Me.re 
freedom was also given to enterprises in designing their c.wn 
products. Increasing proportions of ' theiY pyoducts could be sold 
directly in the open market. The enteyprise was also permitted to 
retain a certain percentage of total profits and it has the 
discretion to use these funds either for distribution as bonuses 
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for expansion of production facilities. And in 1383, 
erprises were beginning to hire some of their workers 
rectly. They were also given limited freedom to discipline and 
en to discharge workers (Reynolds. 1384:78-80) • 
. :. (2) Emphasis on "Expertness;" 
The importance and roles of professional managers and 
technical expertise in enterprise management were emphasized. 
1978, the regime has stressed that professional mana.gers 
using the expertise of all their technical specialists should 
. !!Iake the key decisions relating to production. There was a 
",:' . 
renewed emphasis on skills, expertise and c'::>mpetence above 
.•.. ,ideologi cal po..!r i ty and pol i ti cal awareness. Personnel .wi th higher 
educational and technical training were promoted faster. 
Revolutionary Committees set up in factories and enterprises 
" during the Cultural Revolution period were abolished and their 
broad-based composition of cadres, technicians and workers were 
replaced by previe.us system of factory directors in cha'rge of 
running the operations under the leadership of the Party 
Committee. The Party Committee looked after the ' political and 
ideological work while the actual day-to-day running of the 
enterprises was left to the director and his staff (Saich, 
1982:138) • 
. (3) Use of Material Incentives 
The use of material incentives instead of moral incentives 
65 
'""', ",,~' . 
,.;' ,." , 
,. 
as 6een sanctioned. Enterprise management has been urged to rely 
material incentives and to develop strict systems of work-
lace discipline. The old seniority system was slowly replaced by 
meritocratic system, in which workers were rewarded and 
for better work and higher productivity. There was also 
move aW<i\y from guaranteed lifetime employment towards 
f 
employment by merit (Riskin, 1987:342). 
1;; 
(4) Decentralisation of Economic Decisions 
Another maj.:.r reform was the decentralisation of economic 
decision-making to local authorities. Considerable authority over 
budgetary revenues and expenditures was handed down to the 
provinces and localities with a view of arousing their initiative 
by linking their expenditures to their revenues. Also the 
provinces, special municipalities and the Special Economic Zones 
were able, within certain limits, to sign contracts with foreign 
companies without getting Beijing's approval (Riskin, 1987:343). 
(3) Other mean5 of ownership 
Since early 1979 the ~tate has encouraged the development of 
alternative forms of ownership of the means of production. These 
include the establishment of collectively owned enterprises, 
joint ventures with foreign firms and also private enterprises. 
In the cities and towns, individuals and families opened tailor 
shops, restaurants and c.ther private service retail 
--l:!stablishments, provided that they did not hire more than a 
certain number of workers. 
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Consolidation of Enterprises and Specialisation in Industries 
Following the guidelines on readjustment, restructuring, 
", 
consolidation and improvement of China's economy, enterprises 
',' that consistently perfc.rmed badly and lost money have been told 
to improve their performance or to close down. Some of the 
inefficient industries were closed down while some consolidated 
'. or merged with more successful ones. Subsidies to state 
enterprises failing tc. achieve profit were being Cllt off. The 
catchword now is efficiency, and tc. increase efficiency, the 
Chinese Government has also decided to establish specialised 
companies at both the national and regional levels. It was 
intended that these specialised companies would be freer from 
political interference. Their establishment reflected a new 
emphasis on the need for greater specialisation and division of 
labour throughout the economy in order to raise technical levels 
and operational efficiency. 
(7) Changes in Financial Policy 
As part of the reforms, enterprise profits, which previously 
had to be fully remitted to the state budget was subjected 
instead to income tax. At the same time, the funding of capi tal 
investments which used to be provided almost exclusively through 
budget appropriation, was progressively transferred to the 
banking system. The practice of funding all fixed and circulating 
costs free of charge was replaced by the use of repayable 
interest bearing loans from the banks. This move was aimed at the 
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in capi tal inl/estment and the stockpi 1 ing of ex cessi I/e 
ntories, both of which were exacerbated by the use of capital 
ree of charge (Ma, 1983: 102-12). 
With symbolic symmetry, all the abal/e changes were capped at 
Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee an 20 October 
1984 with the adoption of "A Decision of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China an Reform of the Economic Structure" 
~ a document committing China to a market-oriented economy and 
intended to do for the urban industries what the "responsibility 
:I>ystem" had done for the rural economy. The SOl/iet type of 
central I y planned command-economy with its emphasiS on 
" collectil/ised egalitarianism, had been scrapped and the list of 
controlled commodities was to be curtailed. There would be freer 
trade for non-controlled products and more decisions on purchase, 
production and sales would be made by local managers. Enterprises 
would be taxed on their earnings rather than paying a designated 
I>um to the state as in the past. 
2,3: CHANGES IN FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS-THE OPEN DOOR POLICY 
China's open door policy has been an important component of 
the new 'approach towards achiel/ing , the goals of modernisation. 
The post-Mao leaders beliel/ed that the opening up of China's door 
, to the outside world, especially the West and other del/eloped 
~Ountries, was necessary to speed up economic growth and boost up 
adVancement in science and technology. Thus starting from 1978, 
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'nese activities in the world market began expand 
The Chinese attitude towards foreign economic 
" lations also changed. 
The pOlicies of new and increased econ-:.mic 
latie,ns, what is known as the Open-doCor policy, were 
ignificant in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Beijing's 
leap outward" involved an increase in trade, rising 
of foreign technology, increased solicitation of foreign 
and credits, and assistance international 
rganisations. In essence, the most significant aspect of Chinese 
reign economic relations since the late 1970s was the reversal 
'., :frc,m the policy of self-sufficiency <with minimal foreign trade 
":''activities) to one of expanding trade and increasing econe'mic 
lnterdependence in the world market. Zhao Ziyang's report to the 
'Thirteenth National Party Congress summed up the development 
, 'strategy: 
The three main tasks were to give first priority to the 
expansion of scientific, technological and educational 
undertaki'ngs so as to push forward econe,mic development 
through advances in science, technology and improved quality 
of the workforce; to maihtain a rough balance between total 
demand and, total supply and rationally adjust and reform the 
structure of production; and to open wider to the outside 
world and constantly expand economic and technological 
ex change and cooperatic,n wi th other countr ies (Asian 
Recorder, Vol.XXXIII, No.49, 3-9 December, 1987:1'3.763-4), 
Thus, besides implementing changes in the domestic economy, 
China has also designed various policies to attract foreign 
investment and introduced reforms in the operation and management 
'Of foreign trade. Not only has foreign trade soared after a 
decade of virtual stagnation, bllt more Significantly, foreign 
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~'" capi tal has been sol i cl ted, toUY ism pyomoted and a yemad:able 
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series of institlltional changes made to create an environment 
" attractive to foreign investors (Riskin, 1987:316). 
In essence, the following policies designed to facilitate 
the conduct of foreign trade and to attract foreign investments 
and capital have been implemente'd since 1978:, 
(1) Establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
In Oct.~ber 1977, Foreign Trade Minister, Li Qiang announced 
China's decision to establish Special Economic Zones (SEls), that 
is, certain designated regions to expand China's trade with 
foreign countries. The SEls represent an important component of 
the open-door policy. Prior to their actual establishment, it was 
announced that three special municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin and 
Shanghai) and the two south coast provinces, Fujian and 
Guangdong, were to be granted special status, in the development 
of foreign trade on a highly autonomous basis (China Trader, 
No.3~4 Dec,1980). Shanghai, Guangdong and Fujian are notable 
since they are the homes of many overseas Chinese allover the 
world. Thus, it was not surprising that FUjian and Guangdong were 
the first two provinces in which the Special Economic lones have 
been established. Officially, the SEls were to have the following 
functions : 
(a) to serve as bridges fc.r introducing foreign capital, 
advanced technology and equipment. It was hoped that iM the 
pre-cess of production and circulation, and in the joint 
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ventul'es with Chinese· and foreign investments, the Chinese 
might leal'n the latest technique and 
management; 
scientific methods of 
(b) to pl'omote competition between l'egions and between 
tl'adel's within certain tl'ades, all to the lal'gel' end of 
develc'ping the economy and e~t.pediting the production and 
efficient management of China's entel'prises; 
(cl to eal'n foreign exchange by promoting expol't production 
and to filtel' part c,f the fOl'eign capital, technolc'gy and 
equipment through the SEZs to other l'egions; 
(d) to serve as expel'imental units in economic stl'uctural 
l'eforms and as schools for leal'ning the law of value and the 
l'egulation of production according to market demands; and 
(el to create employment (Stoltenberg: 1984:639). 
To ful f il the above functions, the SEZs were to have the 
special characteristics. 
primal'ily on the fl'ee 
First, 
market 
their · economy would be based 
system. Secondly, foYeign 
investments would be actively promoted to become the dominant 
souyce of investment within the zones, and fil;lally, the zones 
would constitute an open system of high-technology and management 
skills. 
Four SEZs Shenzhen, Shantou and Zhuhai in Guangdong 
province and Xiamen in Fujian pl'ovince - were first established 
in 1979. The location of the SEZla paid pal'ticulal' attention to 
the proximity of intel'national industrial and commel'cial cities 
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~nd fin~ncial centres. In other words, Shenzhen, Zhuh~i and 
Xi~men h~ye been careful I y chosen by the Central Goyernment to 
take ~dyantage of, as well as, to meet the challenges of 
HongKong, Macau and Taiwan respectillely. The four SEZs are also 
all located along the Se,uth China coast, not c'nly to ~,aye easy 
access to existing pc,rt facilities, but also because of their 
close proximity to HongKong, M~cau and Taiwan. In addition, 
Xiamen and Shantou are connected to South East Asia ethnically, 
being the native towns of manyoyerseas Chinese in this region. 
Such geographical and ethnic ties offer the SEZs an edge in terms 
of foreign relations, especial I y where investments c,f overseas 
Chinese are concerned. 
It is also possible that though the SEZs are mainly an 
~conomic component of the open door policy, they may have been a 
factor in the issue of reunification. The increasing freede'm 
granted to the SEZs is in preparation for the ultimate return of 
HongKong and Macau and rellni f i cation wi th Taiwan. The Chinese 
authorities hoped that thrOugh the success of the SEZs, it would 
.conYince the people of HongKong and Taiwan that the framework of 
\: 
~\ .. 
·"t- .. 
"one country, two systems" . could work (Leung, 1986:9-10). 
(2) Opening up of Fourteen Coastal cities and Hainan Island 
Of the four SEZs, Shenzhen was the first to be established 
and has developed the fastest. In many ways, this z':,ne has served 
as a pace-setter for China's open-door approach to economic 
development. As a further step towards the opening to the world, 
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Hainan Island and fourteen coastal cities were opened up in early 
1984. Hainan Island was granted quasi-SEl status and the fourteen 
coastal cities were designated "economic open cities". In order 
to increase the economic and technological exchange with foreign 
countries and tc. create better conditions for investments, the 
Chinese Government has decided to anfe.r ce the following majc.r 
policies and meaSUres in these cities : 
(a) The fourteen cities have greater authority to apprc.ve 
projects financed by foreign capi tal. They have the 
authority to approve joint venture projects involving 
investments between US$5-10 mill ion (Shanghai and Tianjin 
have a limit of US$30 million). This is somewhat less than 
the SEls whose limits are US$30 million for light industries 
and US$50 million for heavy industries. 
Cbl Until 1990, the import of key equipment and other 
necessary materials which cannc.t be readily obtained from 
China are exempted from customs duties, tay.es on imported 
products and value-added taxes. 
(cl Investments involving technology- and knowledge-
intensive production, energy and communications or projects 
involving an investment of mare than US$30 million pay only 
15% income tax (Beiling Review, Vol. 27, No. 50, 10/12/84). 
According to Gu Mu, a State Councillor, the major-
differences between the SEls and the fourteen coastal cities were: 
(a) An SEl is a comprehensive economic development area. 
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Thus, foreign investors can invest in industry, agriculture, 
anim~l husb~ndry, tourism, housing, and any other ventures 
of common interest, whereas in the coastal cities, the 
investors operate primarily productive enterprises and 
research institutes, developing new technolc'gies, new 
products and new industries. 
(b) In the SEZs, all joint ventures, cooperative enterprises 
or wholly owned foreign enterprises, productive or un-
productive pay only 15% income tax, whereas in the coastal 
cities, only productive enterprises enjoy this preferential 
tax treatment. Alsc., in the SEZs, imported capital goods, 
cc.nsumer goods and a few other commodi ties, are exempted 
from custom .duties whereas in the coastal cities, only 
imported goods are exempted from custc.m duties 
(Beijing Review, Vol.27 No.50 10/12/84) • 
.. (3) Decentralisation of Foreign Trade activities 
China began decentralising the management of foreign trade 
in 1978. Under the new conditions of greatly increased trade, the 
old system in- which all decisions had to go through sectoral 
Fe.reign Trade Corporatie'ns under the Ministry .;:.f Foreign Trade 
proved to be inefficient. Authority to engage in foreign 
transactions was therefore giveri to ·various other ministries and 
to local governments. For instance, the provinces of Guangdong, 
FUjian and the three cities of Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin were 
granted greater autonomy in the conduct of foreign trade. In an 
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attempt teo br ing domesti c customers and sllppl iers into direct 
contact with their foreign companies, fllrther devolution took 
place so that now dozens of corporations, enterprises and 
factories are authorized to conduct 
(C 1 ark e , 1 '384 = 8) . 
business with foreigners 
(4) New forms of Economic Cooperation 
Besides importing and exporting, China has engaged in new 
forms of economic cooperation and exchange with other countries. 
The principal forms are as followsl 
(a) Joint Ventures. In Jllly 1'379, the Fourth National 
People's Congress enacted a law permitting the setting up of 
enterprises to be owned jointly by Chinese and foreign 
capital. When the Joint Venture Law was first being 
discussed, it was understood that foreign holdings would not 
be greater than 49% and that gradually enterprises would 
become fully owned by the Chinese state. However, since its 
promulgation, the law has actually allowed for a minimum of 
25% foreign investment and a maximum of 99%. I~ is now even 
acknowledged that 100% foreign ownership is acceptable. 
·China has encouraged the formation of joint ventures with 
foreign partners, especially for large 
involving sophisticated technologies 
industrial 
in key 
projects 
sector.;. 
Favourable tax, profit repatriation and other incentives are 
stipulated in the Joint Venture Law of such ventures (Brehm, 
1 '383 = 16) . 
75 
(b) Compensatory Trade. This referred to an economic 
,,' 
arr.angement whereby in return for contr ibutie,ns of capital, 
technological know-how, or equipment, the foreign investor 
would be paid in the form of goods rather than foreign 
exchange. This could be in the form ' either of direct 
products or indirect products. In compensatory trade, 
arrangements range from oil exploration and coal mining to 
the assembly of calculators, cassette recorders and 
televisions. China agreed to allow the foreign investors to 
export all of the output for an agreed period of time, after 
which the factory and eqUipment ievert to Chinese ownership 
and control (China Trader, March ,1980). 
(c) Cooperative Enterprises or Joint Production. This could 
take the form of technology transfers in which the foreign 
partner supplies the equipment, technological know-how and 
personnel to train Chinese workers to manufacture complete . 
sets of equipment or parts. Other form~ of economic 
cooperation include assembly and the processing 
materials. 
(d) Licensing. In order to gain access to 
technology, China indicated an interest in licensing 
arrangements for the pre,dllction c,f locomotiv'e parts and of 
microelectronics, telecommunic~tions, food-processing and 
construction equipment. Under this type of arrangement, the 
licenser receives a lump-sum royalty payment of around 10-
20% upon signing the contract. Depending on the sitllatic'n, 
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the balance is then paid before or after start-up of the 
pI ant. 
(5) China's participation in various International Economic Bodies 
China has begun to participate in various international 
economic bodies, such as the International Monetary Funds (IMFl, 
the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organisation. UMited 
Nations' assistance was used in preparing the national population 
census in 1982. Loans have also been taken from the World Bank 
(Ross, 1'385:48) and freom Japan for large-scale energy and 
. transport development programmes. China has thus abandoned its 
former policy of rejecting foreign aid and has entered into long-
medium- and short-term loans with governments, international and 
private financial institutions. 
(6) Export of Labour and Foreign Invest .. nts 
China has also begun engaging in undertakings abroad, 
earning foreign exchange from the export of labour and services 
and learning relevant technologies by investing in foreign 
enterprises. From 1979-83, for instance, construction and other 
labour-oriented projects were 
countries and regions involving 
carried out 
a . contracted 
in fifty-seven 
value of $2.2 
billion. Ovei' forty contracting corporations in China sent out 
labour for cconstruction and other services in a wide range of 
activities from building harbours, railways and hotels to 
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agriculture and fishing (Cao, 1983:27). Most such activities have 
been in Third World countries, especially oil-exporting Middle 
Eastern countries with foreign exchange to spend. 
" , 
(7) Fairs & Trade Exhibitions 
Beginning in 1979, the Guangdong Commoditie~ Trade Fairs, in 
which representatives of Chinese manufactuYing industyies 
,~ li5te~ed to consumers' demands and opinions, were held on a semi-
annual basis . In addition to this semi-annual Guangdong Trade 
..... 
" 
' Fair, other fairs and trade exhibitions designed to acquaint 
foreign buyers with Chinese products weye held in majoy cities in 
China and throughout the world. 
2.4: CHANGES IN THE AREAS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
Although since 1978 the emphasis has been on economic 
modernisation, other areas of modernisation have also been 
carried out, albeit at a slowey pace, and without as much fanfare 
as those in the economic ayena. 
One of the majoy facets of China's Four Modernisation 
Programme has been an incyeased willingness to purchase foreign 
technc.logies and acquire foreign technical assistance for 
advancement in science and technolc.gy. The lattey is needed to 
suPPOyt economic development and militayy modernisation. 
Although the use of foreign technology is not new in China, 
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~:t i, 
I'· :.{, 
" ~ ,~ the present receptiveness to foreign technology is in some 
;;r: 
)'1 
;b 
.:: ~ respects unique. Not Bince it c.ame to power in 1949 has the 
Chinese Communist Government maintained as many science and 
technology ccontacts so broadly at one time. Not only has China 
acquired foreign technology through commercial channels, such as 
purch.ases of whole plant or the import of machinery and 
equipment, but it has . utilised government-to-government 
agreements and educational exchanges regarding science and 
technology as vehicles teo secure g~lidance and assistance for 
overcoming many 'of its domestic shortcomings in science and 
technology. Although China's strategy for using foreign 
technology has undergone substantial domestic criticism and 
modification during the last few years, the present leadership 
remains committed to securing technology frcom the West (Simon, 
1984: 326). 
Huang Fangyi noted that the introduction of foreign 
technology and the modernisation of science and technology since 
1978 has entered a new phase because of the economic reforms 
carried out since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee and also because of the technological revolution going 
on throughout the world. Many changes have been observed. 
Firstly, there were changes in the scale of introducing 
foreign technology. For instance, from 1978-84, China signed 936 
contracts with various countries for the introduction 
technology at a cost of about US$6.5 billion excluding the 
importation of equipment. 
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Secondly, there was a change in ccontext of foreign 
chnology. In the twenty nine years before 1978, the general 
value of purely technological contracts amounted to only slightly 
over 1% of the general value of all foreign technology introduced 
in the period. But from 1978 to 1982, the value of pure 
technological contracts amounted to US$400 million and was 12% of 
' the general value of the total (US$3.2 billion) in this period, 
1/ 
., reflecting a growing proportion of pure technology in the total. 
Thirdly, there was a change in the type of foreign 
technology introduced. China moved from the purchase of complete 
' : sets of plant and equipment to more diversified forms including 
~. 
licensed trade, joint ventures, compensation trade, advisory and 
I,' consultancy services, technical services and so on. From 1952 to 
1978, of the 790 items of foreign technology introduced under the 
direction of China's National Planning Committee, only eighty one 
or 2.3% of the total took the form of licensed trade, cooperative 
ventures, advisory or consul~ancy and technical services. But in 
the six years 1978-84, there were 530 such diverse contracts, 
constituting about 60X of more than 900 technology introduction 
projects (Huang, 1987:~78-579). 
Since the early 1980s, a concerted effort has also been made 
to remedy past neglect of education. Respect has been restored to 
intellectuals whose crucial role in socioeconomic development has ' 
been emphasized. Intellectuals are no longer considered bourgeois 
outcasts. Educational institutions have been expanded and 
academic standards have been restored. 
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Because they lack suitable educational facilities, the 
Chinese have sent more than 30,000 students abroad since 1'378, 
about half of them to the United States. By 1'385, in order to 
update its resear ch capabi I i ties, China signed agreements wi t h 
foreign countries con more than 300 projects for science and 
technology exchange and cooperation (Salem, 1989: 167) . For 
instance, as of 1986, twenty five formal agreements on 
cooperation in sciences and technology were signed between the US 
and China. Selme these agreements took the form of 
international protocols, .some were exchanges of letters, while 
others were memoranda of understanding. The agreements ccovered 
cooperation on vayiolJs topics such as space technology, 
meteCIYO logy, fisheries, medicine and public health, nuclear 
safety, aeronautical science and technology and environmental 
protection (Wortzel, 19871622-3). 
The national plan revealed in 1978 for scientific and 
technological development gave priority to research in eight 
general areas . . agriculture, energy resources, materials, 
electronic computers, lasers, space sciences, high energy physics 
and genetic engineering. 
2.5: MILITARY MODERNISATION 
Military modernisation has been accorded lower priority 
since 1980 (Table below reflects the fall in the military budget 
as a percentage of the public expenditures). This was because 
economic development was seen as integral and probably more 
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I' fllndamental to national defence than the military apparatus. 
:1:; Conliequently, economic modernisation was rated foremost in the 
~~~ 
• allocation of resources, and all efforts underpinned this primary ~ ,{{',-
-\[2 
."" objective, including a reduction of the military establishment. 
The principal emphasis in China's military cutback was reduction 
o of the military's burden on the economy (Tai, 1988:759-764). 
Table 2.3: Fall in Defence Exp.nditurB 
1981 1982 1'383 1984 1985 1'386 1987 1988 
Defence as 18.0 15.5 15.3 13.7 11.9 n.a 9.0 8.5 
r. of Public 
Expenditure 
Source: FEER IIsia Yearbooks 
A number of top military commanders, such as Deng loyalist, 
Yang Dezhi (then Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army) 
and Defence Minister, Zhang Aiping, whi Ie representing mil i tary 
interests alsc, believed that economic development in the she,rt 
term at least, had a higher priority than military modernisation 
(Tai, 1988:759). As Zhang said in 1983: 
.•• modernisation of our national defence must be based 
on the construction of our national economy. 
However, he qualified by noting that: 
•.• with the development of the country's economic 
construction, more favourable condi tions wi 11 be 
created in turn for national defence construction. This 
means not only funds for building national defence will 
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be increased but more fine scientific and technological 
personnel and newer scientific and technological 
reslllts will also be shifted to the military industry 
to promote the develo:'pment of national defence 
modernisation (BSC SWB, FE Part III, 18/3/83). 
Despite being ac-cc,rded lower priority in resource 
allocation, the modernisation of the PLA has still gone ahead in 
some ways. For instance, China has acquired from the West 
advanced radar, computers and other civil-military advanced 
technology, equipment related to surveillance, air defence and 
aerospace (Yahuda, 1983:163). Also, through many of China's 
"window-shopping" trips to the advanced countries of the West and 
defence fairs and exhibitions, China's military delegations were 
exposed to the advanced weaponry of the West. Useful information 
on the technical specifications and performance aspects of the 
weapons systems were also acquired or observed during such 
visits. This in turn helped the Chinese military planners to 
appreciate the doctrinal aspect of the weapons system and 
fami 1 iar ise themsel ves with the requi rements of modern warfare 
(Romance, 1980:309), 
Generally, however, some of the measures implemented to 
modernise the PLA also served to contribute to economic 
modernisation to some extent. For example, the demobilisation of 
some one million PLA soldiers not only reduced the burden on the 
state, bllt made available considerable economic resources that 
were to be better utilised or employed in other sectors c,f the 
econ,::.my. Thus, the demobilisation process was coupled with 
skills-training programmes and courses, such as crop cultivation, 
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pig-farming, various technologies and business management (Tai, 
'.: 
19881768) • 
Another area of military modernisation with economic 
overtone6 was the direction of the surplus production capacity of 
the defence industries into the area of foreign arms sales and 
expcorts. The procul"ements of the PLA have been cut back in the 
1980s not only to;:. yed'Jce the budget, but to develop the 
capability of an indigenous defence industry, and to exploit the 
excess production capacities to join in the growing arms tyade in 
the woyld (Tai, 1988:772). This global trading in weapons and 
expeytise, as Premier Zhao Ziyang pointed out in 1986 "is an 
of China's opening to the woYld" (China Daily, 
8/11/86), 
2.61 POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 
Underlying all the l"ecent changes in China has been a major 
reordering of the social priorities. In place of the Maoist 
stress on c lass struggle, continuous revol ution and egal i tar ian 
social goals, the new leadership under Deng has elevated 
pragmatfsm and economic growth to the status of the country's 
primary guiding principles or goals. 
In 1978, the Chinese leade'rship under the increasing 
inflllence of Deng and his supporters began to search feor a 
political arrangement to mesh with and SiUpport the strategy of 
economic development to which they were committed. However, in 
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many r-espects, the changes in the political ar-ena have taken 
~. longer- and been mor-e difficult to effect than many of the 
economic r-efor-ms because they thr-eatened the power- and entrenched 
positions of many officials in senior- leadership positions. 
Nonetheless, some significant changes were deemed necessar-y for 
economic reforms. The Chinese leadership realised that China must 
maintain political stability if it is to come close to achieving 
its modernisation goals. Amc,ng some of the political changes 
advocated were : the separation of Party and State functions, the 
move towards collective leadership, and the cr-ea.tion and 
strengthening of the socialist legal system. 
Just as they wished to r-eplace the mobilisation style of 
development favoured by Mao with a more conser-vative and 
institutionalised one, the leaders also hoped to refor-m the 
political system into one which would implement changes in an 
orderly manner, free tr-om the ar-bitrary and often violent twists 
and turns which had character-ised the political proc~ss tram the 
Great Leap onwards, and especially since the Cultural Revolution 
which began in 1966. To this end, they began to talk ~t length of 
"socialist legality". They also wanted the new arr-angement to 
give more "r-ights to the ma.sses". For the leader-ship, this meant 
that the Par-ty and the Gover-nment should be mor-e responsive to 
public opinion, · and that "the masses" should be given 
institutional channels through which they could supervise, 
criticise and to a certain limited extent even, choose their 
leaders. But as good Leninists, China's leaders intended that the 
Party should remain in full control, that the extension of 
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freedom should be gradual and that there should be no lapse into 
"anarchism" (Gardner, 1982:141). 
On 18 August 1980, Deng delivered a major speech at the 
Politburo meeting, in the course of which he dealt with matters 
to be raised at the Third Session of the Fifth National People's 
Congress. He gave a very clear view of what he thought was wrong 
with China, and what should be done to put it right. 
First, he said that it was necessary to move away from that 
excessive concentration of power which had hindered the full 
exercise of collective wisdom and resulted in individual 
arbitrariness. Secondly, any person should not be permitted to 
hold too many posts and deputised po.i tions. An individual's 
knowledge, . experience and energy were limited, and holding too 
many posts made it impossible to work effectively. Thirdly, it 
was necessary to separate party and governmental affairs, and to 
stop using the Party as a substitute for the Government. 
Fourthly, it was time for China's old· politicians to step down. 
He particularly stressed the need to promote young people with 
good qualifications, and t,e condemned the system of lifelong 
tenure for leadership positions (Gardner, 19821175-6). 
The Chinese leadership has reali.ed that a degree of 
democracy (as defined by them) would be both desirable, to 
promote modernisation, and inevitable given the propc.sed rapid 
social changes, notably in the cities. The Party had found itself 
unable to impose stringent .controls on the expression of opinion 
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and it had thu. found itself in an ambiguous position of wishing 
to promote democracy but at the same time wishing to "guide" it 
(Saich, 1982129). 
In changing the relationship between state and society and 
in reforming the political system and processes, the pc,litical 
leadership has opted for a middle course. This middle course is 
marked Ollt, on the e,ne hand, by the ideological and political 
line adopted at the Third Plenum, and on the other hand, by the 
affirmation of the four baaic principles : upholding socialism; 
the dictatorship of the proletariat; the leadership of the 
Communist Party and adherence to Marxism-Leninism and Mao 
Zedong's Thought. This choice of the middle coul'se is most 
eleal' 1 y I'eflected in the abandonment of the notion c,f class 
stl'uggle between the two lines and its sLlbsti tution by the 
concept of the stl'uggles on two 11'0nts against both leftist ideas 
and the tendency towal'ds boul'geois libel'alisation (Tang, 1984:28). 
Zhao Ziyang, in his I'eport to the Thirteenth Pal'ty Congress 
enumerated a numbel' of institutional forces which refol'm of the 
political system might take. Among these, the sepal'ation of the 
Pal'ty and the State I'eceived the most attention. The separation 
of Party an~ State was followed by six other points : delegating 
powers to lower levels; reforming government organisation; 
reforming the pel'sonnel system relat~ng to cadl'es; establishing a 
system of c6n~ultation and dialogue; improving a number of 
systems I'elated to socialist democracy and strengthening the 
socialist legal system (Schram, 1988:177). 
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(1) SepAration 01 Party and State functions 
The separation of Party and State, which constituted the 
first item in Zhao's programme for political reform, is crucial 
to the transformation and development of the economy. The various 
measures adopted with regards to this goal limit the sphere of 
operations of the Par ty but not its overall author i ty. Changes 
were made in the spirit of Deng's call for upholding firmly the 
leadership of the Party by improving it and its style of work. In 
essence, the general effect was to give greater operational 
authority to the Government, so that the Party can focus its 
attention on comprehensive and long-term programmes and gain 
ultimate ideological and political control. In the word& of Hu 
Yaobang, 
the 
Party leadership is mainly ideological in matters of 
principle and policy and in the selection, allocation, 
assessment and supervision of cadres. 
(Hu Yaobang's Report to the 12th National Party Congress -
BBC SWB Part III, Far East, FE/7125/C17). 
In other words, the Party is to be primarily concerned with 
formulation of policies whereas the State, or more 
accurately the Government, is to be involved in administrative 
work, executing and directing the policies endorsed by the Party. 
The present leadership has sought to recreate the 
distinction between Party and State also in the hope of 
. preventing over-concent.ration of power. This renewed · stress on 
the functional separation of Party and State has been accompanied 
····by the appOintment of di f1erent people to parallel Party and 
;" State posts. 
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(2) Move tow~rd6 Collective le.dership 
Closely linked to the move towards separation of powers was 
the desire to replace individual rule with collective leadership. 
power was no longer to be concentrated in the hands of a single 
individual. Teo disperse the power, there was the elimination of 
the Party Chairman system. Various leadership posts were held by 
different people, for instance, Zhao Ziyang as Head of Party 
(General Secretary), Li Peng as Head of Government (Premier), 
Deng Xiaoping as Head of Military and Yang Shangkun as the 
nominal Head of State (President). 
Besides restricting the number of concurrent positions held 
by leaders and reviving democratic centralism, Deng also 
established a new Central Advisory Committee on top of the 
Central Discipline Inspection Commission in 1986. These t ..... eo 
Commissions like the Central Committee are elected by the 
National Party Congress and each has clearly defined tasks and 
jurisdiction. 
In the 1982 State .Constitution of the PRC, the Chairmanship 
(Presidency) of the State is re-instituted, but its power is 
sharply reduced. The National People's Congress remains as the 
sole legislative body and its authority, part.icularly of its 
Standing Committee is strengthened. The position of the Premier 
of the State Council is enhanced by the stipUlation that the 
Premier has overall responsibility for the State Council. The 
troika in the Government structure conssists of the Premier, the 
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
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Congress and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The 
tenure of the President, the Premier, Vice-Premiers, State 
Councillors and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman 01' the Standing 
Committee 01' the Natie.nal People's Congress is limited to two 
consecutive terms of five years each. 
This new organisational line and changes has had the aim of 
preventing any recurrence of the building up of personality cult 
and rule by an individual. 
(3) Move toward& more democr~cy 
While insisting unequivocally on Party leadership and 
rejecting the separation of three powers - the Legislature, the 
Executive and the Judiciary, Zhao agreed on the need for more 
democracy. The Chinese leadership considered elections as playing 
an important part in the promotion of democracy. Measures had 
been introduced to ensure greater accountability from those 
elected. A new chapter had been added to the electoral law, for 
example, stating that elector or electoral units have the power 
to supervise and rec~ll their deputies. Another new procedure 
sought to ensure that elections would be within limits 
competitive that is, there were to be more c·andidates than 
positions to be filled. 
The scope of election has been ~xtended. In addition to the 
elections of work-place cadres, the principle of direct elections 
for people's congresses has been extended to the county level. 
The secret ballot has also been reinstated. 
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Besides foymal elections, there was also to be emphasis c'n 
more consultation and informal dialogue involving face-to-face 
encounters between leading officials at various levels and groups 
of their ccmstituents. This could be seen as a step toward the 
institutionalisation of the tradition of the massline. 
(4) Reforms in the Personnel SysteMs within both State and Party 
Bureaucracies 
To increase organisational efficiency in both the state and 
party bureaucracies, recyuJ.tment was to be based more on job-
related criteria than "redness". The criteria offered in these 
reforms highlight youth and e xpertise, but continue to emphasize 
political loyalty as an important quality in the case of party 
cadres. In the civil service, personnel were to be recruited 
under a competitive system. 
Younger (usually middle-aged), more educated officials were 
being promoted to more s~nior positions. A whole new geneyation 
of young experts has gradually taken over and replaced the poorl~ 
educated cadres promoted during the Cultural Revolution. There 
has been a modeynisation of the cadyes : 
(a) Nianqinghua: Reduction of age by setting up age bays; 
(b) Zhishihua: Enhancement of educational qualificati':,nsl 
(cl · Zhuanyehua: Insistence on specialisation and expeytise; 
and 
(d) GeJ1Jinghua: Guayantee of revolutionary zeal (Tan, 
1984:25). 
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China's yefoymeys also sought to motiyate cadyes by impYoying 
;.-
the yewAyds pyocesslls. PYomotions, yewayds and punishment weye 
to be linked to peyfoymance thyough a peYiodic and yeliable 
peyfoymance appyaisal system. 
Anothey majoy yefoym in the peysonnel management system was 
the abolition of the life-time tenuye system. Two measuyes haye 
been taken to end the tyadition of lifetime appointments. One 
yelieyed old cadyes fyom actiye yespon!Dibilities by appointing 
them as adyisoys. The othey fixed tenuyes foy yayious posts 
(BuYns, 1983: 716). 
Amidst all the aboye changes, there is, howeyer, cine 
constant : the framewoyk of the Leninist Party-State will ~ot be 
changed and the supremacy of the Party is not to be questioned oy 
challenged. The limits to political and institutional yefoyms aye 
set by the four fundamental pyinciples of upholding socialism; 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thought; the dictate.rship of 
the pYoletayiat and the leadeyship 01 the Communist Party. These 
can actually be summarised into one simple phyase: the 
pyeseyvation and stYengthening of the Leninist payty-state. 
Reforms aye permitted oniy within this YestYictiYe fyamework. 
Political modernisation has been limited to what is necessary to 
achieye economic modeynisation. No indiyidual or gyOUP is allowed 
to challenge the leadership of the Payty and no oppOSition to the 
Payty is ~llowed to exist (Tang, 1984:47 & 62). The 4 June 1989 
cyack down on peaceful students· demonstration in Tian An Men 
Squaye only goes to show the intolerance towaYds any opposition 
to the Payty. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
IMPACT OF CHINA'S MODERNISATION ON ABEAN'S SECURITY 
~.1: INTRODUCTION 
The constant theme in China's domestic politics is 
economic modernisation. The goal of modernisation also features 
pn:.minent1y in China's foreign policy. This is, however, only a 
means to an end. The end goal is natie.nal security and 
independence (but to be independent c.ne must be economi call y 
strong modernised), especially independence from the major 
powers. This is derived from its insistence on dignity, 
territorial integrity and sovereignty. This in part reflects the 
modern history of China - a victim of repeated military pressure 
1 
and foreign aggression from the 1840s to the 19405. 
Michael Yahuda has argued that there are two broad 
dimensions in China's foreign policy the societal and the 
strategic dimensions. The first concerns those aspects of 
political, social and economic changes at home which affect 
China's orientation to the outside world. The strategic 
dimension, in contrast, is concerned with the management of 
China's national security interests in response to perceived 
changes in the global and regional balance of power (Yahuda, 
1983: 3). In short, China's 
------------------------------------------~----------- -----------
1. This point Has .ade by Dr Chang Pao.in, Senior Lecturer of 
Pol itical Science, National University of Singapore, during one 
of the in -house selll2n.rs on "China" s Foreign Pol icy" in 198.!i. 
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international behaviour is the product of a complex interaction 
of China's internal politics and capabilities with her assessment 
of the intentions and capabilities of other global or regional 
powers (Taylor, 1974=373). 
The People's Republic of China's (PRC) foreign policy since 
1949 has owed a lot to developments in the international arena: 
the emergence of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the 
United States; the United States' policy of containing the spread 
of communism; the desire of the Soviet Union to maintain 
leadership over the international Communist movement; the rise of 
the Third World as a major force in international affairs; and 
the shifting military balance between Wa~hington and Moscow. ~ut 
Chinese foreign policy has also been affected by domestic f,;)rces. 
There is no consensus as to which factors, international or 
domestic, were more important at any given time in determining 
the course of Chinese' foreign policy. But there is no doubt that 
China's foreign relations cannot be fully understood without 
reference to its domestic affairs. Each of China's principal 
domestic development strategies - the First Five-Year Plan, the 
Great Leap Forward of the 1950s, the Cultural Revolution of the 
19605 and 19705 and the modernisation and open-door policies ef 
the 1980s - has had profound effects on its posture towards the 
rest of the world (Lieberthal, 1984=43). 
Many scholars such as Michael Yahuda, Jonathan Pollack, 
Robert Sutter, and A.Doak Barnett believe that the adoptic'n of 
the Four Modernisation Programmes and the corresponding open dear 
policy in 1978 significantly changed China's international 
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position. They argue that China's increasing search for trade, 
capital and technology has made it more conservative (that is, 
less revolutionary) in contemporary international politics. It no 
longer seeks to export revolution; instead it desires peaceful, 
stable global and regional environments in which it can 
concentrate on its .modernisation. This change in its overall 
foreign policy in t~rn has wider implications for China's smaller 
neighbours in ASEAN. China provides a big market and increased 
trade opporturrties. It has also sOlJght increased cooperation with 
. . 
the various ASEAN states and in the process cutback its support 
for ASEAN communist parties. 
Does ASEAN really enjoy greater security with a more stable 
environment because of China's modernisation? I will examine this 
question from ASEAN's perspective. 
ASEAN's security can be threatened by both external and 
internal sources. Direct military attacks on the ASEAN states or 
subversion by external powers are examples of external threats to 
ASEAN's security and territorial integrity. Although direct 
military attacks are quite unlikely, intense rivalries between 
the major powers in the Southeast Asian region will increase the 
risks of external threats. For instance, competition between 
great powers to gain a strong foothold and carve a sphere of 
influence may lead to subversive activities designed to influence 
the course of politics in the ASEAN states. 
The main threat to the stability of the ASEAN countries is, 
hc,wever, internal in nature. Issues such as poverty, increasing 
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,'/ disparities; between the rich and the poor, racial conflicts, 
).J.; 
t~\· 
religious fundamentalism, political succession and rampant 
corruption in society pose a much greater and imminent threat to 
most ASEAN countries. 
From the ASEAN countries' point of view, '. China's influence ) 
on thei I' security stems from its geographical prOXimity, 
huge { 
great I 
its historical and cultural links, its large population, 
military force and its great power status. Of all the 
powers, China has the most direct interest in the pattern of 
power within the Southeast Asian region as it is physically 
linked to Southeast Asia through shared borders with Vietnam, 
Burma and Laos. Conversely, ASEAN is . constantly on its guard 
against China's intentions. Although a direct attack by China is 
unlikely, the ASEAN cO IJntries are wary of Chinese subversi c,n 
because of its links with their outlawed communist parties. They 
are also afraid that China might exploit the sentiments of the 
ethnic Chinese in their countries, which has the danger of 
le.ding to increased ethnic tensions. Another area of pc.ssible 
contention between some ASEAN countries .nd China is the 
conflicting claims over some of the Spratly islands in the South 
China Sea. 
It ill in these crucial areas - China's relatic.ns with and 
activities in response to the other superpowers in this region; 
China's polic~es towards th~ o utlawed Communist parties and the 
ethnic Chinese in the ASEAN countries and China's claims over the 
Spratly i!llands in the South China Sea that I examine the 
impact of China's modernisatic.n on ASEAN's security. 
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~.21 CHINA'S RELATI~NS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS 
Strategic considerations are key factors governing China's 
relations with the two superpowers. Much of China's policy 
towards the superpowers is a reaction to the policies and 
positions adopted by the latter. Because of China's comparative 
weakness vis-a-vis the two superpowers, it is usually placed on 
the defensive and its policies tend to be more reactive than pro -
active. 
Domestic policies pursued by China also influence its 
foreign policy options. For· instance, China's rejection of 
Soviet's development model in the late 1950s and its switch to 
the Great Leap programmes contributed to the Sino-Soviet split. 
The motivation to move closer to the U.S. in the late 1970s 
arose from both strategic calculations and domestic economic 
requirements. The 1978 Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of 
Kampuchea, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghani~tan and 
its increased deployment of forces at the Sino-Soviet border, all 
contribllted to China's fear of an increasing Soviet military 
threat. The encirclement of China appeared complete with the fall 
of Kampuchea and Afghanistan. Faced with such a situation the 
Chinese leaders made a conscious decision to move closer to the 
U.S. and its allies and friends in the hope of enhOlncing its 
security and checking further Soviet expansion. 
China saw the Soviet Union as thrusting outward into Asia 
directly in Southwest Asia through its occupation of Afghanistan 
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and indirectly in Southeast Asia through its ally, Vietnam. Thus 
China's security concern in Southeast Asia focused on the Soviet 
Union and Vietnam. Vietnam's close alliance with Mc.scow 
facilitated Mosce.w's containment of China by providing basing 
rights for the Soviet navy and air force in the Cam Ranh Bay and 
Danang military bases (Levine, 1984:117-130). 
Increasing Sino-Vietnamese conflict in the Southeast Asian 
region (seen by China as a microcosm of its greater conflict with 
the Soviet Union), especially after the fall of Kampuchea led to 
the heightening of regional tensions • . It also caused some initial 
jitters amongst the ASEAN countries. The punitive war waged by 
China agClinst Vietnam in February 1979 tc. teach the latter "a 
lesson" only compounded to ASEAN's fears of increasing regional 
tensions Clnd instability. An escalating Sino-Soviet conflict in 
the region wOI~ld undermine the stabil i ty and secur i ty of the 
ASEAN countries. 
Fortllnately, China's desire for a peaceful global and 
regieonal environment where it could concentrate on modernisatieon 
preovided a substantial incentive for China to keep its tensieons 
wi th the . Soviet Union at a manageable level. Al thc.ugh China 
continued to supply arms to the Khmer Rouge to keep IIp the 
pressure on Vietnam, ChIna also supported ASEAN in the search for 
a diplomatic solution to the Kampuchean problem. 
In the early 1980s, China also moved towards a limited 
detente with the Soviet Union. Chinese leaders believed that a 
policy of limited Sino-Soviet detente would give China a greater 
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manoeuvreability vis-a-vis both superpowers and make the U.S. and 
the USSR more inclined to concede to Chinese demands. It was also 
a pragmatic response to the continuing Soviet military bUild-up 
in Asia. China'S calculated close ties wi,th the U.S. had failed 
to stop the build-up in Soviet military power or elicit a more 
favourable re5lponse from the Russians on the three key issues 
concerning China's national security. namely, Soviet support for 
Soviet tre.ops in Vietnam's continu&!d occupation of 
Afghanistan and the deployment 
Kampuchea, 
of highly accurate SS-20 
intermediate range missiles along the Sino-Soviet border. Chinese 
leaders hoped that by seeking a limited detente and engaging in 
negotiations with Moscow, the latter would refrain from using 
for ce against China (Yahuda, 1983: 118). 8i -annual tal ks at the 
vice-foreign ministerial level were thus revived in October 1982. 
The increasing contacts and exchanges with the Soviet Union 
may have arisen from a strategic 
independent pc.sture between the 
cal culation to signal China's 
two superpowers: to display 
China's displeasure with the U.S. over Reagan's decision to 
resume the sale of military arms to Taiwan, and over the issue of 
technology transfer and some trade problems; and to allow China 
greater flexibility in its actions within the great power 
triangle, the internal modernisation programme was also a factor 
in bringing about thi51 change in China's Sov.iet policy. A much 
more active Sino-Soviet economic and technological relationship 
was appealing to some Chinese leaders because of a perceived 
complementarity betw&!en the two economies amd the fact that mu~h 
of China's heavy industrial base was furnished by the Se.viet 
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Union in the 1950s. There was a large market in the Soviet Union 
for China'9 light industrial products such as textiles in return 
for the Soviet Union·' s heavy eq •. tipment and machinery. Al though 
Soviet technology on the whole may not have been up to the most 
advanced levels of Japan and the U.S., it was more advanced than 
that of China. Even more important it could be more readily 
adopted to Chinese condition as a great deal of Chinese 
technology was derived fr,::>m Soviet technolo!;ly supplied in the 
19505 (Yahuda, 1982:45-6). 
Thus, in December 1984, China and Russia signed three 
Economic and Scientific Agreements. The three Agreements covered 
a wide range of economic cooperation, including the exchange of 
production technology and technical know-how; the construction 
and revamping of industrial enterprises; technical training; 
Joint studies; and exchanges of experts, scholars and scientific 
and technical information and data under the supervision of a new 
Sino-Soviet Economic, Trade, Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation Committee (Asia Research Bulletin, 28/2/85). 
In 1985, the two countries signed a 1986-90 trade pact which 
put economic ties back on a long-term path. Undei'" the terms of 
the Agreement, the USSR would provide heavy indllstry, aircraft, 
motor vehicles, power equipment, railway rolling stock, chemicals 
and metals in exchange for Chinese foodstuffs, textiles and 
various consumer items. China and Soviet Union would deal through 
barter arrangements which would not entail any outlays of hard 
currency reserves. The Agreement also covered Soviet technical 
assistance in modernising seventeen enteypYises in metallurgy, 
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coal, machine building and chemicals as well as pa~ticipation in , 
new const~uction in the powe~ industry. 
The above ag~eements suggest that some Chinese planne~s saw 
the relevance of selected Soviet industrial technologies for some 
of Chinese development needs and the role which inc~eased Sino-
Soviet trade could play in China's modernisation (Pollack, 
1987: 61 -66) . 
Though the anti-Soviet facto~ was the initial reason fo~ 
Sino-Ame~ican ~app~ochement, the domestic economic mode~nisation 
p~og~amme gave an added incentive fo~ China to seek closer ties 
with the u.s. and its Weste~n allies. Good relations with the U.S 
were seen as essential to expanding trade and to secu~ing fo~eign 
capital, investments and advanced scientific and technological 
knowledge much needed fo~ China's economic modernisation. Since 
me.st inte~natiorial financial institutions · a~e dominated by the 
U.S., Japan and the advanced Western nations, a good relationship 
with U.S. would be crucial in gaining access to inte~natie·nal 
loans and credits. 
After 1980, as modernisation gathered momentum, the Chinese 
leade~s were deeply involved with internal political and economic 
problems that arose in the cou~se of modernisation, but the need 
for foreign investments, capital and technology to help in 
attaining their ambitious goals dictated a cautious approach to 
foreign ~elations. Even as it has moved closer to Japan and the 
West, (particularly the u.S. because .:;,f me.der n1 sa t ion 
requirements), it has sought a limited detente with the Se.viet 
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Union to keep conflicts between them at a manageable level. It 
<. 
has r-elied mc·re on diple.macy to ensur-e its national secur-ity. A 
glance at China's for-eign policy r-evealed such effor-ts. 
Negotiations with the Suviet Union focused on r-educing forces in 
the Sino-Soviet frontier. Talks with India also served to r-educe 
. tensions ale.ng the Sine.-Indian bc.rder and Dehli and Islambad •... 
have been encour-aged to adopt ce.nciliatory moves in order to 
establish a more peaceful environment in South Asia. On the 
Korean Peninsula, China has also constantly emphasized the 
necessity for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between North 
and South Koreas (Simon, 1984.512). 
Because a stable global and regional environment offers the 
best setting for China's modernisation, it has in recent year-s 
acted with prudence and restraint in keeping tensions low or 
within manageable level. Regional stability is crucial for the 
security and development of smaller states in ASEAN. China's 
greater openness and pragmatism in its foreign policy following 
its pursuit of an open-door policy has also provided a more 
favourable atmosphere for the ASEAN countries to explore better 
relations with China. 
Although the anti-Soviet cc.mponent of Sino-American 
strategic ties has receded in importance, economic and 
technolc'gi cal factors in the r-elationship remain important 
considerations for China. Beijing's desire to expand its access 
to advanced technology, trade and investments thus provides a 
str-ong impetus for- maintaining close ties with US and its allies. 
Without continuing close r-elatic'ns, China's access to advanced 
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technologies needed for industrial and military modernisation 
would become far more problematic (Garrett and Glaser, 1989:360). 
From ASEAN's point of view, a China that was close to the West, 
and open to the world presented less problems to the region than 
one that was closed, isolated and resentful of the outside world. 
3.3: CHINA'S LINKS WIIH THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF ASEAN 
The ASEAN countries all have a communist party which 
challenges the legitimacy and authcority of the existing 
governments the Ccommunist Party cof Malaya (CPM) ~ the Partai 
Komunis Indonesia (PKI), the Communist Par ty of Thai land (CPT) 
and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Though the 
threat posed by these communist parties (besides the CPP which is 
still the single most serious threat to internal stability in the 
Philippines ncow) has subsided in recent years, they have all 
resorted to armed struggles and posed grave threats to the 
various ASEAN countries at one stage or another in the past. 
Most of these parties were and some of them are still pro-
Beijing, in return receiving some form of support from China, 
whether material or political and moral support. Beijing's 
support for or links with these communist parties has been an 
issue that has hindered the normalisation of relations between 
China and th~ various ASEAN states for quite some time. 
Since Deng Xiaoping's return to power in the late 19705, 
China's policies towards the ASEAN countries have been consistent 
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with its promotion of a stable interniltional political 
environment to permit concentration on economic development. 
China has sought actively to promote better state-to-state 
relations and in doing 50, has cut 'back on her outward support 
for the vOIr ious communist parties (McGyegoy, 1988133). 
However, a more immediate reason for China's reduced support 
for ASEAN's communi5t parties derived from the political 
developments in the Indochina Peninsula. These developments 
stay ted wi th the U. S. debac Ie in Vietnam, the reuni f i cation cof 
Vietnam in Apyil 1975, to Vietnam's incyeasing alliance with the 
Soviet Union leading to the Signing of a Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation in 1978, and finally the invasion of Kampuchea by 
Vietnam, backed by the Soviet Union. 
The pyonouncement of the , Guam Doctyine followed by the 
withdrawal of US troops from the Indochina Peninsula in the early 
19705 coincided with the yetuyn of the modeyates to the domestic 
political .cene in China. The end of the radical phase of the 
Cultural Revolution and the triumph of Zhou Enlai and his 
supporters over Lin Biao filcilitated the return to a more 
flexible and pragmatic approach in Chinese foreign policy. 
Chinil was eager to win ASEAN's friendship in order to check 
Soviet's increasing influence in Southeast Asia. ASEAN countries 
in the advent of a Sino-American rapprochement were also more 
willing to accommodate the vital interests of China and 
recognised the latter's role in ensuring the security of the 
.. -, - -. 
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Thus the desire to improve relatigns in the early 1970s was 
not a unilateral effort on China's part. While China began to 
court the friendship of the various ASEAN countries, the changing 
global scene and the changing regional balance of power in 
southeast Asia were yeasons enough for the ASEAN countries to re-
evaluate their policies towards China. E~t.cept foy Indonesia, all 
ASEAN countyielS responded positively to China's gestuyes foy 
fostering closer relations (Khaw, 1977:32-33). Malaysia was the 
first ASEAN cc.untry te. establish diplomatic ties with China in 
May 1974. The reunification of Vietnam in 1975 furthey hastened 
the pyocess of normalisation of relations with China; the 
Philippines and Thailand established official ties with China in 
June and July 1975 respectively. IndonelSia remained appr&hensive 
about reviving its ties with China. And Singapoye has; declared 
that it will only normalise yelations with China aftey Indonesia 
has done so. 
studies done by Jay Taylor (Taylor, 19741371-376) on the 
relationship between China and the Communist parties of Southeast 
Asia show that developing friendly relations with Southeast Asian 
countries has been China'~ objective in Southeast Asia all along. 
Melvin Gurtot further argues that China has placed more 
importance on state-to-state yelations rather than party-to-payty 
relations. In fact China's policy towards the CommunilSt pal'ties 
in Southeast Asia is pl'imal'ily a functie.n of the condition of 
state-to-state relations, that is, when the context of state-to-
state relations is good, support fay the communist parties will 
be low. 
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Indeed, from the very beginning of its establishment in 1949 
China tried to win the friendship of her neighbouring countries 
in Southeast Asia in the hope of loosening the ties between these 
countries and its then arch foe, the U.S. In the interest e.f 
establishing better state-to-state relations, its support for the 
communist parties in the 1950s was low and unobstrusive. 
However, China's gestures to woo the ASEAN governments into 
establishing state-to-state ties with itself were not 
reciprocated. Thailand and the Philippines in the 19505 through 
to the 1960s were actively following the American policy of 
containing China. Their participation in the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO), a military alliance created by the 
US to contain the spread of communism was an additional sore 
point. Although Malaysia did not join SEATO, it refused to 
recognise China and isolated itself from the latter. Publications 
from China were banned and the Bank of China branch in Kuala 
Lumpur was closed. Malaysia also concluded a military treaty, the 
Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA), with Great Britain. 
When the diplomatic efforts to win the friendship of these 
countries failed, China turned to supporting their outlawed 
communist parties. The thinking behind this was that if making 
friends failed, perhaps making enemies · might overawe them and 
"cow" them into deferen·ce towards China. Hence, from the 1960s 
onwards, China began to adopt a policy of active overt .support 
tor the communist movements in the ASEAN countries. 
Changing power structures and the realities facing China and 
109 
I ;w 
@; 
;f' the ASEAN countries forced both parties to ( seek accommodation 
~.~;-
with each other and worked towards the improvement of bilateral 
relations. The 1978 Soviet-backed Vietnamese 
Kampuchea brought about a convergence of interest between ASEAN 
and China, resulting in moves by both parties to further 
accommodate each other and create a temporary alliance to check 
l... -_~ .,.. ,..., ~ . " .... -. 
the expansionist designs of Vietnam backed by the Soviet Union in 
c--.. ---......... _ __ ~-.-~.---.-~ ....... ~." ----- . - - ... 
Southeast Asia. 
The Vietnamese invasic·n of Kampuchea has indirectly helped 
China to improve its position in the eyes of the ASEAN countries. 
The Kampuchean issue posed a direct threat to Thailand's security 
and thereby endangered ASEAN's security as a whole. China's 
opposition to Vietnam was thus welcomed by ASEAN. 
In Kampuchea, China has actively supported the anti-
Vietnamese resistance forces, especially the Khmer Rouge. In 
supplying physical support for the Khmer Rouge, China has had to 
make use of Thai facilities and has consequently become a close 
ally of Thailand in their common opposition to Vietnamese 
aggression. China has even declared that it would not permit 
Vietnam to invade Thailand and has supplied Thailand with 
military hardware and ammunition at che.ap prices. Intimate Sino-
Thai relations in the 1980s was a stark contrast to their 
adversarial attit~\des tow.ards each other in the 19605 when 
Thailand was a faithful follower of US containment policy against 
China. 
It was thus the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea 
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that brought China and ASEAN to see each other in a more 
favourable light. China's for ces in its southern border have 
exerted considerable military pressure on Vietnam, tying down 
some 60% of the latter's regular forces and keeping Vietnam from 
realising its hegemonic designs. 
In its ce,nflict with Soviet-backed Vietnam, China had to 
adopt a very different vocabulary frc,m that employed in its 
confrontation with the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
revolutionary rhetoric of the earlier decades was less suited to 
the task of dealing with the Soviet Union and Vietnam as they 
were, after all also Communist countries that trumpeted their 
commitment to supporting other communist revolution.. Instead, 
China had to appear as a responsible member of the international 
system promoting stability and order (Levine, 1984: 124-5). Thus 
China lost no time in accusing the Soviet Union-Vietnam clique of 
posing a threat to regional stability and the security of smaller 
countr ies in Southeast Asia through their aggression against 
Kampuchea. In order to portray Vietnam as the main threat to the 
region and to contrast itself favourably against Vietnam, China 
thus reduced its suppe'rt for the communist insurgencies in the 
ASEAN countries. 
As mentioned in the earlier part of this chapter, the 
modernisation agenda whi ch plugged China more and more into the 
world economy provided an added incentive to keep its global and 
regional environments stable. Increasing tensions would only 
divert its attention and scarce resources away fr6m the tasks of 
modernisation. The internal stability of the ASEAN countries was 
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thus not only important to the overall stability of the region, 
but a strong ASEAN on the side of China would also be a major 
diplomatic triumph for the latter vis-a-vis Russia. China 
therefore reduced its support for those communist movements that 
would threaten the stability of the ASEAN countries and 
concentrated its efforts in building-up better state-to-state 
relations with the ASEAN countries. 
Beijing's moderation since the late 1970s of its support for 
.communist parties in the ASEAN countries was . intended to 
alleviate ASEAN's fear of the threat China posed to their 
national and regional stability and to enhance Beijing's policy 
of regional stabilisatie·n. The limited support that China still 
gave to tbese parties probably owed much to fears that if it were 
to withdraw support altogether, Vietnam might replace itself as 
their sponsor, and the parties would come under the influence of 
Vietnam. 
At the same time, the open door policy pursued by China ~lso 
provided the ASEAN countries with a better insight into Chinese 
society. Much of the awe and mystique surrounding China because 
of it9 isolation from the outside world for more than two decades 
was eroded. It presented itself as any other country with its own 
problems. The better understanding of China gave ASEAN countries 
more confidence in dealing with the former. 
In addition, the nature of the economic policies implemented 
by China bore many similarities to those of a capitalist economy. 
This whittled away the revolutionary ideological leadership that 
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China had claimed for itself in the 1960s. China no longer served 
as a cr'edible revolutionary model for the ASEAN communist parties 
to emulate. Not only did material aid from China decline, but the 
ideological support that China could provide was also being 
eroded. Indeed, Harold Cre.uch noted that although me.st of the 
ASEAN communist parties were at one stage very pro - Beijing, they 
have since developed to become much more national organisations 
(Crouch, 1982:74). Both the Sino-Vietnamese conflict and China's 
. _------ ----_.- ~ l (' ( (. • 
modernisation have forced the communist parties to become me.re 
self-reliant in terms of material and moral support, strategy and 
tactics (Weatherbee, 1983:62). 
The estrangement of the local communist parties from China, 
however, does not necessarily mean a reduction of their threats 
to the ASEAN governments. The role of the Chinese Communist Party 
in the communist movement of the ASEAN countries and its ability 
to influence these communist parties has often been exaggerated. 
Most of them are national organisations that exploit local issues 
particular to their own countries such as corruption, military 
abllses and poverty. The panacea for eliminating the communist 
threats thus lies in the ASEAN government's effort. in solving 
these problems. 
3.4: CHINA'S poLICY TOWARDS THE OVERsEAS CHINESE 
There are approximately 18.4 million ethnic Chinese in 
Southeast Asia. This community is heterogeneous in terms of 
culture, political orientation, economic status, etc. In terms of 
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political orientation, there are 
) 
different factions, some 
sympathetic towards China, some pro-Taiwan, but with the majority 
accepting the reality that their fate depends more on the country 
that they are residing in than on Beijing or Taipei. Studies by 
Leo Suryadinata and Wang Gungwu confirm the heterogerl~us nature 
of the overseas Chinese (Suryadinata, 1985:10-23 and Wang Gungwu, 
1979: 36-50) • 
In spite of this heterogeneity, their importance in 
Southeast Asia has been yecognised largely because of the 
important economic roles they play in their resident countries. 
It was in fact this economic preponderance especially over the 
indigenous peoples in the ASEAN countries that aggravated the 
differences between the Chinese and the indigenous peoples, 
.leading to serious yacial conflicts time and again. 
The Overseas Chinese policy pursued by the Kuomintang (KMT) 
in the early twentieth century left b~hind a legacy of mistrust 
about the loyalty of the ethnic Chinese to their resident 
countries. Following the 1911 Revolution, the KMT maintained a 
strong interest in the overseas Chinese becauae it had begun 
virtually aa an Overseas Chinese Party and also because it still 
looked to them for finance. The KMT began to initiate varic.us 
policies such as promoting Overseas Chinese education, attempting 
to yegister all Chinese abroad, and mustering their support for 
the construction of a Republican China (Suryadinata, 1985:24-25). 
In 1926, the Nationalist Government of China laid down three 
basic objectives in its Overseas Chinese policy: to devise ways 
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~ in which the overseas Chinese would have equal treatment in their 
. ,: 
countries of residence; to facilitate the return of children of 
overseas Chinese to study in China; and to give special 
guarantees to overseas Chinese who wished to establish industries 
in China. In 1929, the Nationalist Government promulgated a 
Nationality Law based on the principle of Jus sanguinis, that is, 
any person born of a Chinese father or of a Chinese mother where 
the nationality of the father was unknown or indeterminate was 
automatically a Chinese citizen. <In short, this meant 
classifying almost any people 01 Chinese · descent as their 
citizens. ) 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was not totally devoid of 
any I inks with the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia before 
1949. They were also involved in soliciting financial assistance 
and mobilising support for the anti-Japanese struggle in China. 
In fact it was believed that the extent of atrocities committed 
by the Japanese when they occupied Malaya and Singapore was in 
retaliation for the active support given by the Chinese in these 
two countries for the anti-Japanese struggle in China. 
The CCP's Overseas Chinese policy immediately after 1949 
considered all ethnic Chinese as the nationals of China. The 
People's Republic of China's (PRC) policy towards overseas 
Chinese was reflected in Article 56 of the Common Programme of 
1949. Article 56 stated that "the PRC would do its utmost teo 
protect the proper rights and interest of Chinese residing 
overseas." When the first Constitution 01 the PRC was adopted at 
the First National People's Congress in 1954, it stipulated a 
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policy similar to that of the Common Programme on overseas 
Chinese. Article 98 of the Constitution stated that the PRC 
"protects the proper rights and interests of Chinese residents 
abroad." Other policies adopted by the Chinese Government allowed 
fcor 'Chinese who had taken up citizenship in another country to 
enter China without a visa and to regain Chinese citizenship if 
they moved back to China. The overseas Chinese were also called 
upon to contribute towards the reconstruction of China through 
remittances, investments and any other means. 
This posed a serious problem to many ASEAN states which upon 
gaining independence had to face the arduous ' tasks of national 
construction themselves and had to tackle issues related to 
'" ) 
ethnic, religious and economic activities. The e xistence 0' ( 
\ I · 
I' " "'! overseas Chinese who did not easi 1 y assimi 1 ate to the indigenous i c •.•. .., '. 
, 
; (\.. • .<-'", r' ... 
culture but at the same time wielded considerable economic power I . 
I .I " l ·· "'" t"1 
caused many difficulties for the local governments and also 
China when it tried to woo the friendship of these countries. 
for 
/ 
After assessing · the resul t of its overseas Chinese pol i cy 
from 1949 to 1956, some observations made by China prompted it to 
change its policy towards ' the overseas Chinese. Firstly, the CCP 
disc6vered that the overseas Chinese were divided in their 
attitudes towards China. Not many cof them paid allegiance t o 
Beijing and embraced the Commun1st ideology. Besides China was nco 
longer able to influence the overseas Chinese through education 
as the Kuomintang did p'rior to the Second World War. This was 
because the governments in South East Asia in their nation-
building efforts has forced more and , more ethnic Chinese to 
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receive a local education - a move towards greater assimilation 
or Southeast Asianisation of the population. Indonesia, 
instance, closed down all the Chinese-medium schools and banned 
all Chinese publications (Suryadinata, 1985:15-23). 
There were also indications that the remittances were not as 
large as expected and the economic value of the overseas Chinese 
w.as no longer very high. Furthermore, several overseas Chinese 
who returned to China did not fit in well to the Chinese society 
and hence created some social pyoblems in China. Last but ncot 
least, the national governments of Southeast Asia increasingly 
resented the ethnic Chinese and became more suspicious of China's 
intentions because of its ties with the overseas Chinese. This in 
turn affected China's relations with these countries which were 
perceived · as important to China's national security. TheYefore, 
when China yealised that the ethnic Chinese question had been 
obstructing the smooth conduct of Beijing's foreign policy, a new 
strategy was adopted (Suryadinata, 1985:62-3). 
·By 1957, the Chinese goveynment began to encourage the 
ov·erBea. Chinese to integrate into their respective local 
communities by taking up ·local citizenship and receiving local 
education. They were also discouraged from returning to China 
(FitzGerald, 1973:134). There was in general a decreasing concern 
for the problems of the ovenseas Chinese as China sought to 
improve relations with the ASEAN governments and as China 
wrestled with its own problems of national constructieon. The 
period of the Cultural Revolution brought further neglect to the 
affairs of the overseas Chinese. No new policy towards the 
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overseas Chinese was introduced even after the official ending of 
the Cultural Revolution in 1969. 
This low-key posture with regards to the overseas Chinese 
issue must be seen in the context of renewed Chinese efforts to 
court the friendship of the ASEAN countries after the 
pronouncement of the Guam Doctrine by President Nixon. Concerned 
that the Soviet Union would exploit the racial issue to fuel 
ASEAN's mistrust of China, China adopted a policy similar to that 
of 1957, encouraging overseas Chinese to take up the citizenship 
of their resident countries. 
The first pLlblic sign of Beijing's revival of interest in 
the overseas Chinese was reflected in a statement made by Vic~-
Premier Deng Xiaoping on 29 September 1977 in which he mentioned 
that he wanted Overseas Chinese affairs to be part of the agenda 
when he met domestic overseas Chinese delegates during the 
National Day celebrations (Suryadinata, 1985:68-9). An editorial 
entitled "Attention must be paid to the Overseas Chinese affairs" 
which appeared in the Renmin Ribao on 4 January 1978 argued that 
China regarded the overseas Chinese as part of the Chinese nation 
and called for the formation of "the broade.t patriotiC united 
front among the overseas Chinese. " Al though China still 
encouraged the overseas Chinese to become citizens of the country 
of their reSidence, the editorial noted that while those who 
acquired foreign citizenship were no longer citizens · of China, 
"they are still our kinfolk and friends" (Beiiing Review, No.3, 
20/1/78, Renmin Ribao 411178). The editorial further urged the 
overseas Chinese to abide by the laws and decrees of the 
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countries in which they lived, but it also appealed to the 
Southeast Asian governments "to protect the rights and interests 
of overseas Chinese and respect their national tradition, custe,ms 
and habits." 
The revival of China's interest in the Chinese abroad seemed 
to be linked to Chinese domestic politics, in particular the 
emphasis by Deng's leadership on economic development and 
modernisation. In the post-Mao period, ethnic Chinese living 
abroad once again were cast in the role of potential major 
contributors to ' China's development. In this connection, Leo 
Suryadinata has argued that the policy was aimed not at Southeast 
Asian Chinese alone. It also included the Chinese in North 
America and Europe. In terms of absolute numbers, although the 
ChineSe in North America and Europe were not as many as those in 
Southeast Asia, their llsefulness to China appeared to be much 
greater in terms of the skills and resources they possessed. The 
Chinese in the West were thus seen as a source of development for 
China and the Chinese leaders had them in mind when formulating 
the new Overseas Chinese policy (Suryadinata, 1985:72-3). 
Lucian Pye also noted that the revival of interest in China 
following the Sino-Amer i can detente, the "American Chinese have 
been in the forefront in providing different kinds of help to the 
PRC in terms of their development, and it is likely that this 
trend wi 11 continue" (Pye, 1980: 29) • . He further noted that the 
new overseas Chinese policy of the PRC would enable the American 
Chinese to e:(port technological skills and business to China. 
Thus it appeared that the need for capital, technole'gical 
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and entrepreneurial skills in its drive for 
modernisation was utmost in the minds of Chinese leaders when 
pushing for the resumption of ties with the overseas Chinese. 
However, China's efforts in trying to woo the ethnic Chinese 
investors caused some misgivings within some ASEAN states. 
Malaysia, for instance, felt that appeals based on narrow ethnic 
grounds to all professional Chinese and businessmen to contribute 
their expertise and capital to China's modernisation was at best, 
insensitive to the political realities of the ASEAN countries, 
and at worst, caused the ASEAN governments to question Chinese 
motives and cast doubts on the loyalty of thei~ Chinese 
communities (Leong, 1987:1113). 
In addition, the ASEAN government& feared that by calling 
upon the overseas Chinese to contribute to China's economic 
modernisation would imply a reciprocal obligation for China to 
aid the overseas Chinese in case they became objects of 
persecution in their resident countries. This would mean China 
could use the "pyotection of the rights and interests ' of the 
ethnic Chinese" as a pretext for intervention in the internal 
affairs of the ASEAN states (Levine; 19841134-5). 
It is, however, unlikely that Chinese businessmen from the 
ASEAN countries would invest in China out of the simple 
"altYl\"£tiC or patriotic" 
I 
reasons of helping China to modernise. ' 
Chinese businessmen like any businessmen look for profits. 
Investments made in China would be based on the calculated risks 
and returns. In fact, studies done by Leo Suryadinata show that 
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ASEAN Chinese businessmen invest more within the region and the 
west. Investments 1n Hong Kong are also high but have begun to 
dec 1 ine since the announcement of China's decision in 1982 to 
recover the sovereignty of Hong Kong (Suryadinata, 1985:95-97). 
Although China's explcoitation of ethnic Chinese sentiments 
to serve its interests such as remittance of money or investment in 
China met with little success, ASEAN governments, 
particularly in Malaysia Clnd Indonesia remained s~\spicious. The 
ethnic Chinese in these two countries have been held in 
considerable suspicion. Both the I ndonesian and Malaysian 
governments have taken discriminato~y polities to reduce the 
political and economic power of their ethnic Chinese minorities. 
The feeling that Beijing has sought to manipulate ethMic 
solidarity for its own purpose persists. With 
modernisation in China, the ASEAN governments were not so fearful 
of the attractiveness of China's communist ideology to the ethnic 
Chinese. Instead, they feared that increasing contacts between 
their ethnic Chinese and China would ~llow them to compare the 
status they enjoyed in their resident countries with that of 
returned overseas Chinese in China, leading to resentment and 
dissatisfaction. Also the emotional and culhlral attachment to 
China by ethnic Chinese could not be totally eliminated 
(LevineI133-134). 
Both the Kampuchean issue and China's open door policy have 
created the conditions for increasing contacts between top-level 
Chinese officials and leaders from the ASEAN countries. Such 
contacts and exchanges have made the Chinese leaders more aware 
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)f the sensitivity of the ethnic Chinese issue to the ASEAN 
:ountries. Thus, for instance, after Deng Xiaoping's visit to 
\SEAN in 1978, Chinese official documents began to differentiate 
;he use of Huaren (to refer to Chinese overseas who have taken up 
,ccal citizenship) and Huaqiao (Chinese nationals residing 
,verseas ) (Suryadinata, 1985:3-4 ) , 
Though Beijing has tilken pains to convince ASEAN that her 
)olicy toward the Oller seas Chinese remains unchanged and there is 
10 intention in the part of China to intervene in the affairs of 
,ther countries, the , fear, especially of the Malaysian and 
ndonesian governments, that these communities constitute Trojan 
,orses thilt could be manipulated at China's behest remains. 
The various islands scattered in ttoe South China Sea have 1 
1,51 CHINA'S CLAIMS OVER THE SPRATLY ISLANDS IN SOUTH CHINA SEA 
I 
i 
,ttracted the attention of littoral states in the region because 
,f their economic and strategic potential. These states have 
:ontested their ownership both politicilily and militilrily. The 
lisputed islands in the South China Sea can be divided into four 
)road groups the Macclesfield Bank; the Pratas Group; the 
'aracel. Group and the Spratly Group. 
Besides being geographically scattered, the Spratly Group is 
,Iso the most politically divided. The islands in the Spratly 
Iroup i1re claimed i1nd occupied by four Southeast Asian states. 
'resently, Philippines occupies eight islands of the Kalayaan 
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group off the island of Palawan; Malaysia occupies three coral 
reefs off the coast of Sarawak - Terumbu Layang Layang, Mantanani 
and Ubi Atolls, Indonesia occupies the Natuna islands; Amboyna 
Cay is occupied by Vietnam and Taiwan also occupied some of the 
islands. On top of this, China claims the whole group. The 
potential for military conflict over these islands is thus very 
real because the ownership of the disputed islands in the South 
China Sea and yield considerable economic and strategic benefits 
for the occupying states. 
Economically, the South China Sea teems with edible marine 
life. Fishing in this region is reported to be still under-
developed when compared to its potential. Large quanti ties of 
guano · are present too in the islands in the South China Sea. 
However, the fishing potential and guano depoai ts are pi ttance 
when compared to geological reports of potentially vast resources 
of oil and minerals in the region. This is by far the most 
lucrative attraction with regards to ownership of the islands. 
The right to exploit the potential wealth present in this 
continental shelf is tied closely with the developments in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) II. The 
200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone would give the states 
the sole rights to exploit the wealth in their Exclusive Economic 
Zone. 
From the strategiC point of view, the islands in the South 
China Sea could be used as a ·springboard for naval and air 
offensives against any of the littoral states. Japan demonstrated 
this during the Second World War by using Ibu Atu of the Spratly 
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Group as a submarine base to interdict Allied shipping forces and 
as a supply base. The Spratly Group is strategically located to 
allow control of all shipping movQment. in the South China Sea 
because of the islands' proximity to shipping lanes, fay 
instance, the Singapoye-Hong Kong route. Contyol of these islands 
would enable the contYol c.f these shipping l .. nes in the South 
China Sea, which ranks among the woyld's busiest with more than 
30,000 ships "passing annually. Moye speCifically, the islands 
could seyve the following functions : serving as bases fay 
communication, weathey observation and yepoyting; sllpporting or 
countering neayby fiSihing and yelated economic activities; and 
Suppoyting intelligence gathering .. nd the projection of military 
powey into the gea and air sp .. ces in their vicinity. 
Although China has long pyoclaimed sovereignty over all the 
SpYatly islands in the South China Sea, for a long time China did 
not take any concrete actions to occupy the islands. Prior to 
19B~, for instance, China did not possess a single island in the 
Spr.tlys. But a Yeviv .. l of interest and a more assertive posture 
, 
with yeg .. yds to the claims of these islands were evident in the 
1980~) 
It i5 cleay that China intends to establish a permanent 
pyesence in the Spyatlys. Delay in taking any concrete actions 
could be due to f .. ctors such as limited capabilities and 
pyeoc cupation with other PI" ior i ties.FoY instance, in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, at the height of the Kampuchean conflict, 
China did not wish to alienate any ASEAN states. Thus claims for 
jUrisdiction in the South China Sea weye suspended for some time. 
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Chinese activ~ties in the Spratlys have been stepped up in 
recent yeOlYlI. In May 1984, China conducted a series of naval 
exercises 
warships 
in the South China Sea. 
were deployed to the 
Dur ing these exer cises, two 
Spratlys on a probable 
reconnaissance mission, and amphibious landing operations were 
practised in the South China Sea area. Since 1984, Chinese 
research ships have also conducted extensive operations in the 
Spratlys. In the spring of 1987, China sent a seven-ship task 
force to conduct naval exercises in the Spratlys and B6 bombers 
overflew the Spratlys. 
The greater interest demonstrated by China towards the South 
China Sea islands may be due in part to the fact that Chinese 
leaders have perceived that the time is propitious to assert the 
claims based on its growing naval capability. Military 
modernisation now enables its vessels to operate further away 
from the Chinese coast. The search for vast resources of oil in 
the South China Sea to replace its fast-depleting on-shore oil 
resources strained by increasing energy needs in the face of 
rapid economi c modernisation is an additional reason for China 
taking more concrete actions to stake its claims over the Spratly 
islands. 
With this aim in mind the Chinese have developed a naval 
strike force in the South China. Sea. China's move in 1987 and 
1988 towards the Spratly Islands which included naval exercises, 
surveys and reconnaissance activities was probably a reflection 
of its confidence in a newly acquired capability. Beijing also 
feared that a delay in taking control of the Spratlys would only 
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make it more difficult in the future. As it is, Vietnam has begun 
to upgrade its defences on those islands it occupies. Older 
weapons have been replaced. The Vietnamese have also added 
additional tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft guns and have 
constructed new buildings and weapons positions. 
January 
observation station 
1988, China began building 
in the South China Sea on a 
a maritime 
spit of land 
called Yongsau Island (Straits Times, 13/6/88). 
to station troops on eight islands and 
China also began 
build military 
installations on two reefs (Straits Times, 814188). At least 
three Task Groups with ships from China's North, East and South 
Sea Fleets took part in the large scale operatic.ns of 
transferring personnel, equipment and materials to the Spratlys 
for the construction of various military outposts. Vietnam 
reacted to China'a activities by occupying at least four new 
reefs. 
By mid-March 1988, China had const.ructed another outpost and 
was conducting survey operations on a reef four nauti cal mi les 
from an unnamed cay occupied by Vietnam in the Union Bank region. 
Chinese Press reports indicated that this reef (known as Chigua 
reef to the Chinese) was the scene of the 14 March incident that 
resulted in Chinese forces engaging Vietnamese forces, who also 
landed on the reef. The Chinese. fdgates patrolling the area 
reportedly fired on and sank as many as three Vietnamese supply 
ships (Bangkok Post 714/88). 
These clashes between Vietnam and China in early 1988 have 
126 
~. 
;!. 
~; 
raised the concern of the ASEAN countries, especially those who 
have a stake in the South China Sea islands. China cannot resort 
to force to eject the Vietnamese without alarming ASEAN and 
affecting relations with the regional organisation. However, the 
reactions of different ASEAN states differed. For instance, 
Thailand's interests do not lie in the islands in South China Sea 
and its leaders may in fact welcome the additional pressure 
placed upon Vietnam as a means of curtailing the latter's 
expansion. The clashes in the South China Sea have been portrayed 
as an extension of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in Indochina. On 
the other hand, Malaysia would be deeply worried as it occupies 
islands that are within the boundaries of China's claim. The 
Chinese stand that issues with any ASEAN states can be negotiated 
or shelved for the time being raises fears that it cO'-lld deal 
with competitor-claimants one by one, and the use of force could 
not be totally ruled out (Buszynski, 198818). 
Though the demands of the civil sector of the economy were 
such that military modernisation has been accorded lower 
priority, nevertheless, modernisation of the People's Liberation 
Army (PLA) has gone ahead . in many ways. The "open door pol icy" 
has also . contributed significantly. Firstly, closer study of 
advanced mil i tary experience in other count I' ies has hel ped te. 
familiarise China's military planners with the requirements of 
modern warfare. Secc.ndly, China has acquired from the West 
advanced radar, computers and other civil-military advanced 
technology and equipment related to surveillance, air defence and 
aerospace. Thirdly, China's naval capabilities have been greatly 
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f upgraded (Yahuda, 
~. 
19831163). 
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With the aim of converting the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) into a more conventional force, the emphasis for the past 
ten years has been on its ability to project its military power 
beyond its frontier. Thus one area which was given priority was 
the development of a blue-water navy. Newer and more capable 
ships have been added to the South Sea Fleet. The Chinese has 
also developed a naval strike force in the South China Sea whose 
specific purpe.se may be to assert territorial claims to that 
ilrea, as well as a marine corps unit , of some 56,000 
(Strilits Times, 13/6/88). 
With increased capabilities, Chinese naval vessels are able 
to operate further away from the China coast and they have been 
sighted more and more often in the South China Sea arol.lnd the 
vicinity of the Spratlys. Both Malaysia and Indonesia have 
expressed concerns over the activities of the Chinese naval craft 
in the South China Sea. Alread! M~laysia has responded to this 
development by sending more military reinforcements to Terumbu 
Layang Layang and stationing more fighter aircraft in Labuan Air 
Base, an air base in Sabah close to Terumbu Layang Layang. It has 
also moved towards upgrading its naval capabilities and building 
up a submarine force. Indonesia has also planned to upgrade its 
military facilities in Natunas. 
The modernisation of China has prompted it to assert its 
claims over the Spratly islands in a more forceful manner. It has 
represented not only a challenge to Vietnam, but also to 
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Indonesi~, the Philippine!; and Malaysia, a challenge that has 
both strategic and economic consequences. China h~s always been 
sensitive on issues of territorial integrity. Historical records 
have shown China to be a tough negotiator over disputed 
territories. Thus ASEAN is really concerned about finding a 
solution to this problem (Pye, 19821172). 
Thus, ironically, while economic modernisation of China in 
the last ten years has helped to propel Sino-ASEAN relations to 
a higher ground, reducing suspi c icons in the ideological 
dimension, the fear of China increases from another source - its 
military modernisation. The ASEAN states will become more anxious 
with the appearance of more Chinese naval lIessels in the South 
China Sea. The· likelihood of China resorting to force t .o settle 
territo,ial disputes is very real. This can be seen in the series 
of clashes with the Vietnamese in early 1988. Although the 
conflict has not escalated and China for both strategic reasons 
and domestic economic requirements has not resorted to force to 
eject Malaysia out of Terumbu Layang L~yang and the Indonesians 
out of Natunas, the claims oller the Spratly Islands will be a 
major area of security concern for ASEAN in the near future. 
China has since 1988, stationed troops on eight · of the islands 
~nd built military installations on two reefs. The Chinese-
Vietnamlisli cl~sh on 14 March 1988 highlighted the dangers of 
futllre cconflict over the islands in ways that could affect not 
only the regional stability and the strategic enllironment c,f 
ASEAN, but alsco the immediate interests of some of the ASEAN 
countries. 
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3.6' FACTORS AFFECTING CHINA'S GENERAL POLICY TOWARDS ASEAN 
In conclusion, since 1978, both strategic and domestic 
reasons have brought China and ASEAN closer together than they 
would normally be. The Soviet-backed invasion of Kampuchea was 
the mos·t immediate reason behind the move by China to be more 
accc,mmodative towards the ASEAN countries. The Kampuchean issue 
created a convergence of interests between China and ASEAN. Both 
were wary of the expansionist designs of Vietnam, which appeared 
very real at that juncture. Sino-ASEAN mutual understanding has 
been improved through their common opposition to Vietnam's 
aggression in Kampuchea. 
As both China and ASEAN sought to improve relations and 
formed a "united front" against the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, 
both parties were more willing to accommodate each other on 
certain sensitive issues. This was especially true for China who 
was anxious to have the ASEAN countries on its side. China thus 
reduced its support for the ASEAN Cc,mmunist parties. This was 
seen not only in the reduction of material aid, but also 
reduction · of Chinese media coverage of their activities, the 
downplaying of any exchanges between CCP and the ASEAN communist 
parties, and most important of all, the closing down of 
clandestine stations such as the Voice of People's Thailand and 
Voice of Malayan Reve,lution which were based in China. All these 
were done to reassure the ASEAN countries that China would not 
engage in subversive activities to threaten ASEAN's security. The 
maintenance of unobstrusivemoral links with the ASEAN communist 
parties was deemed necessary to prevent these parties from 
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turning to Vietnam for sponsorship and coming under the latter's 
influence. 
The ASEAN countries are, of course, not entirely convinced 
by China's reassurances that it would not use its links with the 
outlawed communist parties or use the ethnic Chinese issue to 
interfere in their internal affairs. Most of them still regard 
China as a long-term threat to their security. 
He,wever, se,me ASEAN countries, particularly Thailand were 
more willing to accept China's reassurances. As a frontline state 
in the Kampuchean conflict, Thailand's relations with China have 
improved significantly with the latter openly declaring that 
China would definit'ely come to Thailand's assistance in the event 
of a Vietnamese attack on Thailand. China's willingness to use 
force against Vietnam as displayed in the 1979 punitive war 
against Vietnam made China an important security guarantor for 
Thailand. In 1987, China and Thailand even signed an arms 
agreement in which the former would supply tanks, armoured 
personnel carriers and other small arms and ammunition to 
Thailand at friendship prices. 
The Kampuchean issue may have resulted in a "marriage of 
convenience" between China and the ASEAN state., but the pursuit 
of domes~ic economic modernisation in China created a real desire 
on China's part to maintain stable and peaceful global and 
regional environments. An unstable regional environment would 
distract the Chinese from the tasks of modernisation. The 
increased emphasis on trade (because of an export-oriented 
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industrialisation strategy) and the need for foreign investments, 
capital and technology required international 
diplomatic relationships. The search for more markets and the 
increased participation in more and more regional and world 
c,rganisations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank meant that China had to act 
within certain international rules and regulations in order to 
secure loans and assistance. The greater openness to the outside 
world meant a more predictable China. 
In addition, ASEAN constitutes a fast growing community of 
more than 250 million people - an obvious market for exporting 
countries and a source of key raw materials such as rubber, palm 
oil and timber - not to be ignored by a China going full-steam on 
its economic mc,dernisation. This is especially so since China 
enjoys trade surpluses with the ASEAN countries. The trade 
surpluses from its trade wi th ASEAN are an important sour ce of 
revenue used to cover China's trade deficits with the advanced 
nations. 
It is thus in China's interests to have ASEAN countries who 
are politically stable and economically strong. Viewed from this 
perspective China would not want to engage in subversive 
activities that could threaten ASEAN's security. And indeed, 
China has acted with prudence in its relations with the ASEAN 
states, emphasizing the improvement of state-to-state relatic,ns 
and being more sensitive to issues that are of concern to them. 
Though military modernisation has been accorded the lowest 
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priority during the last ten years of China's modernisation, the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) has also benefitted from the open-
door policy. More advanced weapons have been acquired, and the 
PLA has been more exposed. to the tactics and strategy cof modern-
day warfare. The emphasis in the last ten years of military 
modernisation was on the build-up of a slim, professional 
fighting force, able to project its power beyond Ch i noll's 
frontier. The development of a blue-water navy is one example of 
this. 
With increased naval capability since 1987, China has begun 
to assert its claims over the Spratly Islands in a more forceful 
manner. It clashed wi th Vietnamese for ces on a few oc casions 
(this can actually b~ seen as an extension of the Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict in Indochina) and took concrete measures to occupy some 
of the islands by building military installations and stationing 
some troops on them. But it has continued to act with restraint 
and did not escalate the conflict to a wider scale. It has also 
refrained from using force to claim any of those islands occupied 
by the ASEAN states. This is because China did not want to 
alienate the ASEAN states .;\t this jltncture. However, there is 
fear amongst some ASEAN countries, particularly Malaysia and 
Indonesia, that once the Kampuchean issue is resolved, and China 
no longer requires ASEAN's support, it could be more assertive 
and act to claim all the Spratly islands, regardless of who 
occupies them. 
In ASEAN's eyes a modernising but not a modernised China is 
a positive factor in its security. It is only when China is 
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I· .:, , ~ i~ . % preoccupied with the tasks of modernisation, when it has to keep 
its doors open for investments, trade and so for th, that the 
ASEAN countries feel more comfortable dealing with China. Thus 
China's modernisottion for the past ten yeotr9 from 1978-88 has 
been seen as contributing to the maintenance of security of this 
region to some extent. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CHINA'S MODERNISATION ON ASEAN 
4.1; INTRODUCTION 
A commitment to economic modernisation has led China's post-
Mao's leadership to increase the level of foreign trade, welcome 
foreign loans and investment, and undertake a wide range of new 
international economic relationships. These new foreign economic 
policies are closely linked to a set of sweeping domestic 
economic reforms. 
China's foreign trade policy is interwoven with 
international and domestic politics. Foreign trade is not simply 
an exchange of goods in the economic sense; it is also an 
expression of friendship and reflects dominance or subordination 
in the political sense. Ideological, political and strategic 
factors influence the direction and level of trade, and determine 
the role of foreign capital and foreign technology in the 
development of a country's economy. 
Similarly, Sino-ASEAN's economic relations are not 
conditioned by pure economic factors alone. History, ideology and 
strategic factors were (and will probably remain as) active 
agents in the overall Sino-ASEAN relationship. Economic relations 
were very much affected by the state of political relati':,ns. At 
the Siame time, China had also made use of economic tools (such as 
the sales of oil to Thailand at friendship prices) to win the 
friendship of the ASEAN countries. 
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This chapter will examine if and how ABEAN economic 
relations with China have changed as a result of China's 
modernisation drives. Is China's economic relations now governed 
more by economic considerations or is it still as clouded by 
politico-strategic factors as before? Hc.w mllch impact, if any, 
does China's modernisation have on the ASEAN economies? To begin 
with, I will compare China's economy with those of ABEAN, so as 
to assess the economic complementarity or competitiveness of 
their economies, 
modernisation. 
and then the economic 
4.2. CHINA'S ECONOMY 
impact of China's 
China's participation in the international economy since its 
establishment in 1949 could only be explained if we understand 
the structural and institutional characteristics of its domestic 
economy and the national goals which the leadership has set for 
itself • 
Bruce Reynolds (Reynolds, 1984: 72-79) provided us with a 
framework which gave us some insight as to why China behaved in 
certain ways with regards to its foreign economic relations. 
Firstly, the structural characteristics of China's economy 
conditioned some of its policy choices. Although accorded the 
status c.f a great power because of its huge population and 
military force and its possession of nuclear weapons, there is no 
doubt that China is still economically underdeveloped, a fact 
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which the Chinese leadership itself has acknowledged in recent 
years. Although its per capita income has risen in recent years, 
it is still somewhere between US$300 to US$500. It remains 
largely an agricultural country. Being a less developed country 
(LDC) means that it faces a set of problems common to all LDCs 
such as high illiteracy, technically backward population, urban-
rural income disparities, problems of rural migration, and so on. 
Being poor means that its ability to import may be hampered. At 
the same time, because of its huge population and lack of 
technical experts and skilled labour force to compete in the high 
technology industries, its cc.mparative advantage in the 
industrial sector lies in the production of labour-intensive 
products. 
However, unlike a lot of LDCs, China has a continental 
economy. It can find a whole range of resources which the economy 
requires within its own borders. Arable land makes up one-tenth 
of the total area, and its major industrial cash crops include 
cotton, silk cocoons, tung oil, kenaf 'and jute. China also has 
rich mineral reserves such as coal, iron, petroleum, rare earth, 
magnesite, tungsten, antimony, bauxite, zinc, tin, lead and 
mercury. Its coal exports totalled 7.57 million tons, the highest 
in Asia. Petroleum output reached 125 million tons in 1985, the 
sixth highest in the world and its export volume amounted to over 
30 million tons. 
Though richly endowed China still has to import some 
Faw materials such as Fubber, copper, aluminium, timber which are 
either not found c.r only in small quantities in China. In 1960, 
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for instance, China imported 107,000 tons of natural rubber, 
112,000 cubic metres of timber and 74,000 tons of copper. With 
the growth in economy, these increase to 205,000 tons, 8.238 
million cubic metres and 311,000 tons respectively, in 1984 (Guo, 
1987:63). 
Having a big, continental economy also implies that the 
ratio of trade to Gross National Product (GNP) tends to be small. 
China had never been a major trading partner. For example, during 
the period from 1952-78, China's exports came to only 4-5X of its 
GNP and China accounted for only about 0.6X of the total volume 
of world trade. Most continental economies such as the US for 
, 
instance, trade1 less than small countries. 
Next, China's political ideology. China's Leninist ideology 
conditions the way her economy functions. Leninism requires state 
ownership of industyy, centYal planning of the economy and the 
concentyation of powey in the hands of a vanguard Communist 
Party. An ideology which stresses the importance of the Party's 
vanguayd role breeds stiff resistance to ecclnomi c 
decentralisation. That is one of the main reasons why the recent 
economic changes intyoduced since 1978 continue to face problems 
of resistance. 
Thirdly, we look into the national economic goals of China. 
Rapid growth, price stability, income equality and national self-
sufficiency ~re the aims of many countries. However, the priority 
ac corded to each di ffer9. Some countries aye wi 11 ing to achieve 
rapid economic growth at the expense of price stability and 
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income equality. During different phases of China's internal 
development, depending on which group of people was in control, 
China has given different emphasis to these goals. For example, 
during the Great Leap years under Mao Zedong, these four goals 
were p~lrsued at the expense of ece.nomc rationality. But when 
major problems surfaced, Liu Shaoqi took over the tasks of 
rebuilding the economy, and he was willing to forego the goal of 
income equality in the short run, in exchange for higher 
productivity and efficiency and hence. higher growth. 
In recent years, we also saw the pursuit of higher growth at 
the expense of income equality and self-reliance. Since 1978~ the 
priorities of the economic goals of China have changed. The goal 
of modernisation is now almost equated with achieving r~pid 
economic growth. Efficiency and productivity are taken as the 
keys to higher growth. Efficiency is emphasized at the expense of 
self-reliance and productivity at the expense of equality. 
Foreign debts ha~ been increasing. China has become more and 
more dependent on foreign investments and foreign trade for its 
economic growth. It has created for itself a situation of 
dependency and opened itself up to exploitation by the advanced 
economies. Income disparities have widened, between different 
regions, different households, between the urbanites and the 
rural population. 
Last but nc.t least, we look into the economic institutions 
in China. China has had for many years, a central planning system 
responsible for the running of the whole economy. Under this 
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",/ system, most industries were state-c·wned and all were slJbjected 
<..t 
," 
~:-" 
'I' 
to tight restrictions by government planning agencies, which set 
the enterprises' annual production plans, controlled the size of 
their labour force, allocated key inputs, distributed their 
outputs and determined their prices. 
The foreign trade sector was run in the same manner. 
Enterptses c·r other units whi ch wished to import foreign goods 
must woyk thyough administrative channels, receiving permission 
from the foreign trade bureaucracy in Beijing. Exporters did not 
interact directly with foreign markets; they were insulated from 
their buyers by the state corporations through which all foreign 
importers must wOYk. Expoyt then was not an end in itself but a 
means to pay fay imports. Foreign trade was the balancing sector 
in the economic plan, with impoyts making up for shortfalls in 
domestic production, and pyoviding goods that could not be 
produced economically in China (Lee, 1982:41). 
China's manufacturing sector until recently focused on 
import-substitution, the development of heavy industries and the 
production of investment goods rather than consumer goods. Under 
this industrialisation strategy a typical trade pattern was large 
imports of machinery and industrial raw materials, financed by 
exports of agricultural products. Imports of consumer goods were 
restricted. (pp. cit., 103) 
China, ~ntil recent years, h~s an inward-looking economy and 
has been qui te sel f -Sllff i cient. However, economi c reforms since 
1978 have shifted China towards a more market-c.riented and open 
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economy. Fundamental changes have taken place in China's 
industrial and trade policies since 1980. The new policy is more 
outward looking and emphasizes comparative advantage in contrast 
to the earlier stress on import substitution (Chia, 1987:89~104). 
Indeed, Chinese activity in the world market has increased 
significantly since 1978. In the ten years since it launched its 
ecc'nomic reforms in 1978, China h~d' developed into one of the 
I 
world's fastest growing ece,nomies. The pursuit of an open de.or 
policy and corresponding changes in its approach towards foreign 
economic relations had seemingly e.pened up great opportunities 
for the outside world. Chinese leaders under Deng believed that 
the country would need considerable foreign financial and 
technological assistance if it was to achieve the goals of 
modernisation. Therefore a concerted effort was made to attract 
foreign investments (Table 4.1 show~ the growth of foreign 
investments over time), to expand trade (Tables 4.2A and 4.2B 
reflect the expansion of foreign trade with Table 4.2B showing 
the slight increase in China's trading volume in the world 
market), to acquire loans and credits and to import capital goods 
and foreign technological know how. 
Although many changes in the economic arena had been 
implemented, the changes in the structure and institutions of 
China's polity were somewhat slow and were not keeping pace with 
the economic changes. This in turn constrained the move towards 
the goal of economic modernisation. The Leninist political 
ideology of concentration of power in the hands of the Communist 
Party is ' I' the main obstacle c.f 
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the recent economic reforms. 
Economic reforms cannot proceed any further without corresponding 
changes in the political arena. The Tian ,An Men incident on 4 
June 1989 highlighted this conflict. 
Before proceeding to discuss the economic impact of China's 
modernisation on ASEAN, let's look into the economies of the 
ASEAN countries. In this discussion, Brunei has been deliberately 
left out of the analysis because of its relative insignificance 
in view of its small population and size, (Brunei has a 
population of approximately 200,000). Although a rich country by 
world standard (with a per capita ince.me of US$10,000), it is a 
relatively yc.ung cc.untry having achie'ved full independence on 1 
January 1984, whose economic and political significance in the 
regional scene 'is negligible. Also because .;)f its newly 
independent status, much of the historical analyses prior to 1984 
would not be applicable to Brunei. 
4.3: THE ASEAN ECONOMIES 
Although differences exist in the economies of the various 
ASEAN member states, some generalisations could still be made. 
The ASEAN economies are typically open and outward looking, 
deriving a large proportion of their GNP through foreign trade. 
Foreign investments play a crucial role in the growth of the 
ASEAN economies by creating emple'yment and making available 
capital, technology and access to foreign export markets (Wong, 
1'384: 10). 
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A large proportion of ASEAN's primary commodities are 
exported to the industrial markets of advanced economies. And all 
ASEAN members because c.f their small domesti c markets, were 
event~ally forced to switch from import-substitution strategy to 
~' the strategy of export-driven industrialisation (Chan, 1989:53). 
~" 
"," 
The efforts to promote industrialisation, so as to diversify 
the economies from over-reliance on primary prc.ducts, and the 
desire to have a modernised and independent economy, led to 
industrialisation strategies based initially upon import-
substitution. Import-substitution refers essentially to the 
policy of reducing or eliminating the import of foreign goods 
through ta~fifs and quotas and reserving the domestic markets for 
/ 
local production. Import-substitution industries are usually set 
up to produce simple, lc,w-priced consumer goods using imported 
machinery and cheap local labour. The ASEAN countries differed in 
the extent and duration of their import-substitution policies 
before eventually shifting to the export-oriented 
industrialisation (Tong, 1987:95-6). 
The ASEAN countries now differ in the degree cd export-
orientation of their manl,facturing sectors. ' The difference in 
timing of the switch from import-substitution to export-oriented 
industrialisation, accounted in part for the differences in their 
current state of industrialisation. Singapore is the most export-
or iented, having exper ienced c.nl y a I imi ted phase of import-
substitution in the early 1960s. With Singapore's separation from 
Malaysia in 1965, it was clear that Singapore lacked the domestic 
market for a viable import-substit'.ltion programme. Therefore, it 
145 
started off with an export-oriented industrialisation drive. 
The SingaDor. Economy 
Manufacturing, contributing 24.3;( to Gross Domestic Product 
(GOP) in 1396, is the most important sector of the Singapore 
economy, followed by financial and business reserves (21.6;(), 
commerce (17;(), and transport and communications (14.3%). The 
distinguishing feature of the Singapore economy, however, resides 
not in its sectoral composition but its external orientation and 
extent c.f foreign participation. Direct exports constituted 61;( 
of manufacturing output in 1984, and of these 82;( were by foreign 
owned establishment which also accounted for 53% of manufacturing 
employment, 63;( of value-added and 7f;( of gross output (Chng, Low 
and Tc.h, 1988: 1(3), 
Within a span of twenty years, Singapore has added various 
new pillars to its economy. Its manufacturing sector exports a 
varied range of increasingly more sophisticated products to world 
markets. Trade in services contributed 60;( of GOP in Singapore in 
1984 and is expanding and .growing in importance. 
Its dependence on the region and hence its vulnerability to 
the policies of its neighbc.uring countries has been reduced. 
ASEAN's share c.f Singapore exports has shown a sharp decline from 
44.8% in 1965 to 20.9% in 1986, while the share of Northeast 
Asia, especially Japan has risen sharply from 9.4% to 21.4%. The 
share of the US market has also increased dramatically from 4.2;( 
to 23.3%, but the share of the European Community (EC) has fallen 
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. . '." somewhat frc.m 13:r. to 11.1:r.. Thus over the years, Singapc,re has 
overdependence on the region to 
! wider and more varied markets around the world. This also implied 
. )~~";: 
+ . ~ Qreater d1rect exposure to the ups and downs of the world economy 
:.7:- -
.~\~ 
~ (Chng, Low and Toh, 1988:134-5) . 
.• ;~ 
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International trade is thus the lifeblood of the Singapore 
economy. Its economic miracle would not have been possible 
without the sustained boom in the wc,rld ecc,nomy which began in 
the early 19509, a boom fed by an even faster rise in world trade 
and investment. When international trade surges, the Singapore 
economy soars; when world trade slows, the Singapore ece,nomy 
falters. The amount of buffer provided by domestic demand 
management is rather limited. Thus in the global recession of the 
early 1980s, when Singapore's expc.rt gr':lwth de·clined sharply, GOP 
was kept up for a time by domestic demand, but when the 1983/84 
US-based upturn in world economy was not sustained, 
economy tumbled, recording .a minus grc.wth in 1'385, 
years of uninterrupted gr':lwth (op. cit., 135-7). 
the Singapore 
after twenty 
Given the external dependence, the nightmare for Singapore 
would be a breakdown of the liberal trading system, a resultant 
shrinkage in world trade and the onset of world depression. Thus 
the maintenance of a liberal world economic order is of paramount 
importance to Singapore. 
The Malaysian Economy 
Malaysia started with import-substitution industrialisation 
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in 1958 and switched to export manufacturing in the late 1960s. 
The deyelopment of the manufacturing sector is an integral part 
of its oyerall economic diversification programme. 
After more than a decade of import - substitution industrial 
" . development, a number of structural cor policy problems surfaceil. 
To begin with, the Malaysian economy is too small to support 
technically optimllm - sized and efficiently competing firms. The 
limitation of domestic markets ruled out certain lines of 
industrial production unless they were set up with a view to the 
e xport market. MalaYSian leaders thus decided that further 
industrialisation wOllld have to be expeort -or iented (Wong, 
;~:. 197'3:65) . 
Despite advances in the export of some manufactured 
products, about 60% of Malaysia's export earnings still come from 
commodity exports. The main primary exports are rubber~ oil palm, 
tropical hardwood and tin. Oi 1, copper and iron are also 
important e xports. In contrast, the manufactured exports are too 
narrowly based on a few products, particularly, textiles and 
electronics (which contributed some 637. of total manufactured 
e xports in 1985, of which the semi-conductor assembly alone 
accounted for 36.2% (Salih, Piei and SahathaYan, 1988:66-7'. 
The we~kness in the Malaysian economy was exposed during the 
world recession in the . early 1'380s . . Up till the 1980s, primary 
e xports had been the major source of growth for the Malaysian 
economy. However, since 1985, the primary sector failed to 
perform, following an across-the-board decline in the prices of 
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I., ~.,·,;.·.;.I Malaysia's major exports, me.st notable being rubber, palm oil and • • tin. The price decline, unprecedented in recent history in terms ~,': of per'vasiveness as well as the sharpness of the fall, had 
I·.~' 
;:r·· resulted in a 25.2% contractie.n in the comme.dity llnit value 
l'. 
!f index, and a loss e.f about M$7.79 billion in commodity e~l,p'::Jrt 
~:'.: 
:,,'" 
. 
" earnings in 1986 and hence a fall in Malaysia's GNP. The economy 
;,: 
thus faced serious dislocations (Salih et · al, 1'388:69-70). 
In light of such massive economic problems, Malaysia adopted 
more liberalised investment policies in order to spur domestic 
investment and attract fe.reign investments, particularly in the 
manfacturing sector. This was crucial, since the sector has been 
identified to spearhead Malaysia's economic growth over .the next 
decade, as the prices of primary commodities are likely to remain 
depressed for some time to . come. Towar'ds this end, the Malaysian 
government had since 1986 undertaken a series of measures which 
offered more attractive investment incentives, especially to 
foreign investors with less restrictic.ns attached (Salih et aI, 
1988: 99) • 
The Philippines Economy 
The prime motivation behind Philippines industrialisati.:;on 
drive was ver'Y much the same as those of other ASEAN countries : 
th~ desire to diversify the economy from over-reliance on primary 
exports, to promote faster economic growth and to create more 
employment. Traditionally, manufactlJring in the Philippines was 
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centra ted in the processing of raw materials SllCh as sugar 
1979:67). 
The trade and exchange controls of the 1950s created an 
economic environment favourable to full-scale import-
substi tuti';:.n, as goods industries prc,f i ted from 
relatively free impo::,rts o::,f capital goods (secured through the 
massive economic aid pumped into the Philippines by the US) and 
the high domestic price of finished products engendered by the 
system. 
The foreign exchange needs of the import-substituting 
industries were satisfied mainly through the export of commercial 
agricultllral crops. Philippines exports were then characterised 
by low-valued added products, excessive concentration on a few 
items, and continuing reliance on agriculture or agricult'.lral-
related pro::,ducts. Cash crops such as coconut and Manila ' hemp 
accounted for one third of total arable land. It is also a major 
producer of trc'pical timber. Most of its timber ar .. e e :~ported 
after processing. Of recent, copper has also become an important 
export (Alburo, Medalla and Pailte, Jr, 1988:104-5). 
With the saturation of the domestic market and exhaustion of 
the import-substitution phase of development, Philippines became 
more dependent upon imports and ~inally r_n into a foreign 
exchange crisis. This coupled with the oil crisis in 1973/74~ led 
to shifts in the structure and pattern of trade. Export-oriented 
industrialisation was encouraged. The share of manufactured 
products such as electronic components, garments, handicrafts and 
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footwear in exports increased from 8.3% in 1970 to 61.7% in 1985. 
The change in trade structure was not only confined to products, 
but markets as well. The principal destinations of Philippines 
remained the same, but their percentage shares in the Philippines 
market declined. In the early 1'370s, both the US and Japan 
constituted 74% cof Philippines' export,s markets. By 1'385, this 
had dropped to 44% with the slack being ta~en up by ASEAN 
countries, the socialist ccountries, HongKong, Australia and the 
Middle-east. For imports, the shares of both US and Japan 
declined from 57% to 39% during the same period (Alburo et aI, 
1'388: 105) • 
The Thai Economy 
In Thailand, the urge for industrialisation was generated 
basically by the same set of conditions as the other ASEAN 
economies. Modern industrialisation process was supposed to start 
in 1954 following the enactment of the Industrial Promotion Act. 
However, there was a lack of industrialisation momentum then due 
to the acute shortage of capital, technology, infrastructure and 
entrepreneurs (Wong, 1979: 77). Thus its indllstr ial isaticon onl y 
got off the ground in the 1960s. Like the Philippines, it 
switched to export-oriented industrialisation only in the mid-
1970s arid most of its manufac.tured products are still tilted 
towards labour-intensive, low-value added products such as 
textile, fo:>otwear and so forth. In recent years, the share cof 
manLlfactures in Thailand's trade has been increasing, finally 
reaching the 501 mark in 1986. 
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Agricultural products remain as important e~;ports e,f t~,e 
count ry. Ri ce, rubber, co conu ts and oi 1 pa 1 mac count for a 1 mos t 
half of the country's total export value. As for minerals, 
Thailand's traditional mining indllstry is in tin and tungsten 
(Guo:" 1987:65). 
The Indonesian Economy 
Indonesia has still a relatively inward looking 
manufacturing sector but has begun to move towards export-
expansion after a drastic drop in the prices of primary 
commodities, especially that of oil, which dealt a heavy blow on 
its economy. 
From the very beginning of its independence till the 
present, Indonesia has relied heavily on primary products to earn 
the necessary foreign exchange. It started with agricultural 
commodity exports and expanded to include extractive commodities 
such as energy fuels, minerals and timber. In 1986, agriculture, 
livestc,ck and fishery, petroleum, petroleum products and natural 
gas, and other primary commodities such as rubber, tin, oil palm, 
timber and log contributed more than 90X of Indonesia'S exports. 
The foreign exchange earnings from these primary products were 
then used to sustain the import-substitution industrialisation 
strategy pllrsued (Mangkusuwanda,Simandjuntak and SUY'ono, 
1988: 39-4'3) . 
The various changes in the economic environment facing 
Indonesia, however, necessitated a new direction in its economic 
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strategy. The import-substitution industrialisation which it has 
relied for many years was no longer sustainable in the 1980s as 
many industries in this category faced a stagnating domestic 
market. On the other hand. the development of import-substituting 
ind'.lstries in the areas c,f prc,ducer goe,ds is ece,nomically less 
viable because the domestic market is too small in terms of the 
scale needed for efficient production. 
Furtherme,re. the was 
unemployment problems. tight foreign 
confronted 
exchange 
by 
and 
serious 
savings 
constraints when prices of primary comme,dities in general. and 
that of oil and natural gas in particular. plunged to a very low 
level resulting in a rapid decline in exports and export 
earnings. It had no choice but to change its course and pursue 
an expo ... t-led 
development in 
development. 
the years to 
Therefore. Indonesia's economic 
come is dependent on manufactured 
exports which also call for changes in its trade policy. A se ... ies 
of trade liberalisation measu ... es we ... e implemented since 1984. and 
it also began to expand its trade with the eastern bloc count ... ies 
(Mangkusuwanda. Simandjuntak and Surono. 1988;53). 
Indonesia is a newcomer as an exporter of manufactu ... ed 
products. As noted earlier. the combined share of chemical 
products. machinery and transport equipment. and miscellaneous 
articles in total exports was as law as 4Z in 1982. Within the 
category of manufactured products. only a few items are of export 
significance. namely; fe ... tilise .... plywood. textiles and clothing. 
As a whole, Indonesia's manufactu ... ed exports are few in numbe ... 
and small in terms of value (op.cit., 53-4). 
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As noted, with the exceptic.n of Singapore, the other four 
ASEAN countries are still heavily dependent on the export of 
primary commodities even after embarking upon industrialisation: 
89~ for Indonesia; 73~ for Malaysia; 65~ for Thailand and 49~ for 
Philippines in 1985. (See Table 4.3) The\'e are a number e.f 
commodities that the five ASEAN countries together dominate: 
abOl.lt 80X of the world's rllbber; 65X of the tin supply; 56~ c.f 
coconut; 51~ of palm oil. Other commodities of which ASEAN is an 
important supplier are rice and timber 
1977:10). 
(Saw and Sirisena, 
Another important feature in the extern~l economic relations 
of ASEAN is its heavy dependence eln the industrialised market 
economies, partiClllarly those of Japan and the US. Table 4.4A 
shows ASEAN's trade with the industrialised countries and Table 
4.4B shows the high per centage share of the Japan and Amer i can 
markets in the total trade turnover of the individual ASEAN 
ce.unt I' ies. This can be explained in part because of the heavy 
concentration of primary products in ASEAN's exports, which are 
absorbed by the industrial economies. 
Furthermore as the ASEAN countries set upon the path of 
industrialisation, they relied on the continuous inflow of 
capital, technology and modern equipment from the West and Japan. 
The dependence on Japanese investments for instance can be seen 
from Table 4.5. Also the ASEAN econeomies have come te. depend 
increasingly on these advanced countries as markets for their 
low-cost, labour-intensive industrial exports. This results in a 
high-degree of dependency on the part of ASEAN (Wong, 1979:18-9). 
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To avoid being overly dependent on the developed countries, 
the ASEAN countries attempted to diversify their economic 
relations aft~r freeing themselves from the repercussions of the 
economiC crises that originated in the West during the late 19705 
and early 19805. They toc,k steps to eliminate the influence of 
ideological factors as an obstacle for forging greater economic 
ties with other nations. Apart from a big effort tc, develop 
economiC cooperation with countries in southern and western ASia, 
they also set themselves to improving economic relatic,ns with 
socialist countries (Cheng and Zhang, 1'387:31). 
The region is still very much dependent upon foreign trade 
for economic growth and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable 
fuhtre. The pattern c,f ASEAN dependence on industrial market 
economies has changed in many respects; from a main exporter of 
primary resoul'"ces to the provision cheap laboltl'" and 
functioning as cheap production bases for companies from the 
advanced industl'"ialised countries. Nevertheless, the growth 
prospects of ASEAN countries are still very much dependent on the 
economic performance of the industrial market countries eNg, 
Hirono ~ Akrasanee, 1987:45). 
4.4; CHINA-ASEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
China's bilateral economic relatic,ns with the ASEAN 
cOI~ntries, especially in the 1960s and 19705 were very much 
affected by the political climate and the strategiC situation in 
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the Southeast Asian region. Not surprisingly, 
economic relations with individ~\al ASEAN countries 
China's past 
at the peak 
of the cold war were characterised by nUmerOl\S pe.litical twists 
and turns. 
Prior to 1978, the econe.mic relations between China .and 
ASEAN centred primarily on trade ale.ne. Other areas of ece.nomic 
interactions had not been developed. China's two-way trade with 
ASEAN before the open door policy constituted an average of 5.81% 
of China's total trade during the period from 1'371-74. On the 
c.ther hand, China' 5 share of ASEAN's overall trade in the same 
per i-:od was 1.8'37.. (See Tables 4.6 and 4.7 respectively) 
Trade between China and the various ASEAN countries had 
begun even in the absence of formal diple.matic relations, the 
most notable was the uninterrupted trade relati-:ons between 
Singapc.re and China. Although Singape.re until this day has not 
established official relations with China, the two co untries has 
been engaged in trade since the 1950s. 
There were certain outstanding features in Sino-ASEAN trade. 
Firstly, in terms of trade pattern, China had been a major 
exporter of rice, foodstuffs and low-cost consumer goods (ranging 
from various kinds -:of household wares, tools, to low-priced 
garments and textiles) in return for Chinese import e.f certain 
raw material such as rubber, sugar and copper. Food commodities 
played a fairly modest role in ASEAN-China trade. 
For individual ASEAN countries, Singapore and Malaysia were 
majc.r impe.rters of fc.od from China, while China was the ma.jc.r 
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food market for Thailand and the Philippines. Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore imported more in val ue of foods frc.m China, E~~; 
they exported to China, resulting in trade deficits in foods 
during 1975-82. However, Thailand and the Philippines (except in 
1975) enjoyed a surplus in foods with China during the 
corresponding period (Akrasanee and Charnsupharindr, 1987:45). 
Secondly China had fc ... many years enjoyed a t .. ade surplus 
wi th all the ASEAN countries as shown in Table 4.8). China took 
lip e:.nly 0.87. of ASEAN's e~;po .. ts for the period of 1971-1'374. By 
comparison, China appeared to be mo .. e important as a supplier of 
various goods to the .. egion, her average share of exports being 
2.97. for the same period (Wong, 1977:150). ASEAN has been an 
important source c.f su .. plus for China. The surplus derived frc.m 
t .. ading with the developing countries (ASEAN included) was used 
to cover the deficits incurred for the imports of capital 
eqUipment and technology from the Soviet Union (in the 50s) and 
later the indust .. ialised advanced countries. 
The Sino-ASEAN relationship since 1978 has been quite 
dynamic with both competitive and complementa .. y interactions. 
From 1978-88, China was one of the world's fastest growing 
economies, growing at an average of 8-9" per year. The rapid 
development of the Chinese economy and its shift from a strategy 
of ecc.nomic self-sufficiency impli""d a rapidly growing Chinese 
demand for p.rimary products, manllfactll .. es and se .. vices. This had 
created both positive and negative feedbacks on the ASEAN 
economies. 
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As the Chinese economy grew, its market expanded. Both 
imports and exports increased significantly in absolute terms. 
This created favourable opportunities for ASEAN as Chin~ began to 
import more raw material from ASEAN to meet her industrialisation 
needs. At the same time, China also emerged as a keen competitor 
ASEAN, especially in the area of labour-intensive 
man,-,factures. The proper evaluatie,n c.f the impact e.f China's 
mc.dernisation on ASEAN has te. be made in the perspective c.f 
individual ASEAN countries because the distribution of costs and 
benefits were quite uneven. For instance, the increase in Chinese 
demand fc,r natural rubber benefitted 'Malaysia but not 
Philippines;. On the other hand, an influx of labour-intensive 
Chinese manufactures into the world market hurt Philippines and 
Thailand more but not Singapore which has started to phase out 
labour-intensive industries, and moved into higher-value added 
and more capital intensive industries (Wong, 1984:9-29). 
However, some generalisations can still be made. As China 
opened up its economy in 1978, the trading pattern of China began 
to undergo some changes. It intensified its economic ties wjth 
the advanced capitalist econe,mies more than with the 3rd Wo)'"ld 
countries. The impo)'"t of technology was to be the cutting edge of 
the development programme. Thus China turned towards Japan and 
the West for technology, capital eqUipment and indust)'"ial 
supplies eTai, 1987: 1). 
In many ways, as China e.pened up its economy, its t)'"ade 
pattern for the past ten years shared some simila)'"ities with 
those of ASEAN. First, foreign t)'"ade began to playa pivotal role 
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in the Chinese economic planning process and served increasingly, 
in the same way as it has served the ASEAN econeomies, as an 
impeortant vehicle for the transmission eof foreign techneology and 
an engine of growth. Secondly, there was this heavy dependence on 
the industrially advanced countries of the West and Japan. China 
exported about 40X of its products to the industrialised 
countries. China then imported wheat, machinery and equipment and 
technole'gy from the West and Japan. China's import policy has 
always been closely geared to meet the developmental needs of the 
country. Its import is dominated by capital goods and industrial 
supplies which China either could not produce, or could only 
produce in quantities short of domestic demands (Wong, 1980:35). 
Sino-ASEAN t~ade, however, remained relatively stable, and 
the trade pattern remained pretty much the same. There was still 
a heavy concentrati':ln of primary products. Natural rubber, palm 
oil, timber, copper and coconut oil still ·formed the bulk of 
China's imports from the ASEAN countries. On the other hand, 
ASEAN imported large quantities eof crude petroleum and basic 
foodstuffs from China. 
The trade balance was still largely in China's favour. The 
trade surplus from its trading with the ASEAN countries and other 
countries such as HongKong and Macao was used to cover the 
deficits incurred from . its trading with the industrialised 
countries. The continuing trade surplus with the ASEAN countries 
has been an area of contention with seome ASEAN countries, 
especially those facing problems on their balance of payment. As 
China sought to increase her exports to meet her trade deficits 
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, wit~, the advanced ecc.nc.mies, friction with some ABEAN e.:;ountries 
f4' 
q; was inevi table. ;¢i,. 
'0: 
;:: 
The volume and the absolute value of trade between China and 
ABEAN have increased significantly over the last decade. However, 
China's per centage share in ABEAN's overall trade turnover did 
not increase. As indicated in Table 4.7, China's average 
percentage share from 1971-74 was 1.89%, and for the period from 
1981-84 this dropped to an average of 1. 7'3%. as shown in Table 
4.10. Similarly, ASEAN's share in China's total trade volume also 
she.wed a slight decrease, from an ayerage of 5.81'-: (1971-74) to 
an ayerage of 4.88% in the years fr.:.m 1'383-87 as indicated in 
Tables 4.6 and 4.9. This in a way highlighted the basic 
structural weakness in China's trade relations with the ABEAN 
countries, namely, it was based on a few primary products. The 
limited absorptive capacity of the Chinese economy for the raw 
iTraterials meant a limit to any further expansion of the Bino-
ABEAN trade. 
As China and ASEAN both continue to progress in their 
deYelc:.pment, their active search for e:"port markets in the last 
few years brought them intc. the competi tion zones. Competi t ion 
between China and ASEAN, for instance, arose in the area of 
labour-intensive manufactured products. China's exports, 
especially labour-intensive products were mqre competitive in 
terms of diversity and price. Although the export of primary 
commodities has been and still is the mainspring of the economic 
growth of ABEAN, increaSingly, with industrialisation, the growth 
of the manufacturing sectc.r is now an impc.rtant determinant Co"f 
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the overall economic well-being of the ASEAN countries. In recent 
years, ASEAN's industrialisation process has become more export-
orierited, with manufactured goods constituting an increasing 
pre'portion of the ASEAN' s total trade. Table 4.11 shows the 
relatively high percentage contribution of the manufacturing 
sector towards the GDP of the various ASEAN countries. 
As latecomers in the industrialisation scene, both China and 
the ASEAN countries (except Singapore) specialised in the simple, 
labour intensive manufactures for exports and hence compete with 
each other in the slowly expanding or, in some cases, contracting 
e x port market. During the mid-1980s, most of the industrial 
economies, except Japan, were plagued with problems of economic 
recession and high unemployment. These resulted in slow import 
growth and rising protectionism. Thus the markets of the advanced 
countries during this time was viewed almost as a "zero-sum game" 
in which expansion of Chinese exports was viewed by some ASEAN 
cc,untries as t,aving been achieved at the e"'pense of its own 
exports (Wong, 1984:24-28). 
Besides competition in the markets of the advanced 
economies, the flooding of low-price Chinese manufactures in the 
home markets of ASEAN also posed serious direct cc,mpetition to 
the many local industries in the region, some of which were still 
quite fragile having just emerged from the import substitlltion 
phase industrialisation. In short, China'S exports drives exerted 
stre,ng competitive pressures on the labour-intensive indllstries 
e,f ASEAN. The vision of China as a potential market of a billion 
consumers readily gave way to the spectre of China as a 
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competitive producer of several hundred million workers. 
Other than foreign trade, another area to be examined is 
foreign investment. In c,:,ntrast to the Maoist era, China since 
1978 has been actively seeking foreign investments. Special 
Ecc,nomic Zones, and various coastal cities have been opened up 
for the purpose of attracting foreign investments. Both China and 
ASEAN countries were all c,ut to attract foreign investments. 
ASEAN in particular, after three yeays of severe recession 
(1984-86) have made aggressive drives to woo foreign funds (Chan, 
1989: 58). 
China with its huge cheap labour resources and prospective 
massive internal market has emerged as a favourite investment 
target of multi-national corporation (MNCs), especially the 
Japanese companies. (The Tian An Men incident in June 1984', 
however, has seriously dampened this interest and as the leaders 
in China continued their political juggling, the MNCs are holding 
back any further investments.) 
As mentioned in the earlier part of the chapter, foreign 
investments played an important role in the growth of the ASEAN 
economies. Japanese investments in this region were particularly 
significant. The main attraction for Japanese companies in ABEAN 
today walS the low wages to cut m'anufacturing cost. The ASEAN 
countries functioned as safer and cheaper production sites for 
export to the US, Europe and Japan itself. Te, retain a 
competitive edge in attracting these investments, there was 
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pressure for the ASEAN countries to keep their wages low. 
Alternatively, they ce.uld switch tc. higher-value added and more 
capital intensive industries as Singapore has done. However, 
countries like Indonesia and Philippines which have not been able 
to b~lild up their technological base would have to continue to 
rely on labour-intensive manufacturing sectors to boost its 
economy and provide employment for the people. 
There was no evidence to show that investments from the 
advanced industrialised nations, particularly Japan and US, in 
ASEAN have declined since 1978 and that they have started putting 
their money in China. However, the simple logic of having to 
share the pie with an additional competitor meant probable 
smaller pieces for each party ~Inless the pie is getting bigger 
and bigger each day. More importantly, the competition for 
fO'feign investments, especially in the labour-intensive 
industries, would mean pressure for ce.untries like IndoneSia, 
Philippines, and to a lesser extent, Malaysia and Thailand to 
keep the wages low so as to maintain their competitive edge. This 
in turn has its impact on the socioeconomic development of the 
countries. As wages were depressed, the general we.rking 
population remained poor, and the standard of living stagnated. 
Poverty breeds discontent which would affect the social and 
political fabric of the country concerned. 
In addition to the competition for foreign investments, 
China has also entered the scene of financial loans and credits 
and international aid. It joined the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank in 1980, and was finally admitted to the Asia 
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Development Bank in 1989. Since it began accepting United 
Nations' assistance in 1978, China was granted more than US$1 
billion in aid and loans from United Nations agencies in a space 
of six years (from 1'378-83) (Asia Research Bulletin, _ 31/10/84). 
Besides loans fre.m internatie.nal agencies, China also solicit 
loans and aid from foreign governments such as Japan. This again 
put China in direct competition with the other ASEAN countries. 
However, ultimately, the decision as to how much aid and loans a 
country should receive would depend on the donor cc.untries and 
the latter's calculation of their own interests involved. 
In summary, as China proceeds with its modernisation 
programmes, the competitive pressures that arise can take a 
number of forms. First, China's import penetration of the ASEAN 
markets will threaten the survival of domestic industries. 
Second, China and ASEAN products will compete more aggressively 
in third country markets, both the developed market economies and 
the LDCs. Third, China and ASEAN countries will compete to 
attract foreign investments from Japan, US, EC and the NICs to 
engage in manufacturing for the domestic and export markets and 
alse. ce.mpete for ecc<nomic assistance (Chia, 1987: 124). However, 
in reality, the economic competition arising from China's 
ecc.nomic modernisation for the past ten years had not been as 
intense as feared by ASEAN. Politico-strategic factors as 
discussed in Chapter Three ~'c7/ made China more sensitive tc.wards 
ABEAN's requirements in both the political and economic arenas. 
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§ino-Indonesi.n Economic Relations 
Direct trade existed between China and Indonesia before 
1967. Indonesia was then the only ASEAN country to extend 
diplomatic recognition of China after it was p~oclaimed a 
People's Republic in October 1949. 
Under Sukarno, relations between the two countries improved 
significantly. As Indonesia was Beijing's only non-communist 
friend in Southeast Asia and represented its only success in 
breaking out from the encirclement and isolation imposed on China 
by the US, China valued its relations with Indonesia a lot. It 
therefore sought to sustain the close relationship by boosting it 
with trade and aid. China's share in Indonesia'S total trade rose 
steadily reaching record level of 11X in 1965. China became 
Indonesia's second largest supplier of goods. China also e x tended 
a sUbstantial amount of economic aid to Jakarta (Wong, 1987:3-4). 
However, the close alliance between China and Indonesia was 
brought to an end by the Gestapu affaiy in 1965. Beijing was 
accused of being involved in the aboytive coup together with the 
Communist Payty of Indonesia (PKI). Indonesia undey the mil i tayy 
generals can"ied out a bloody puyge of PKI and all suspected 
communists. Foymal Sino-Indonesian yelations was suspended in 
1967. Diyect tyade between the two countries was also,:. banned. 
Since then ttade was caYried out thyough a third payty, mainly 
Hongkong. 
Following the Sino-American yappyochement in 1972, 
Indonesia's FoYeign Minister, Adam Malik also declayed that 
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Indonesia would welcome the restoration of relations with China. 
However, a few factors stood in the path of restoration of 
bilateral relations. Indonesia's staunch anti-communist stance 
(the Indonesian government has continued to play up tbe threat of 
ccommlJnism - even though the PKI is almost tcotally annihilated 
after the Gestapu affair - t,:, justify its tight rein over the 
country); the deep-seated mistrust of China after the Gestapli 
incident; the military's fear of China as a long term strategic 
threat to Indonesia's security and that China wcould thwart 
Indonesia's ambitions cof playing the "big brcother" role in 
Southeast Asia all worked towards the delay cof the normalisation 
of relations. Even after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 
1978, when a convergence of interest between China and ASEAN was 
created, bringing China and ASEAN generally closer together, 
Indonesi~ remained as the most distant ASEAN member from China. 
Of all the ASEAN cOltntries, Indonesia was the slowest in 
responding to China's open door policy partly because cd the 
above reasons. It had, for e xample, failed to take hold c,f the 
opportunity to e,;port more rubber to a modernisinQ China, thus 
le,sing out to Malaysia ir:t this respect. It was not until 1985 
when the Memorandum of Understanding CMOU) on establishing 
direct trade was signed did trade between China and Ind':.nesia 
really take off. A look at Table 4.12 reflects the increasing 
trade between China and Indonesia. 
Clearly economic crisis at home has been a major stimulus to 
Indonesia in its search for more trade outlets and to expand non-
oil commodity e xports. Firstly, the raising c,f barriers te, the 
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penetration cof Indonesia's traditional markets in Japan, the US 
and Europe, and secondly, the dramatic fall in 1985 in the price 
of oi 1, Indonesia's main sour ce of sta te revenl.les. These brough t 
serious economic woes to Indonesia. Although Indonesia has 
encouraged export diversification, up till 1985, Indonesia's 
e~r.pclrts were still crucially dependent em primary cc'mmodities, 
especially petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas. Also 
Indonesia has nc,ticed the forwardness of its ASEAN partners 
Singapore, Thailand and even Malaysia - in reaching out to China 
to take advantage of that cc,untry's open door policy. Thus the 
Indonesian decision to resume direct trade in 1985 was taken only 
after a great deal of soul-searching (Gunn, 1987:21). 
But several competitive elements exist in the two economies. 
For instance, according to the Indonesian Minister of Energy and 
Mines, Subrc.to, Indonesia began to e);perience competition from 
China on the international oil market in the mid-1980s. China's 
export of petroleum and petroleum products in the 1950s and 19605 
was negligible. But since mid-1970s, and mc.st notably in the 
early 1980s, petroleum and petroleum products have become an 
impol'"tant component ,;)f China's exports as reflected in Table 
4.13. China's daily oil pl'"oduction was increasing even when the 
world oil prices were cc'ntinlting to 
China was not an OPEC member, it did 
quota set by OPEC. Hence China was 
daily against Indonesia's 320,000 to 
into the Japan's mal'"ket has callsed 
/ 
drop. Fu I'" thermc,,'"e. since 
not have to conform tQ any 
e>;pc.rting 400,000 barrels 
350,000. China's inroads 
some concel'"n amc'ngst the 
Indonesians. Japan, a majol'" oil importer of Indonesia was 
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pressing Indonesia to sell at a lower price and beginning to buy 
more oil from China (Straits Times, 7/5/85 as cited in Justus van 
der Kroef, 19861925). Table 4.14 shows that in 1974 Japan 
imported 15.6% of its total oil r·equirements from Indonesia, and 
2.911 from China. However, by 1986, Indonesia's share has dropped 
to 11.491 and China's share increased to 6.071. 
The growth of China's petroleum exports had, however, shown 
signs of slowing down towards the late 1980s because of China's 
c.wn increasing energy needs, and as offshc.re oil exploration 
failed to produce any significant new finds. 
There were also demurrences frc'm some Indonesian business 
circles that China would draw away foreign capital (in the form 
of investments, loans or aids, but most notably, investments from 
the advanced nations, particularly Japan) from Indonesia. It was 
felt that China with its low labour costs may be able to outsell 
Indonesia (Asiaweek, 14/6/85). Thotlgh there is no evidence to 
show that China had siphoned off investments otherwise meant for 
Indonesia, the presence of China as a competitor had put 
additional pressure for Indonesia to keep her wages down, and to 
improve her various infrastructural facilities in order to remain 
attractive to foreign investors. 
China is a potential market for such goods as fc'odstuffs, 
raw mater ial s, chemicals and derivatives. With regard to 
foodstuffs, Indonesia has difficulty meeting the potential needs 
of China because of lack of suitable export products in this 
category. But products such as fertiliser, cement and plywc.c.d 
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hav~ found their way into the Chinese market (Kuntjoro and 
Elnathan, 1987: 133). 
Indonesia has only switched to an export-oriented 
industrialisation in recent years. For both Indonesia and China, 
which are countries with large population, abundant unskilled 
labour, and low income, the emphasis has been, and will be on the 
expe,rt of labollr-intensive manufactured products which utilise 
elementary and intermediate technology. These included products 
s'~ch as textiles, clothing, footwear, toys and sporting goods 
(Sadhi, 10/7/85), Presently, Indonesia's most important 
manufactured exports are plywood, · clothing, textiles and 
fertilisers. Plywood, produced from its vast natural forest 
reserves, and fertilisers are exports with potential in China's 
markets. Ceompetition is, however, intense in the clothing and 
textile exports which are Cllrrently facing a saturated, if not 
contracting, world market. 
Sino-Malaysian Economic Relations 
Malaysia was the first ASEAN country teo begin thawing its 
cold relationship with China, a process started soon after Tun 
Razak put forth in 1970 the concept of establishing Southeast 
Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN). He also 
openly acknowledged the role of China in ensuring the security of 
the region. 
The despatch of a Malaysian Trade Mission led by Tengku 
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Razaleigh Hamzah, Chairman of the Malaysian Trading National 
Corporation in May 1971, marked the beginning of formal contact 
between the two countries and paved the way for the establishment 
of diplomatic relations. As a res'.llt of the visit, China agreed 
to buy the entiye substantial yubber stock of the Rubber Fund 
Board, and in addition, the purchase of 150,000 tons of rubber a 
year at market price. In return, t~,e Malaysian Trade Mission 
invited its Chinese host, the China Committee of Pre,motion c,f 
International Trade (CCPIT) to send a delegation to Malaysia, 
which it did on August 1971. During this visit, the CCPIT agreed 
te, purchase 40,000 tons e,f YI.lbber, 5,000 tons of palm oil and 
50,000 cubic metres of timber as well as other commodities. These 
gestures by China indicated its eagerness to improve political 
ties with Malaysia (Jain, 1984:xlv). 
Though direct trade was established in 1971, and since then 
several exchanges were made, diplomatic ties was not formalised 
until 1974, the year of Malaysia's general elections (the first 
electic,n after the May 13, 1969 ble,c,dy racial riots). By 1974, 
Malaysia had become China's second major trading partner in 
Southeast Asia. It imported $44.7 million worth of Chinese goods. 
Its exports to China, however, amounted to only $17.4 million. 
Kuala Lumpur was anxious to rectify this adverse balance of 
trade. Thus the Malaysian Minister of Agriculture during his 
, 
visit to China in 1975, express~d the hope that China would buy 
more products from Malaysia in c,rder to rectify the imbalance. 
China agreed to import more rubber from Malaysia and to promote 
cooperation between the Chinese Ocean Shipping Corporation and 
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the p~ope,sed Malaysian F~eight Booking Cent~e of the Malaysian 
Rubbe~ Exchange and Licensing Boa~d (Jain, 1984:xlvii). 
Afte~ no~malisation of relations, although t~ade between the 
two countries did inc~ease, Malaysia's ove~all relationship with 
China did not really take off because of China's continued ties 
with the Ce'mmunist Party of Malaya (CPM). The fi~st decade of 
Sino-Malaysian relations afte~ normalisation was dominated by 
political issues. Malaysia with a big Chinese minority population 
of mo~e than 30::<:, and its e xperience of violent armed challenges 
from the CPM in the 1950s and 1960s, was pa~ticularly suspicious 
of China. Although, Malaysia is endowed with favourable facto~s 
conducive to growth - SllCh as a ~ich natural resource base, low 
population pressure and so forth, this rests on a shaky base of a 
plural society with deep racial and divisions, 
compounded furthe~ by differences in the socioeconomic status 
along racial lines. The econe,mic development p~ogrammes of the 
government are t .hus very much influenced by this political 
~eality of a complex multiracial society (Wong, 1979:62). 
The discriminatory policies against the minorities adopted 
by the Malaysian government, especially in its developmental 
pc;,lices which were aimed at ~edistributing the wealth ale,ng a 
specific racial line, sometimes went against the need for 
efficiency and pragmatism in i .ts econe,mic policies. In view of 
the disc~imination, especially against the Chinese in thei~ 
society~ Malaysia was worried that this issue would be exploited 
by China for its own political gain. The fact that the CPM was 
dominated by ethnic Chinese complicated the problem and added to 
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Malaysia's deep apprehensions of thina. This coloured the 
bilateral relations between these two countries to a great 
extent. 
The advent of a world-wide recession in the 1980s and the 
open door policy adopted by China were some rease'ns behind the 
more pragmatic drives by Malaysia to improve its economic 
relations with China. Another important reason was that the 
membership of the CPM has dwindled and by the 1980s, it could no 
longer pc,se a serious threat tc, Malaysia's security. Instead, in 
the face of economic woes, racial and religious tensic,ns have 
mounted. These economic woes if not rectified would soon lead to 
greater political dissent and threatened political stability. And 
in fact we did witness a heightening of racial tensieoris during 
the period from 1984-1986. Hence the pragmatic drives to improve 
the economic situation. 
Sino-Malaysian trade remained as the most important aspect 
of bilateral econclmic relations. The commodities exchanged 
between the two countries remained primarily agricultural, nativ~ 
and special products, and light industrial and textile products. 
These products accounted for 
bilateral trade. For instance, 
a sizeable proportion of the 
in 1984, the value c,f Chinese 
exports of grain, edible oil and foe,dstLIffs, native and animal 
products, light industrial and textile products and handicraft 
articles · amounted to two-thirds of the total value of China's 
exports to Malaysia. As for Malaysia's exports to China, they 
consisted mainly of rubber, palm oil, timber and cocoa products. 
The value of rubber, timber and palm ,:;.il purchased by China in 
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1984 amo\'lnted to three-quarters of tl.e teotal value eof Chinese 
imports from Malaysia. However, China and Malaysia also began teo 
trade in certain heavy industrial products such as iron and steel 
products, telecommunicatic.ns eqllipment, and mechanical products, 
but these remained limited in variety and volume (Fu, 1987:157). 
Although Malaysia has been able to increase her exports of 
rubber, palm oil and timber to China (the needs created by 
China's rapidly expanding economy and industrialisation) in 
absolute volume and value, China's share in the overall Malaysian 
trade has in fact showed a steady decline. (See Table 4.15) Trade 
with China represented 3.45% of Malaysian trade in 1974, falling 
to 1.46% in 1984. 
Malaysia has also gained some headway into. the Chinese 
manufacturing market. For instance, a joint venture between 
Malaysian Intraco Reso\.lrces Trading Limited and China Reso\.lrces 
(Holdings) Company Limited was set up in November 1985. A month 
later, the first Malaysian manufacturing venture, Dreamland 
Tianjin was set up. This is a joint venture between Dr·eamland 
Spring Co (Malaysia) and a Chinese firm to produce spring 
mattresses in Tianjin and Shanghai. By the end of 1986, there 
were Malaysian investments in several projects including hotels, 
restaurants, offshore petroleum prospecting, wood processing, and 
joint ventures to produce industrial goods (Leong, 1987:1123). 
Sino-Philippines Economic Relation5 
The P~.ilippines and China have a long history of trade. 
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J ~. Howel/er, with the formation of Communist China, trade relations 
~' . 
between the two countries were disrupted by ideological and 
politico-strategic factors. Trade between Philippines and China 
broke off in the 1950s because of Philippines close alignment 
with the US. After the detente in 1972, direct trade was rel/il/ed 
when President Mar c-:os signed an Exe cuti I/e Order whi ch apprc,ved 
trading with socialist countries. 
Philippines looked to China f-:or the supply of crude 
petroleum and petroleum products. Other minor imports include 
fruit and nuts, zinc, electrical machinery and apparatus. China 
imports sugar, coc,::>nut c,il, calcillm carbide, 10g5 and timber and 
copper from the Philippines (Lee, 1982:62-3). 
Trade between the two countries took a favourable turn with 
the establishment of official diplomatic relations in June 1975. 
This also marked the drawing up of a Trade Agreement, which now 
forms the backbone of bilateral economic and trade relations. The 
Agreement, among ot~,ers, provided for the· following: 
most fal/oured nation treatment on the 
reciproci ty with respect to CllstOm duties and 
duties applicable to bilateral trade exchanges. 
basis of full 
other taxes and 
bilateral exports on the conclusion of long-term contracts 
relating to imports and exports between trade organisations and 
enterprises of both countries; 
settlement through friendly cconsultations of any disputes 
relating to the commercial transactions of the two countries. 
consultations to discuss measures aimed at broader economic 
and trade relations between the two countries and solutions of 
problems conne~ted with the implementation of the Agreement. 
Both countries also agreed to establish, in 1976, the 
Philippines-China Joint Trade Committee which was given the task 
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examining the implementation of the Trade Agreement 
(Estanislao, 1987:167). 
In 1979, a long-term tyade agyeement coveying the peyiod 
fyom 1979-85 was; signed in Beijing, providing fc,y US$2 billion 
woyth of impoyt and export cc,mmc,dities to be exchanged. The 
Chinese side agyeed to export 8,400,000 metric tons of cyude oil 
and ceytain qualities of yefined petroleum products. China also 
agyeed to give pyeference to supply the Philippines with 
additional quantities cof crude oil and refined petyoleum 
pyoducts. In exchange, the Philippines would e~;pc'rt tc, China one 
million metric tons of Yaw sugar, 400,000 to 700,000 tons of 
copper concentrates and 200,000 to 300,000 metric tons of coconut 
oil (Liao, 1988:181). 
Al though trade between the two ce,untr ies has shown steady 
incr.ease aftey 1975 as shown in Table 4.16, it yemained small 
yelative to totals; the Philippines expoyts ba yely a little ovey 
1% of her total exports to China and impoyts only close to 2% of 
total impoyts fyom China. Likewise, China's total tyade with the 
Philippines for the peYiod 1971-84 accounted foy, on the average 
only 0.6% of her total trade with the woyld • . The trade has always 
been in China's favouy too (Estanislao, 1987:168). 
The variety of pyoducts traded between China and Philippines 
was also limited; China's exports to Philippines were dominated 
by crude oil and petroletim pyoducts, while its impoyts from 
Philippines comprised mainly sugar, coconut and copper. The 
limited base of the trade between the two countyies hamper 
175 
further expansion of the bilateral economic relations (op.cit., 
176-8). 
Another reason why Philippines had not taken full advantage 
of China's modernisation pc,licy teo moY"e eceoneomic 
c'pportunities was because Philippines was enmeshed in its own 
internal problems, especially after the assassination of Beningeo 
, f 
Aquino in 1983. Internal politics in Philippines in the 1980s was 
characterised by chaos and violence and a growing communist 
threat because of the increasing widespread pc,verty, increasing 
gaps between the rich and poor, rampant corruption in the system 
and military abuses. Even after people's peower brought about the 
downfall of Mar cos, Phi 1 ippines under Corazon Aqllino was sti 11 
plagued by politital instability caused by several military coup 
d'etats. 
Sino-Singapore Economic Relations 
Singapore became a sel f -governing state in 1959. As both 
Singapore and China were then engaged in economic recovery and 
development, their economic relations were confined to trade 
alone. Through joint efforts over the past twenty five years, 
bilateral trade has grown rapidly. With the exceptic,n of a few 
years, 'total trade value rc,se sh",rply, especially during the 
1980-85 period as ref lected by the figures in Table 4.17 (Gu, 
1987:188). 
Singapore in view of its geographical size and small 
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populatic.n has since its independence embarked llpon a growth 
strategy based on export-orientation. Because of its heallY 
reliance on trade and foreign inllestments, its gOllernment has 
adopted a pragmatic policy of separating politics from trade as 
much as possible. Thus, Singapore engages in trade with any 
country that is willing to trade on mutually beneficial terms 
regardless of ideology. That was one reason why it has maintained 
continuous trade with China ellen in the absence of formal 
diplomatic ties. Singapor~ has thus been the mainstay of China's 
ollerall trade with the ASEAN region and their relationship is 
firmly based. When direct trade was disrupted between China and 
Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia, most of the indirect trade 
went through Singapore. 
Singapore with its early headstart in industrialisation is 
now one of the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs). Its 
economy is largely cc.mplementary with a modernising China wtyD has 
just set on a path of export-oriented growth. The complementarity 
of the two economies was the main 'reason behind the e x panding 
bilateral economic relations for the past ten years. In additi.:on, 
it has been able to exploit the opportunities offered by a more 
outward-looking China for the past decade by lIirtue of its 
piagmatic economic outlook and its own relatille success in 
industrialisation. China with its substantial natural resources 
was ab'le to 'export primary products ,as well as labour-intensille 
light manuf~ctures. Singapore lacks natural resources and has a 
limited home market. It has to rely on the resources of other 
countries and the international market for its econc.mic 
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development. Thus China's light mamlfactllres and raw materials, 
especially mineral fuels, sold at competitive prices, 
readily demanded in Singapore, both for home consumption and re-
export. 
On the other hand, in comparison with China and other ASEAN 
countries, Singapore has advantage in the training of manpower. 
It has combined this comparative advantage with Western capital 
and technology to foster industrialisation, diversify products 
and IJpgrade 
technology 
the value of 
products. With 
products, putting 
rising wages in 
emphasis on high-
Singapore, labour-
intensive industries were no longer competitive in the market. 
China is, however, still producing mainly labour-intensive 
products. The two countries are therefore in different stages of 
industrial development and have different production structures. 
Consequently, manufactures traded between them were complementary 
in nature (Gu, 1987: 193). 
The modernisation programme of China and the recent ~Iigh 
wage policy of Singapore facilitated trade and investment between 
the two countries. Singapore is today the largest ASEAN investor 
in the PRC. With rising wages, some of the Singapore businessmen 
shifted their production base to China making use of its cheap 
labour under the compensatory trade agreement (Oas, 1988: 187). 
According to offical Chinese sources, fre,m 1979 to 1'385, 
Singapore and Chinese enter PI' ises together made investments in 
twenty projects; contracts have been signed for another 150 
projects in which Singapore businessmen have promised to invest 
about S$900 million. 
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The investments, mostly jOint ventures covered twelve 
provinces and municipalities. These project~ ranged from harbour 
construction, warehouses, hotels, urban housing construction and 
management, ship-repairing services to logistic services for oil 
exploratie.n (Gu, 1'987: 18'3-1'92). 
The services sector was another area of the PRC market 
which Singapore focused on. Efforts have been directed to develop 
the export of professional services like construction services 
<architecture design, planning and pre.ject management), 
accountancy services, port and airport man,gement, technology 
transfer, 
upgrading 
transport, 
consultancy 
telecommunications services and 
services. Singapore's success 
factory-
in the 
services market in the PRC include, for instance, a US$170 
million contract to construct a 12 berth harbour in Shenzhen; a 
US$140 million World Trade Centre contract in Beijing; a 
consultancy contract for the development of Tianjin port and many 
others. 
One 
approach, 
approach 
whereby 
being 
the 
adopted by Singapore was 
objective was to provide 
the 
a 
system 
package 
comprising planning design, construction, sourcing, installation, 
management and training tailored to the PRC's needs (Oas, 
1'388: 18'9). 
Thus nc.t · only trade has increased between Singapore and 
China. Sinc.-Singapore cooperation in capital investment, finance 
and other areas has been developing and expanding, and only 
showed signs of slowing down after the Tian An Men incident in 
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June 1989. Singapore's informal and traditional links, strategic 
location as well as its sophisticated physical and financial 
infrastructure gave it the added advantage of serving an 
impcortant role in China trade (Das, 1988: 186). Singapore now 
occupies quite an important place in China's economic relations, 
and ranks among China's top ten trading partners. 
Sino-Th@iland Economic Relations 
Trade is the most important aspect of economic relations 
between China and Thailand. Thailand's trade with China has grown 
at a rather impressive rate both in absolute and relative terms 
since the establishment of formal diplomatic ties with China in 
July 1975. 
modernisation 
(See Table 4.18) The launching of China's 
in 1978 added further impetus to the growth in 
trade. According to the Foreign Trade Statistics revealed by the 
Thai DepartmeMt of Statistics, China has become one of Thailand's 
top ten trading partners (Wong, 1984:175). 
Also because of her strategic impcortance tco China in the 
ensuing Indochina conflict, Thailand had been able to enjoy 
certain trade concessicons from China. This was reflected, for 
instance, in the sales of China's petroleum and petroleum 
products to Thailand at "friendship prices". In March 1979, the 
Thai governmjnt negotiated a five-year Agreement with China . under 
which China ~o~ld increase the supply of Shengli crude oil from 
600,000 tons to 800,000 tons for 1979, 800,000 to 1,000,000 tons 
for 1980 and one million tons each for 1'381, 1982 and 1983. 
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(B~\siness Times 3/3/80). The agreement was left vague so that 
both sides could meet regularly to adjust price changes. In the 
1980 sales contract, China sold 700,000 tons of Shengli crude and 
250,000 tons of high-speed diesel. The price of the Shengli crude 
was fixed in accordance with the world market price first and 
then given at special discount of 2% (Asian W.;IIl Street Journal, 
11/1/80), Another e~;ample was the Chinese increased purchase of 
Thai rice when Thailand faced the problem of a rice glut, 
although China itself is a major rice e:(porter and there was 
absolutely no economic reason for it to do so. 
Among China's exports to Thailand, petroleum and petroleum 
products were the most important items, and made up about half of 
China's total e-xports to Thai 1 and. Besides petroleum and 
petroleum products, other principal Chinese commodities exported 
to Thailand were bean cakes, traditional Chinese medicinal herbs, 
paper, porcelain, silk, paraffin wax, chemical materials, 
pharmaceuticals and machinery. Agricultural products formed the 
bulk of Thailand's exports to China, such as rice, corn, 
granulated sugar, mung beans and rubber, which made up about 80% 
of Thailand's exports to China. Other agricultural products 
include glutinous rice, tobacco and cashew nuts. After 1979, 
Thailand also exported steel tubes, precious stones, machinery, 
polyethylene from high pressure process, tyres, glass, veneer 
boards and other industrial products to China (Pang, 1987:212-6). 
The effects of this new phase of relations between China and 
Thailand since 1978 were seen ne.t only in the rapid growtt, of 
trade but also in the development of other fe.rms of ece.ne.mic 
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"r.,·· 
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coopeyation. Fiyst of all, coopeyation has expanded with the 
establishment of joint ventuyes. Thai entyepyeneuys began to 
invest in China in 1981. By the end of 1985 Thai entyepyeneuys 
had set up thiyty one joint ventuyes in China with a total 
investment of USS200 milli,::>n. These joint ventuyes covered a 
range of sec tOYS including the motoycycle, glass and carpet 
ind'lsty ies. 
China has also established twenty joint ventures·, 
coopeyative and wholly owned Chinese enteypYises in Thailand in 
such areas as construction, coal prospecting and mining, timbey 
processing, phaymacy and machineyy industries. Scientific and 
technological coopeyation has also made headway. Training 
pyogyammes foy technicians and manageYial staff have alyeady been 
set up. Up till 1987 China and Thailand have cooperated in moye 
than 100 projects relating to domestic animals, fnlit, medical 
research, the improvement of water and soil, marsh gas and 
mineral pyospecting (Liao, 1'388: 180-181). 
Other Thailand investments in China were in productive 
projects, including factories producing fodder, dYinks, 
motorcycles, synthetic fibres, plastics, glass, paints, concrete 
bricks, soya sauce, and so on, as well as chicken fayms and some 
service projects such as he,tels, shipping companies and golf 
courses (op.cit., 219). 
Both China and Thailand are developing nations and economic 
developmellt in the two cc,untries is more or less at the same 
level. In its foreign economic exchanges, Thailand imports 
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machinery and equipment, technology and raw materials (not 
available domestically) from the developed industrial nations to 
satisfy the needs of economic development. At the same time, it 
exports to developed industrial econe,mies agricultural produce 
and other primary pre,d'.lcts and labour-intensive light 
manufactures to earn foreign exchange. China's pattern of foreign 
exchange is similar to that of Thailand, as it imports machinery, 
techne,logy and raw materials frc,m developed industrial nations 
and then e xports to them agricultural, sideline and native 
products and some, light manufactures (Liao, 1988:223-4). 
A similar situation is found in bilateral investment too. 
Both China and Thailand invite foreign investment for the purpose 
of making lise of foreign funds, introducing advanced technolo,gy 
and equipment, and creating employment (Pang, 19871224-5). 
These similarities in their trade and investment structures 
had created competitive pressures, but because of strong 
political motivations, Sino-Thai economic relations remained 
sound and both parties had tried to accommodate each other in 
economic issues as much as they could when both of them continued 
to require each other's sUpport over the Kampuchean issue. 
In summary, the econc,mic , impact of China's modernisation 
during the past ten years on the ASEAN countries is varied. 
Singapore and to a certain extent Malaysia benefitted more than 
countries like Indonesia and Philippines. Singapore with her 
higher level of economic and technological development was better 
183 
able to complement the needs of China's modernisation. Malaysia, 
by virtue of the fact th.at she possessed raw materials, notably 
rubber and palm oil which China does not produce but required in 
considerable amount foy its modernisation, was able to increase 
its exports to China and close the trade gap between them. 
Thai 1 and has al so benef i tted from the economi c modernisation 
because cof peolitical reasons. However, in general, the ece.nomic 
impact of China for the past ten years from 1978 to 1988 has not 
been extensive because of China's relatively unimportant role in 
ASEAN's economies. China's average share in the total tr.ade of 
ASEAN, for example, was less than 2%. The economic well-being of 
the ASEAN countries remains essentially dependent on the US and 
Japan. 
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TAble 4.11 Browth of Foreign Inv •• t .. nts over ti .. 
1979-82 
1983-84 
1985 
1986 
Projects 
19 
74 
not available 
178 
Investments 
(in US. 11) 
10 
47 
140 
168 
Source J .]41llleS Petres "Contradictions of Market Social iSIII in 
Chine" in .]ournal of Contelllporary hSie, Vol.l8, No.2, 1988, p238 
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TABLE 4. 2A 
Chilla'~ Fo r"Ci~n Trad(', 19S1l ·· IH 
Total Trade ~: .~puru Impufh 
\. ;,1 111' en),," II, K ;.\(' V:II \1 (' CWh ih Kale \ '" luI- (; ."wll. it a \(' 
Yrar , L'SS milL) (" III _ (L"SS milL ) f" , ,,, r C5S lIlili . i (""J 
1950 IIJ5 5)2 :i83 
r 951 \ 1955 i2 .2 ij 7 37. I 11 911 IfIS.J 
1952 I ~HI -0.7 623 8.7 IliA - 6.7 
1953 2368 no 1022 lU 1146 20.-1 
19S·\ 1·1Jl 1 .7 IH6 12. 1 "U7 - ·L4 
1955 31,S 29.J 1'1') 23.1 li33 J ·I.1 
1956 320ft 1.0 16'5 16.5 15liJ - 9.U 
1951 3101 - 3.3 1597 -'1 .9 ISOG -1.6 
1958 3071 no 1981 no la~ 25.5 
1959 ,181 132 1161 I ... 1120 12.2 
1960 lUU'J - 1l. 1 1856 
- 17 .9 1953 - 7.9 
1961 2936 '-n .9 1'91 - 19.7 ' ... 5 -'26.0 
1962 2663 - 9.3 1190 -0. 1 1113 -IA.8 
19G3 '291~ 9 .. 5 161~1 10.7 "1lifi 7.9 
Il){ji :I 'Hi',1 III.H 1!.H6 I Ii. 2 15-17 n .2 
1965 4'l · l ~1 n.G 11'18 16.:! 'lU17 :m.t 
1966" 'Hil-l 8.1 1JtiG 6.1 22·IU 115 
1961 -1-1:'5 -9.9 l1 J5 -9.8 20"10 -10 I 
1%0 -tnt" -2.6 2103 -1.5 11),1,') - :1.7 
1969 4029 - 0.5 no, ' .8 IA15 -G.2 
1910 4586 13.8 2200 '1 .5 2316 V.5 
1911 'U41 5.6 1636 16.6 '1205 -5 .~ 
1912 6JOI 30.1 3443 30.6 2858 29.6 
1913 10916 141 ;819 69.0 51~7 00.' 
1914 1';68 31.1 6949 IH 1619 411 
1915 14150 1.1 11M U 1486 -1.7 
1916 13433 -8.9 6855 -5.6 6518 -12.1 
1911 14804 102 1590 10.1 1214 9.1 
1918 20638 39.4 9145 2SA 10893 51.0 
1919 29333 11.1 13658 40.2 .. 15615 ,39 
1980 31822 28.9 18212 33.8 19550 14.1 
1981 4031l 6.8 20893 14.3 19.81 -0.3 
1982 39291 - 2.1 21819 
, 
H 11418 -10.3 
1981 ;0121 3.6 22191 1.1 18530 6.0 
1984 53630 31.6 . " 25960 16.9 21610 49.3 
SoUI\C£.S: 1950-83. from Ministry orron:ign Economic Rdalioru and Tnd~, Chin .. , AlmM~(JfCJrilltl'J 
F.rrig,. UDM",;C Ri/dliotU tin' Trll'(,I98I (Hong Kong, 198~) . 198 .. , rram £SCAP, ClliJlbook '" TraJi1l1 
wWt.tJuP,opl,'J _R,tn'blir of OiM (New York, 1985), p. 56., , , '" I. i l .:~" ,L_ ;'. . 
e , ' 
._, -
.... =.: =; : -~~ . 
11:>6. 
Imports 
1980 Exports 
Total 
Imports 
1983 Exports 
Total 
Imports 
1984 Exports. 
Total 
Imports 
1985 Exports 
Total 
Imports 
1986 Exports 
Total 
World's Total 
(in US.l00 M) 
20497.8 
19905.7 
40403.5 
18786.9 
18078.4 
36865.3 
19876.2 
19019.9 
38896.1 
20269.5 
19274.6 
39544.1 
22158.4 
21154.2 
43312.6 
China's Share %age of World's 
(in US.l00 M) total vol. of trade 
195.5 0.95 
182.7 0.92 
378.2 0.94 
213.9 1. 14 
222.3 1.23 
436.2 1. 18 
274.1 1.38 
261.4 1.37 
535.5 1.38 
422.5 2.08 
273.5 1.42 
696.0 1. 76 
429.1 1.94 
309.4 1.46 
738.5 1. 71 
So~rce , Calculated based on statistics fro. th. Yearbook of 
International Trade Statistics, United Hations, (HeH York, United 
Nations Publishing Services, (v.rio~s years) 
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TABLE 4.3 
Trade Palun or ASE.A.N 
(As a percentage or lOla] exports) 
Primary Commodities Maauradured FJ"ports 
1970 1981 1983 1984 1985 1970 1981 1983 1984 1985 
ASEAN 87.9 71.1 65.7 6H 63.0 9.6 22.2 34.3 36 .4 37.0 
Indonesia 98.6 %.8 92.2 90.7 89.0 1.2 2.9 7.8 9.3 11.0 
Malaysia 92.8 80.0 74.1 73.4 73.0 6.3 19.5 25.9 26.6 27.0 
Philippines 89.5 55.4 50.0 45.7 49.0 6.4 22.8 50.0 54.3 51.0 
Singapore 69.0 51.5 44.2 42.6 41.0 28.0 41.1 55.R 57A 59.n 
Thailand 89.5 71.6 67.8 65.4 65.0 5.2 24.8 322 3-l.(i 35.0 
SOURCE: Uni1c.d N~Hions. Commodify Trade SIOfiJ(jcJ, J970·J91i~; lVorid 
Dt1'tlopnrcrtf Rtpot1 1987. 
. . 
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Tible 4.4A: ASEAN's Tride with the Industriilised Countries (in US 'Iillion) 
Industriilised Countries (I.C) 
Exports Gnnd I.C 
Tobl Tohl Z USA Z Japin Z He Z 
1~71 65~4.7 3847.9 58.4 1169.6 17.7 1570.2 23.9 817.3 13.4 
1972 7857.5 4686.2 59.6 1411.2 17.9 1918.0 24.4 1235.4 15.7 
1~73 13214.0 8210.9 62.1 2258.2 17.1 3628.5 27.5 2097.7 15.9 
1974 22604.2 13983.5 61.9 3919.7 17.3 6877.9 30.5 2633.5 11.7 
1m 20953.4 12743.3 60.8 421~.3 20.1 5496.2 26.2 m4.7 13.3 
1983 68209.1 40925.4 60.0 13710.0 20.1 15006.0 22.0 9003.6 13.2 
liporis 
1971 7979.2 4495.5 62.6 1144.8 13.3 2083.2 26.1 1547.0 19.4 
1m ~442.3 5806.8 61.5 1448.5 15.3 2501.1 26.1 1624.5 17.2 
1973 14197.7 8546.1 60.2 2272.8 16.0 3575.1 25.1 2345.5 16.5 
1974 22813.5 13110.9 57.5 3366.1 14.5 5516.9 24.2 3687.8 16.2 
1975 23236.5 13859.0 59.6 3653.8 15.7 5892.7 25.4 3721.5 15.9 
1983 76123.0 43964.6 57.4 12332.0 \6.2 16m.3 22.2 9667.6 12.7 
So.refS : Co.,ated fro. dlti fro. IIF iIId llR', •• ,t of st.tisties, Iili,Si. lid h,t of Stltisties, 5i.g.,ore 
cited in John Mong, 'ASEAN EconOlies in Persptcti,e', pp 144-145 
Tible 4.4B: Perclntage of trade with Japan and USA of indiyidlal ASEAN countries 
Indonesh "alaysia Philippines Sing.pore Thailand 
1981 1986 1981 1986 1981 1986 1981 1986 1981 1986 
Z tnde 41 44.6 23.4 20 20 17.4 15.1 14.6 16.3 20.3 
with Japan 
Z trade 17 20.6 12.6 17 25 30.1 12.9 IB.9 11.9 16.1 
with US 
SOIree: FEER Asil Ytilrboots, 1982 & 1987 
189 
Tabl. 4.5A I Japanese Dir.ct Inv •• t .. nts by Industry in ASEAN 
ASEAN's 
ASEAN World X share 
1. Agriculture !< 163 558 29.2 
Fisheries 
2. Mining 2397 6311 45.1 
3. Manufacturing 1614 7139 22.6 
Industries 
4. Commerce 8< 374 7856 4.7 
Others 
5. Real Estate 8< 34 1347 2.5 
Branch Offices 
Source : HITI, 1978 
Tabht 4.58 I Japanese Direct Investments by Country and Region, 
1931-81 (cumulative) 
Cumulative Total Amount Percentage share 
1951-81 US. M of Japan's total 
investments 
ASEAN 985:5 21.6 
Indonesia 6838 15.1 
Malaysia 681 1.5 
Philippines 687 1.5 
Singapore 1202 2.6 
Thailand 42.7 0.9 
Other parts of Asia 3312 7.4 
Grand Total 45403 100.0 
Sourct;! : HIT I, 1982 
N. B The above tables are cited in Johan Saravanamuttu "Japanese 
Economic Penetration in ABEAN in. the context of the International 
Division of Labour" in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol 18 No 2, 
1988, pp 140 - 141 
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Tjibl. 4.6. Chirnl's Two""\o/ay trjid. with ASEAN afar .• 1978 
(in US • million> 
China's 
Total 
Trade 
1971 4681 
1'972 5716 
1'973 9870 
1'974 13705 
1971-74 
Percentage 
Average 
China's · 
trade with ASEAN 
2'91. 6 
314.1 
588.1 
757.0 
As a Xage of 
China's total trade 
6.23 
5.50 
6.00 
5.52 
5.81 
SOlJ.rce: John /liong, "The Political Economy of China's Changing 
Relations uith SOlJ.theast Asia" (London: MacMillan Press, 1984) 
p 148 
1'91 
Table 4.7: ASEAN'. Trlde vit~ C~ina before 1978 (in US '.illion) 
Astin', ASeln's Grand Exports Ilporls Total I 
Exports l.,arts Tolal to ChAI fro. Chn. (2) (211) I 1001 
(IJ 
1971 6594.7 7979.2 14573.9 33.4 (0.5) 226.6 (2.8) 260.0 1.78 
1972 7857.5 9442.3 17299.8 50.2 (0.6) m.7 (2.7) 301.9 1.75 
1973 13214.0 14197.7 27411.7 140.5 0.1) 456.8 (3.2) 597.3 2.18 
1974 22604.2 22813.5 45421.7 171.4 (0.8) 669.6 (2.9) 841.0 1.85 
1971-74 
Pertentlge (0.8) (2.9) 1.89 
Average 
SOI,e,s : COI"tll fro. lata 1'01 IMF all lB", Q"t of Statistics, Malafsia all I"t 01 Statistics, Silgl,o,r 
cited in lobn Wong, 'ASEAN Econotits in P,rsp.cti,,', pp 144-145 
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Tlbl. 4.8: Chinl's Trldt vith individual ASEAN Countries brfore 1976 (In US $ "illion) 
Indonnil I "aliysia Philippines 
Year 
" 
X 8 
" 
I B 
" 
X B 
70 30.6 • + 30.5 74.7 21 .8 + 52.~ 
71 27.6 + 27.6 88.9 26.2 + 62.7 0.8 + O.B 
72 39.0 + 39.0 6~.6 27.1 + 42.5 16.5 +16.5 
73 48.8 f + 48.S 150.1 83.7 • 66.4 21.3 +21.3 
74 113.9 +1\3.9 195.3 87.1 +108.2 27.0 13.4 +13.6 
IIGtes I " • liports frol Chnil. X: Exports to China 
B ' Balln(e (I pl., sign indicat., ,.rplus for Chili) 
• , Statistically insignificant 
I ' In Iht cas. of Indonesia, a relalivtly large alount of 
re-exporls of China origin frol Honglong, for exalpl., in 
1974, Hlt314 lillion (or US.63 lillion) of Chinese goOd, 
vere re-exported to Indonesia frol Hong (ong. 
Sources : INF • ISRD: Direction of Tradt, .arioul issues, as 
cited in John Mong, The Political ECOID', of Chila's Chalgilg 
telatiols Hith SOltb •• st Asia, 1984:188 
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Sin,apore 
" 
X 
125.~ 22.7 
132.9 15.2 
141.5 20.4 
232.2 52.0 
264.6 51 .2 
Thailand 
B N X B 
+103.2 
+117.7 
+121.7 
+180.2 
+213.4 4.5 • +4.5 
Tibl. 4.91 Cbia.'s Tr~. vii. ASEAN Counlrill, (1983-871 
(iN US "illion DoII.rsl 
Tolal Exports 'Iporll 
Country 1983 1984 1986 1987 1983 1984 1986 1987 1983 1984 1986 1987 
Snnd Tolal 23121 32288 73850 82650 11782 15608 30940 39440 11339 16680 42910 43210 
"diysh 213.5 249.0 383.0 556.6 99.1 123.3 202.7 254.4 114.4 12~.7 186.3 302.2 
As % of 
Chni's 0.92 0.77 0.52 0.67 0.84 0.79 0.65 0.65 2.48 1.53 0.43 0.70 
lohl Irid. 
Pbilippines 100.2 200.4 293.4 385.5 76.3 147.6 1~.9 245.8 23.9 52.9 136.5 139.7 
As % of 
Chin.'s 0.43 0.62 0.40 0.47 0.65 0.95 0.51 0.62 0.52 0.64 0.32 0.32 
loli! Inde 
Sing. pore 362.7 876.6 1759.3 1945.3 302.1 779.6 1206.3 1327.5 60.6 97.0 ~3.0 617.9 
As % of 
China's 1.57 2.72 2.38 2.35 2.57 5.00 3.90 3.37 1.31 1.18 1.29 1.43 
lolal tnde 
Th.ihnd 175.5 270.7 445.1 709.8 103.1 158.9 158.8 305.1 71.8 111.8 286.2 404.6 
As % of 
China's 0.76 0.84 0.60 0.86 0.88 1.02 0.51 0.77 1.56 1.36 0.68 0.94 
told trade 
lndon .. ia 105.6 184.7 466.7 779.2 25.9 43.5 142.5 188.1 79.7 141.2 324.2 591.1 
As % of 
CUna's 0.46 0.57 0.63 0.94 0.22 0.28 0.46 0.48 1.73 1.72 0.76 1.37 
tolal trade 
----------.---------------------------------.---------------------------------------------------------.-----------
ASEAII Tolal 9~7.5 1781.4 3347.5 4376.4 607.1 1252.9 1867.2 2320.9 350.4 528.6 1486.2 2055.5 
As % of 
China's 4.14 5.52 4.53 5.30 5.15 8.03 6.03 5.88 3.09 3.17 3.46 4.76 
tolal trad. 
----------------------.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soarc'l Co.,ol.4 Iro. 4ala i. the 'Cbi.a Statistical Yearbook, 19BB' a.4 'Statistical y •• ;loot 01 Chi •• , 19B5 
(kijiBg: SI.t. Statistical brul 01 Chili, 19BBI, P 646 • p .96 respectively. 
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T~bl. 4.101 ABEAN'. Two-way Trade with China, 1981-84 
Total value of 
ASEAN's trade 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1981-84 
Percentage 
Average 
140439.06 
141560.11 
143947.62 
148378.35 
Trade with Percentage 
China share 
2370.041 1.69 
2622.432 1.85 
2227.775 1.55 
3068.766 2.07 
1.79 
Soarce = Calcalated fro. Tables 4.12, 4.14, 4.14, 4.16 & 4.17 
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T~ble 4.111 ShAre of the Industri.l Sector to the GDP 
(Percentages) of the ASEAN countries 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore 
1965 12 (8) 24 (10) 28 (20) 24 (15) 
1983 39 (13) 35 (1'3) 36 (25) 37 (24) 
Thailand 
23 (14) 
27 (9) 
Note : Figures in brackets denote th~ share of the manufacturing 
sector. 
Source: Uorld Bank, 1985 as cited in John Wong, 19841151 
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Table 4.121 IndoAfSia's Total Trade and Trade with China (in US. "illion) 
I.porls Elports Total I.ports Exports Total Percentage 
(j) fro. China to China (2) (2J1l 
1m 1561.7 1777.7 2162.1 ~.013 (2.50) ~.013 1.69 
1973 2729.1 3209.7 5938.8 53.371 (1.96) 53.371 0.90 
1974 3862.6 7420.8 11283.4 114.690 (2.97) 114.690 1.02 
1975 4769.8 7102.5 11872.3 203.476 (4.27) 203.476 1.71 
1976 5673.1 8546.5 14219.6 131. 789 (2.32) 131.789 0.93 
un 6230.3 10852.6 . 17082.9 153.495 (2.46) 153.495 0.90 
1978 6690.4 11643.2 18333.6 112.171 (1.68) 112.171 0.61 
1979 7202.3 15590.1 22792.4 131.777 (1.83) 131.777 0.58 
1980 10834.4 23950.4 34784.8 197.273 (1.82) 197.273 0.57 
1981 13272.2 . 25164.4 38436.6 243.549 (1.84) 8.295 (0.03) 261.884 0.68 
1982 16858.9 22328.3 39187.2 230.887 (1.371 14.230 (0.06) 245.119 0.63 
1983 16351.1 21145.9 37497.0 264.032 (Ull 29.945 (0. W 230.977 0.62 
1984 13882.1 21887.9 35770.0 224.420 (1.62) 7.667 (0.04) 232.087 0.65 
1985 10258. , 18589.5 28848.4 248.929 (2.43) 84.189 (0.45) 333.118 1.16 
So,rct I Tt.rboot of l.ttr •• tio •• l 1rad. Statistics, U.itfd N.tio.s, (varioas ,f.rs) 
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Table •• 13A= China's Export of Petroleum and PetroleuM products 
(in percentage of total exports) 
1'359 1'366 1970 1'374 1978 1984 
negl. negl. negl. 8. 1 12.0 21.8 
* negl. - negligible 
Table 4.1381 China'. Export. of Crude Petroleu. and Petroleu. 
Products (in thousand metric tons) 
1'360 1970 1'380 1'384 
Crude Petroleum 62.8 1 '31. 5 13,308.'3 22,2'32.7 
Petroleum Products 27.1 193.2 4,202.7 5,817.5 
Sources Ministry of Foreign £cono.ic Rel8tions 8nd Trade, 
Al.anac of China's Foreign £cono.ic Relations & Trade, 1984 & 1985 
<as cited in Guo Peixing "Trade in Industrial Raw Materials 
between China and the ASEAN Countries" (1987:63». 
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Table 4.14: Japan's Imports of Patroleum 
(in millions yen) 
Japan's Total 
Petroleum Imports 
(excluding 
petroleum products) 
Imports from China 
Imports from 
Indonesia 
1974 
5,503,860 
120,303 (2.19X) 
858,307 (15.6:0 
1986 
3,430,929 
207,466 (6.07X) 
394,144 (11.49X) 
SOlirCeJ Nippon Statistical Yearbook, (197~ & 1987 editions). 
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T.blt 4.151 ~1'Yli"1 Tol.1 Tr.d •• nd Trid. vii. Chin. (in US. "illion) 
'Iporh Exporh Tohl 'Iporh Exports Toh1 Percenlilgl 
(\) frol Chin. 10 Chin. (2) (2111 
1912 Im.9~ 1693.65 3309.60 69.016 (4.211 21.1\8 (1.60) 96.134 2.94 
1913 2488.10 3022.52 551\.22 150.384 (6.04) 82.245 (2.121 232.629 4.22 
1914 4194.96 4213.50 8468.46 204.953 (4.891 81.480 (2.05) 292.433 3.45 
1915 3583.02 3811.02 1460.04 141.180 (4.12) 53.251 (1.31) . 201.031 2.69 
1916 . 3188.01 5242.38 9030.04 134.259 (3.54) 44.681 (0.85) 178.940 1.98 
1911 4517.65 6133.19 10110.84 139.712 (3.05) m.521 (1.95) 259.239 2.42 
1978 5886.70 1350.42 13237.12 220.613 (3.75) 108.755 (1.48) 329.368 2.49 
1979 7894.1\ 11140.69 19034.80 220.613 (2.811 181.699 (1.63) 403.446 2.12 
1980 10787.46 12958.94 23746.40 253.419 (2.35) 216.542 (1.67) 469.961 1.98 
1981 1\439.63 1\657.04 23096.67 214.189 (2.40) 88.220 (0.161 362.409 1.57 
1982 12480.23 12086.53 24566.76 277.582 (2.221 110.540 (0.911 388.122 1.58 
1983 13241.94 14091.62 27333.56 269.555 (2.04) 156.242 (I. \1) 426.397 1.56 
1984 14158.14 16618.17 30776.31 285.219 (2. Oil 165.242 (0.991 450.460 1.46 
'ocre, : Ytilr6001 of l.t,rl.tiolill Ir.d. StatistiCS, 8lite~ ~.tiols (,.,iols ".rs) 
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ribl, 4.161 P~ilip,intl' rolil Tradt in' Trade wilh Chini (in US. "illions) 
'Iports Exporls Tolal 'Iporh Exports Tolal Percenlagt 
(I) fro. CUna to CUna (2) (21ll 
1972 1229.6 1159.5 2389.1 2.305 (0. t9l 0.835 (0.07) 3.140 0.13 
1973 1590.5 1797.9 3388.4 24.267 ((.m 6.571 (G.40) 30.838 0.91 
1974 3143.3 2677.0 5820.3 27.005 (0.B6) 13.307 (0.50) 40.312 0.69 
1975 3766.2 2294.5 6070.7 50.687 <I.m 20.183 (0.88) 70.870 1.17 
1976 3953.3 2573.7 6527.0 56.511 <1.431 35.708 (1.39) 92.279 1.41 
1977 4269.8 3150.9 7420.7 83.153 <I.m 106.375 (3.38) 189.528 2.55 
1978 4732.2 3424.9 8157.1 117.850 (2.491 47.458 <1.39) 165.308 2.03 
1m 6612.9 4601.2 11214.1 127.216 (1.92) 51.464 <1.12) 178.680 1.59 
1980 7726.9 5787.8 13514.7 221.094 (2.86) 44.986 (0.78) 268.080 1.97 
1981 7!45.7 5722.2 13667.9 209.901 (2.64) 78.225 (J. 371 288.126 2.11 
1982 8255.3 S020.6 13275.9 222.702 (2.30) 105.205 (2.10) 327.907 2.47 
1983 7m.S 5005.3 12984.8 128.979 (1.62) 29.392 (0.591 158.371 1.22 
1984 6051.2 5321.6 11372.8 230.228 (3.80) 57.494 (J. OBI 287.722 2.53 
1985 5261.0 4543.5 9804.5 291.782 (5.55) 75.640 (J .66) 367.422 3.75 
1986 5394.3 4841.8 10236.1 122.431 (2.27> 104.689 (2.16) 227.120 2.22 
SorrcI : Y,.r600t of l,terl.tiol.' Ir.lt Statistics, Sli/el Hatiols (,ariols ,ears) 
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Table 4.17: Singapore's Total Trade and Trade wilb C.lna (in US. "illions) 
'Iporls Exports Total 11ports Exports Tohl Percentage 
(1) trol China to Chn. (2) (2(1l 
1972 3433.69 2213.64 5647.32 141.531 (4.12) 20.365 (0.921 161.896 2.87 
1973 5130.33 3651. 87 8782.20 232.221 (4.53) 52.036 !I.42> 284.257 3.24 
1974 8373.94 5804.37 14179.21 263.319 (3. J4) 51.427 (0.99) 314.745 2.22 
1m 8093.40 5358.36 13451.76 287. ~5 (3.56) 41.511 (0. m 329.416 2.45 
1976 8961.60 6506.40 15468.00 266.769 (3.21) 38.633 (0.59> 305.402 1.97 
1977 10464.43 8236.90 18701.33 275.067 (2.63) 59.348 (0.72> 355.117 1.79 
1979 13024.44 10113.84 23138.28 341.853 (2.62) 57.602 (0.57> 399.455 1.73 
1m 17641. 92 14232.40 31874.32 411. 403 (2.33) 170.015 (1.19) 581.418 1.82 
1980 23726.07 19482.91 . 43208.89 622.753 (2.62) 301.533 (1.58) 930.286 2.15 
1981 21412.75 20816.11 48229.52 711.412 (2.81) 118.598 (0.86) 950.070 1.97 
1982 28315.15 2O~2.31 49201.46 819.471 (3.11) 241.501 (1.03) 1120.918 2.28 
1983 21966.88 21692.85 49659.73 826.785 (2.96) 212.783 (0.98) 1039.568 2.09 
1984 28732.98 24129.80 52862.18 1353.129 (4.]1l 243.851 (1.01) 1596.980 3.02 
1985 26017.65 22584.60 48602.25 2260.320 (8.69) 332.409 (1.41l 2592.729 5.33 
1986 25550.70 25533.56 51084.26 1428.211 (5.59> 571.113 (2.24) 1999.324 3.91 
So.rc, : YI.rboat of 1.lfr •• tio •• 1 Tr.d, St.tistics, U.it,d •• tio.s, (v.rio.s ".rs) 
2Q 2 
Table 4.18: Thiil<lnd's Told TTde and Tude witb China in US. "illion 
IIporh Exports Tohl 'Iports Exports Total Percentage 
(I) frol China to Chn. (2) (211) 
1974 3138.11 2462.01 5600.12 4.529 (O.W 0.112 (negl.) 4.641 0.08 
1975 3274.46 2373.46 5648.41 16.877 (0.52) 19.203 (0.01) 36.080 0.64 
1976 3570.97 2979.05 6550.02 71.670 (2.01) 62.058 (2.08) 133.148 2.04 
1m 4614.67 3488.70 8103.37 67.188 !I.46) 102.040 (2.921 169.228 2.09 
1978 5336.05 4070.19 9406.24 83.793 !I. 57) 73.656 !I.81) 157.449 1.67 
1979 7161.89 5300.77 12462.66 241.889 (3.38) 76.976 (1.45) 318.865 2.56 
1980 9487.28 6526.65 16013.93 416.778 (4.39) 123.603 !I.89) 540.381 3.37 
1981 9970.32 7038.05 17008.37 320.748 (3.22) 186.844 (2.65) 507.592 2.98 
1982 8454.49 6868.30 15322.53 233.657 (2.76) 306.649 (4.46) 540.306 3.53 
1983 10174.19 6298.34 16472.53 265.179 (2.61) 107.283 !I.70) 372.462 2.26 
1984 10296.51 7359.95 17656.46 319.824 (3.1Il 181.693 (2.471 501.517 2.84 
1985 9293.25 7154.51 16447.76 223.501 (2.40) 271.332 (3. m 494.833 3.01 
Soarer : Year~oot of lttert.tiotal Tr.~t St.tistirs, Utited .Itiots, ('Iriols ,firs) 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
For more than a century, the theme of modernisation has 
dominated the Chinese political scene. The beginning of 
modernisation in China in the second half of the nineteenth 
century created ce,nditions which alle,wed political leaderships, · 
including the Communists to further the process of modernisation. 
The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) leadership is not a 
me,nolithic entity. DUl'"ing its stl'"uggle for powel'" against the 
Kue'mintang, the CCP was able to submerge val'"ious differences in 
the face cof a common enemy. Hc,wevel'", after achieving powel'" and 
setting itself upon the tasks of constl'"uction, the strains 
imposed by the model'"nisation process undel'"mined the unity of the 
leadership. The ups and downs, twists and turns in the Chinese 
political scene since the CCP came to pc,wer were essentially a 
result of the differences in opinions on the strategies and 
tactics to be adopted by China in its development. Diffel'"ences 
over the l'"ight path of modernisatic,n intel'"acted with personal 
conflicts and power struggle to manifest itself as the pel'"iodic 
swings in Chinese domestic politics. 
The shifts in domestic politics in tUl'"n had its impact on 
China's foreign policy. 
of the principles and 
Chinese foreign policy consists not only 
practices govel'"ning its relations with 
other countries; in cel'"tain respects it also reflects the way the 
Chinese leadership govel'"ns and contl'"ols its own people. Fol'" 
instance, dUl'"ing the Cultural Revolution, China's apPl'"oach to the 
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outside world primarily reflected domestic ideological and 
political priorities ' rather than any coherent foreign policy 
strategy. The obsession with ideology and the virtual deification 
of Mao led to extreme revolutionary militancy towards the outside 
world. The export of Maoism was championed by the radicals. The 
image that China projected was of a nation seized by irrational 
extremism, exhibiting an intense xenophobic isolationism and 
almost totally uninterested in normal relations with the outside 
world (Barnett, 1974:271-2). 
However, as noted in earlier chapters, Chinese foreign 
poli cy is also often 
international arena. This 
tends to conceptualise 
influenced by developments 
is 
its 
especially significant 
foreign policy from 
in the 
as China 
a global 
perspective. It is especially sensitive to the policies pursued 
by the two superpowers. For e ~(ample, China regards its conflict 
with Vietnam as a microcosm of a global struggle against Soviet 
expansionism (Levine, 1984:110). 
There is no consensus as to which factors - international or 
domestic - are more important at any given time in determining 
the course of Chinese foreign policy. But there is no doubt that 
China's foreign relations cannot be fully understood without 
reference to its domestic affairs. In large part, of course, 
foreign policies reflect chalienges 
internationa'l arena. Every country 
and opportunities in 
must be sensitive 
the 
to 
development beyond its border. But 
level of economic deveie.pment, 
domestic factors such as the 
the success of 
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programmes, the emergence of new leaders and the attitudes of the 
leaders and the populace towards the outside world combine with 
international circumstances to create a naticon's foreign ·policy 
(Lieberthal, 1'384:43). 
Beijing's foreign pe.licy appeared to be infl'-lenced by a 
long-standing domestic controversy over the desirability of 
transforming China through extensive contacts with foreign 
societies. While some Chinese leaders have been willing to 
promote the all-round modernisation of their country through the 
import of foreign technology and even institutions, others have 
sought to preserve what they regard as the purity of Chinese 
cultural (communist?) values by restricting China's links abroad 
(Oxnam and Harding, 1986: viii -i~d. 
Deng's economic modernisation strategy proposed in 1978 was 
a package of domestic and foreign policies. Its modernisation 
strategy was based on the belief that modernisation would be best 
carried out with some form of external assistance and increased 
economic interactie.ns with as many cOltntyies as possible. This 
had led to increased foreign tYiade, increased ·import of advanced 
techne.logy, the extensive use of foreign loans and investments 
and establishment of a wide range of new inteynational economic 
relationships. These new foreign economic policies were, of 
couyse, closely linked to a set of sweeping domestic ecc.nomic 
reforms as discussed in Chapter Two. 
While economic modernisation is the general mission of this 
new historical period, and there is no reason to doubt the wish 
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of the leadership to make changes, differences concerning its 
scope, corresponding changes in values, institutions and its 
actual implementation continlle to exist. The basic theme of all 
Chinese modernisers from as lcong ago as the Sel f -Strengthening 
Movement of 1860 was revived. Can China preserve its values while 
adopting foreign techniques? 
In the present leadership, two major factions exist. While 
both factions agreed on the importance of economic development, 
they disagreed about the degree tco which foreigners should be 
allowed to penetrate China, and 
the political system should be 
thus. about the degree to whi ch 
changed to facilitate China's 
interaction with the international ccommuni ty. The conservative 
group accepted the importance of importing technology and 
expanding foreign trade, but opposed any major institutional and 
political changes. These people like the scholar official class 
cof China in the late nineteenth century still believed in the 
superiority of the Chinese culture and institutions. The reform 
group not only stressed the importance of importing foreign 
technology, but were also more willing to modify the country's 
institutional structure and practices in order to achieve 
modernisation (Lieberthal, 1984:55-66). 
As the reforms proceeded and created new problems, groups or 
facticons adversely affected by the · reform programme began to 
mobilise in opposition. Thus significant tensions about the best 
way tco modernisation continued to trcouble China. Qllesticons sllch 
as how much should China reform its political system in order to 
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spur economic growth; how much foreign influence should be 
permitted in the country economically and in the social, 
political and ideologi cal arenas: remained contro\lersial. The 
oppe.si tion to refe.rms were manifested in such mO\lements as the 
campaign against spiritual pollution, campaign against bourgeois 
liberalisation and so forth. The latest conflict between the two 
different factions concerned the handling of the students' 
pre.test me.\lements sparked off by Hu Yac.bang's death in April 
198'3. 
The decision to crack down on the students' protest 
c1Jlminating yO the Tian An Men incident on 4 June 19'30 pointed to 
the temporary triumph of the conser\lati\le group in the lead~rship 
who were not in fa\lour of political reforms. Although a return to 
extreme nati\lism and isolationism would be unlikely, the Chinese 
leadership has after the Tian An Men incident placed greater 
restr i ctions on China's contacts wi th the West. The pace of 
economic reforms has also been slowed down considerably. 
Howe\ler, the eagerness of the present Chinese leadership to 
get on to the tasks of economic modernisation by resuming norm~l 
economic relations with the West and Japan after the Tian An Men 
incident also pointed to the difficulties in re\lersing the 
economi c reform programmes enti reI y. The econe.mi c reform pol i cy 
has generated its own momentum. It has also created pockets of 
people who benefitted from the policies and i thus not willing to 
gi\le up without a fight. Hence, the reforms cc.uld not be easily 
re\lersed in spite of temporary setbacks. 
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But even then, China's capacity to modernise appeared 
limited. This is due not so much to the subjective wishes of the 
leadership but to the massive problems, both new and e.ld that 
existed. Problems such as · shortage of well-educated, technically 
competent personnel, the undel'"development of the scientific and 
educational establishments, limited energy resources and so 
fOl'"th, continued to plague the countl'"Y. Worse c.f all, after a 
decade of tllrmoi 1 dllr ing the Cultul'"al Revolution, many 
bUI'"~aucrats had learnt that the way to survive was to be 
outwardly compliant while in fact nevel'" working hard to implement 
any pal'"ticular set of policies. What they had seen and heard and 
their own experience showed them that policies wel'"e likely to be 
reversed with serious consequences for those who had become 
identified with them (Lieberthal, 1'384:58). The crack deown and 
the new restrictions aftel'" the Tian An Men incident in June 1989 
only served to further reinforce this perception that the better 
pal'"t eof valour was not to make decisions for which one might be 
held acceountable when the peolitical line changed. Thus the 
millie.ns of middle and lower level bureaucrats throllgh their 
apathy, indiffel'"ence, skepticism or oppc.sition can sabotage the 
best hopes and desires of the top leadership to implement any 
changes. 
Many o~ the problems related to modernisation were actually 
manifestations of the objective character of the regime - a I'"igid 
ce.mmllnist regime which wanted to maintain a tight control ovel'" 
its population while pursuing economic modernisation. At the same 
time, the intense battles of the Cultural Revolution el'"a had 
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introduced a self-protective factionalism that has remained 
strong in 
bureaucracies. 
the ruling party, 
This factionalism 
government and 
meant a sustained, 
military 
llni f ied 
commitment to any programme was difficult to generate, "as each 
faction bent some of its efforts towards looking for faults and 
vulnerabilities in whatever programme the other faction put 
forward. China under communism has already passed its golden age 
of development as revolutionary fervour waned. Aptly put by 
Professor S.A.M Adshead (Adshead, 1989:8), "Chinese communism can 
no longer provide inspiration for modernisation, yet it prevents 
the emergence of any other source. Communism at one time appeared 
to be China's answer to modernisatie.n. Now it seems more like 
China's avoidance of modernisation". 
In external relations, China will remain ambivalent about 
its ties with the outside world. The international system will 
continue to be regarded both as a source of valuable technology 
and capital and as a se.urce of ideas and val lies that sllbvert 
China's established political and cultural order. As a result of 
this conflict, the cyclical pattern of engagement and isolation 
that characterised the "first thirty years of the People's 
Republic of China is likely to continue. We may well see periods 
in which the restrictions on the range and scope of contacts 
between Chinese and foreigners are relaxed followed by periods in 
which the same ce.nstra"ints are tightened. And as in the past, 
this process is closely linked to an ongoing political struggle 
between those who seel; to. modernise China by liberalising its 
political and economic institutions and th.:.se who believe t~,at 
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China will fall into disorder and instability unless firm 
political control is maintained (Harding, 1984: 215) . 
While theye is no de.ubt that differences e>;isted in the 
leadership with regards to the economic modernis~tion pr6grammes 
with significant tensions about the best way to proceed and the 
scope of reform, the modernisatie.n process has still managed to 
bring abe.ut some significant changes to the Chinese economy in 
the last ten years from 1978 to 1988. 
In the economic arena, decollectivisation was carried out in 
the rural sector. The collective system - a predominant feature 
of the agriculture sector for over two decades 
yeplaced by the household responsibility system. 
In the industrial se c ten", r-efor-ms 
was largely 
enterprise 
management, taxation, finance, priCing, employment and wages. The 
most significant aspect of the modernisation which has a direct 
bearing on China's participation in the international system and 
its relations with the outside we.rld was the change in its 
orientation towards foreign economic relations. The so-called 
"Open Door Policy", a vital part of ~he programme for modernising 
the economy_" signalled China's willingness to participate mOI'e 
actively in the world market. 
How has this change in China's foreign economic orientation 
affected China's relations with its ASEAN neighbours and what has 
been the impact? Will China become more nationalistic and 
assertive in its dealings with its ASEAN neighbours with regards 
te. le.ng-standing claims over the Spratly Islands in the South 
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Chi~a Sea and the presence of large number of overseas Chinese in 
ASEAN countries. What about its links with the outlawed Communist 
parties of the ASEAN countries? 
Southeast Asia is one of the most ~mportant subredions in 
Asia from China's perspective. By virtue of its geographical 
locatic.n and historical asse.ciation China has the most direct 
interest in the pattern of power within the Southeast Asian 
region. Indeed security concerns have dominated China's agenda in 
this area. Conversely, the ASEAN countries have reasons to be 
watchful of events in China and to follow closely the changes in 
China's internal and foreign policies. Although China's influence 
in the region's politics waned from time to time, depending upon 
the nature and degree of its involvement in external affairs, its 
role could not be ignored. 
China's role in the Southeast Asian region are influenced by 
two main factors, its threat perception and perceived changes 
with regards to the global balanc~ of power in general and the 
regional balance of power in particular, and the various internal 
changes (economic, political and social) taking place in China at 
that point of time (Yahuda, 1983:3). 
It would be surprising if the dramatic changes in China 
after Mao's death failed to produce any repercussions in the 
regional scene. As it is, since the ' adoption of the modernisation 
programmes in 1978, Chinese leaders had frequently declared their 
interest in ensuring a stable, tranquil international environment 
o;Is the best setting for its domestic economic development. The 
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Beijing leaders had placed priority in its foreign and security 
policies on securing a stable environment in Asia that would 
allow internal economic modernisation to proceed smoothly. 
Jonathan Pollack believes that China's modernisatic·n 
prospects hinged on several key considerations: diministling 
direct Soviet pressure against China, thereby making defence 
needs less imperative; devising a credible, consistent basis for 
heightened economic and technc.le.gical exchanges with the West; 
and creating a stable and peaceful environment that would be 
congruent with orderly economic development. Pollack also raises 
the possibility that the demands of domestic modernisation will 
lead China to try to disengage itself from the global competition 
between the US and the Soviet Unie.n (Pollack, 1'384: 158). And 
indeed, for the past ten years, we did see the above principles 
being put into concrete policies by the Chinese government. 
Even though for the past decade China had become an active 
participant in the international political system and had emerged 
as a stabi 1 ising infl uence in East Asia, the ASEAN co:::.untr- ies 
still looked at China with ambivalence. Ambivalence towards China 
will always be present because China is a big cOLlntry situated in 
ASEAN's immediate neighbourhood. China elicits feelings of 
suspicions because of historical circLlmstances and its espousal 
of a revolutionary ideology. Over the past de~ades before China's 
pursuit of the e.pen de.or policy, Beijing had been a SQurce e·f 
inspiratic'n and training fc.r le.cal communist gre".lps. This legacy 
of slJspicion is difficult tc. ·:.vercome. For these small ASEAN 
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states, history, ideology, race and geography make China a Middle 
Kingdom that will not go away. 
There is no reason to doubt Beijing's assertion that China's 
. . . 
modernisatie,n reql..li res stable international and regional 
environments. But as noted in Chapter Three, the changing 
strategic environment appeared to be a more important factor in 
conditioning China's policy towards the ASEAN countries. 
Indeed since China's rapprochement with the United States in 
1972, and especially in recent years, China has viewed relations 
with its Asian neighbours, ASEAN included, through an anti-Soviet 
prism. The reunification of Vietnam in 1975 brought little joy to 
the Chinese as Vietnam moved closer to Soviet Union and sought to 
exert its influence over Inde,china. In response to these 
developments, China accelerated the normal isatic:on of its 
relations with the ASEAN states. 
In return, the ASEAN governments also sought to hedge 
against some of the future uncertainties posed by a reunified 
Vietnam by improving relations with China. The overriding factor 
governing the Chinese olltlook fe,r the Southeast Asian region 
since 1975 has been the strategic concern about the increasingly 
formidable challenge by an embolden Hanoi supported by an eager 
Soviet Union. The Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea 
in 1978 further accentuated the Sino-Vietnam conflict and 
increased China's fear of Soviet Unie,n as the latter gained a 
permanent foothold in the region when Vietnam allowed Soviet 
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forces to use the Cam Ranh Bay and Danang military bases 
(Thambipill.ai, 1988: 119-120), 
Chin.a had capitalised on ASEAN's fear Vietnam's 
hegemonist designs in Southeast Asia by extending its approbation 
to the ASEAN cc,untries, and even giving Thailand the assurance 
that it we,uld come to the latter's aid should Vietnam invade 
Thailand. 
Thus, we see that significant changes in the Asian politico-
strategic environment the American defeat in Indochina; the 
emergence of a powerful unified Vietnam and the intensification 
of Sino-Soviet riv.alry in Southe.ast Asi.a - pointed Beijing in the 
direction of downplaying its ties with the outlawed ASEAN 
communist parties in fave,ur of establishin9 official ties with 
ASEAN st.ates. The ASEAN states were in turn more receptive to the 
PRC heretofore. 
Though strategic reason was the main force behind the change 
in China's policy towards the ASEAN countries, the domestic 
ascendancy in Chin.a of pragmatic le.aders such.as Deng Xiaoping, 
Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang - who had opened their doors to the 
capitalist West, American and Japanese governments and business 
gre'llps had accelerated the process whereby China distanced 
itself from Communist parties in Asia. China's pursuit of 
economic modernisation based on increaSing links with the 
capitalist countries also greatly reduced its appeal as a 
revolutionary model. Whether in the realm of ideology or 
development, China was no longer an attractive model (Levine, 
1984: 135-7). 
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In constructing its Asian policy around the concept of anti-
Sc,vietism, China has adopted a very different vocabulary from 
that emple,yed in its c'::lnfrontation with the United States in 
earlier decades. The revolutionary rhetoric of the earlie~ period 
was less suited to the task of dealing with the USSR, which was, 
after all, a Communist state that trumpeted its commitment te, 
suppc'rting revolutions. Instead, China has had to appear as a 
respc'nsible member of the international system pre,moting 
stability and order. The realignment with the US in the 1970s and 
the changing regional balance of power produced a sea change in 
China's orientation in Asia. China became more responsive to 
geopolitical realities than to revolutionary aspirations and to 
the Viewpoints of governments in power than to rebels in 
opposition. Thus Beijing's rhetoric c,f revolutic,nary diplomacy 
yielded to the language and logic of realpolitik. And in concrete 
policies, support for the communist insurgencies in these 
countries declined (Levine, 1984:124-5). 
With regards to the overseas Chinese, ASEAN cou~tries, 
especially Malaysia and Indonesia have treated it as an important 
issue concerning its relations with China. For China, the 
protection of the interests and rights of overseas Chinese had 
never really been a top priority in China's foreign policy. 
Again, China's policy towards the overseas Chinese must be seen 
in the context of its national security. Concern over the 
c,verseas Chinese was expressed only when it coincided with the 
higher priorities of China in matters c,f national security and 
economic development. 
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A study on China's policy towards the overseas Chinese done 
by Leo Suryadinata (Suryadinata, 1985:34-58) showed that when the 
policy of protecting overseas Chinese conflicted with other major 
goals such as national sec1.lrity and territorial integrity, the 
latter prevailed. Leo Suryadinata cited three case stUdies to 
prove this paint. 
The first case was that of Indonesia. In the early l'350s, 
Indonesia was China's only non-communist friend in Southeast 
Asia. It represented China's c,nly success in breaking out of US 
encirclement. Eager to continue this good relationship with 
Indonesia which was seen as important for China in its conflict 
with the US then, China stopped its criticisms of Sukarno's 
discriminatory policy against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia 
when these criticisms threatened to strain the Sino-Indonesian 
relations. 
And again, in the 1970s, in its conflict with the Soviet 
Union (which has become China'S number one enemy) and its ally 
Vietnam in the Indochina Peninsula, China's only ally was 
Kamp~lchea. China failed to do anything abol~t the plight cof the 
Kampuchean Chinese who were persecuted under the Pol Pot regime 
because the maintenance of good ties with the Pol Pot government 
was seen as more important for China's national security than the 
protection of the rights and intere~ts of the overseas Chinese. 
In contrast, in 1978, China made a big issue out of 
Vietnam's purge and forceful resettlement of the Vietnamese 
Chinese in the New Economic Zones. This could be understood when 
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we see it as part and parcel of China's conflict with Vietnam. 
which in turn was a ... eflection of the latter's fea ... e,f the 
expansion of Soviet·s powe ... into the Southeast Asian ... egion which 
could then threaten China's national security. 
In ... ecent yea ... s the ... ellival c,f China's interest in the 
Chinese ab ... oad was linked to China's domestic econclmic 
modernisation p ... ogramme. The goal of economic modernisation was 
the most important mission of the past decade. In this connection 
the need for capi~al. professional and entrepreneurial skills was 
utmost in the minds of the Chinese leadership when it called upon 
all overseas Chinese to contribute to the modernisation of China. 
The wooing of the ethnic Chinese had caused unhappiness to some 
ASEAN gove ... nments. Howelle .... the t ... uth is that Beijing by no means 
has the whip hand on the olle ... seas Chinese in Southeast Asia. The 
inte ... nal consolidation of the ASEAN states. the Southeast 
Asianisation process of the Chinese in these count ... ielS and the 
unattractiveness of China's ideology and development model all 
wc'rked against the possibility of the ethnic Chinese in ASEAN 
being manipulated by China for its own gain. 
The resurgence of China's interest in the Sp ... atly islands 
alse, appeared to be related to China's economic modernisation. 
The search for more oil sources was a strong motivation for China 
to take contrete actions to stake its claims over the Spratlies. 
Military modernisation for the past ten years provided China with 
the means to stake its claims before it·s too late. China's 
fledging blue-water Southern Fleet had been sent to the vicinity 
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of U,e Spratly islands on a mc,re regular basis since the mid-
1'380s. 
In maintaining a higher profile in the South China Sea, the 
Chinese had also taken pains not to alarm the ASEAN countries and 
reassured them that China would seek a peaceful settlement on any 
conflicting claims between them. This continued reaSSllrance was 
gi ven probabl y because ASEAN's support on the Kampuchean issue 
was still perceived as important to China in its conflict with 
the Soviet - Vietnamese clique. In the few clashes with Vietnam in 
the vicinity of the Spratly islands, China h~d tried to portray 
Vietnam as the "provoker" of these clashes. 
However, even with China's reassurances, the ASEAN countries 
remained fearful that the conflicting claims over the Spratlies 
would lead to the heightening of tensions in the South China Sea 
and threaten ASEAN's security and the immediate interests of some 
of the ASEAN countries. 
While the impact of China's economic modernisation on 
ASEAN's security is indirect, one would expect a more direct link 
between China's economic modernisation and its economic relations 
with the ASEAN countries. Indeed Sino-ASEAN economic relations in 
general and China's economic ties with the individual ASEAN 
countries had shown a marked improvement. The absolute volume and 
value of trade between China and the ASEAN countries had 
increased tremendously for the past ten years. And the economic 
ties had also expanded to include other areas such as mutual 
investments and the exchange of scientific and technological 
knowledge. 
Howevey, in yeal value, China' s tyade with and investments 
in the ASEAN countYies remained relatively small and hence the 
impact was inSignificant. Political factors also had an influence 
on the extension of ASEAN's economic ties with China too. 
Unresol ved pol i ti ca I issues such as the issue over the ethni c 
Chinese had affected the further development of ecc1nomic 
relations between China and some ASEAN countries. The deep 
suspicions against China because of history and race and the 
internal politics of the country concerned had impeded moves by 
countries such as Indonesia to seek closer ties, whether 
political or economic. 
But a more important reason behind the less than pc,sitive 
economic impact of China's modernisation on the ASEAN countries, 
except Singapore, was that both were developing economies heavily 
dependent on the advanced capitalist countries. They competed in 
the markets of these countries and they competed foy investments 
and loans from these economies. The ASEAN countYies have nc,t 
weaned themselves away from the over-reliance on the advanced 
capitalist economies. 
Similayly, except for Singa~ore, the rest of the ASEAN 
countries were not major trading partneys of China or big 
investors in China. Their contribution towards China's economic 
me,dernisation was also quite minimal. 
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In summary, we see that both international strategic factor 
(especially the changing balance of power in Southeast Asia) and 
domestic factor (emphasis on economic modernisation) has affected 
China's policy towards ASEAN countries. It is difficult for us to 
determine the real extent of the impact of China's modernisation 
on ASEAN because at the time when China launched its 
modernisation programmes, the strategic situation in Southeast 
Asia was also undergoing significant changes such as the 
emergence c,f a strong Vietnam that is friendly with the Soviet 
Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and its design to set up an 
Indochina Federation also raised the fear, amongst ASEAN states, 
especially Thailand, of Vietnam. The common desire to check 
further expansionist designs by Vietnam was an objective shared 
by both China and ASEAN. The convergence of interest on t his 
issue was an important factor that brought China and ASEAN 
closer than they would normally do. In its bid to win ASEAN over 
to its side, China was more responsive to issues that were 
sensitive to ASEAN countries. Also to contrast itself favourably 
against Vietnam, and to portray Vietnam asa greater threat to 
ASEAN's security, China acted like a benign, responsible power in 
this region, checking Vietnam's hegemonism and supporting ASEAN 
in its stance on the Kampuchean issue. 
Thus, on closer examination, it appeared that Chinese 
foreign policy towards the ASEAN countries is basically reactive 
to a perceived threat from external sources. China has been 
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preocCllpied with the sllperpc,wers and with the smaller countries 
in Asia being used by the superpo::,wers against China. Chinese 
policy towards ASEAN has been mainly a function of Chinese policy 
tc,wards the superpowers. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, 
when China's arch foe was US, it was also hostile to countries 
like Thailand and Ph iii ppi nes who fo 11 owed US policy of 
containing China, and also the other ASEAN countries who were 
friendly towards US. Then in the 1970s, following China's detente 
with the US, Soviet Union became China's number one enemy. China 
began to pursue better relations with the ASEAN countries, 
friends of the US, and who also have reasons to be wary of USSR. 
Though domestic factors also had some impact on policy choices, 
it seemed that external factors were more crucial and important 
determinants of Chinese foreign policy towards the ASEAN states 
(Chang, 1'388:220), The economic modernisation policy, however, 
served as an additional incentive for China to improve its 
relations with the ASEAN countries, and the Sino-ASEAN economic 
relatic,ns that developed might help to pave the way for better 
relations. 
Generally speaking, China's pc,licies in Southeast Asia for 
the past decade from 1978 to 1988 were consistent with the post-
Mao dc,mestic policies of establishing a stable political 
environment and promoting eCQnomic development alc,ng pragmatic 
lines. Aft.r all, a stable poli~ical environment would also 
enhance Chi~a's national security. Policies to facilitate China's 
participaticon in the ir:lternational economy and to convey the 
image of a responsible PQwer were pursued. For the ASEAN 
countries, a China that did not feel threatened and insecu r e and 
fully preoccupied with the tasks of orderly domestic economic 
development, had contributed to the region's stability to a 
certain degree. 
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